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Foreword (2013) 
 
 
In my Foreword to the first printing of Dennis Young’s splendid book, thirty years ago, 
I wrote that, although “[t]his country has, since its early days, relied on voluntary 
nonprofit institutions to carry out a wide range of important social and economic tasks,” 
the nonprofit sector “faces new and more urgent demands for services that “have 
become more difficult to provide in the face of inflationary pressures, 
reduced...endowment returns, and…dramatic government retrenchment.” Both parts of 
this dichotomy have escalated in recent decades.  The demands on the nonprofit sector 
have increased in a society that seeks to provide a larger and more complicated set of 
services to its citizenry, and the difficulty of providing these services has increased in 
the face of fiscal retrenchment and of reduced charitable giving capacity for much of the 
donor base.  Accordingly, it is more important than ever to address the central questions 
that Professor Young’s book tackled. These questions – to quote from my earlier 
introduction – include:  “What functions should the nonprofit sector take on, expand, 
reduce or abandon – in other words, what is an efficient, equitable and otherwise 
appropriate division of labor among the nonprofit, governmental and for-profit sectors 
of our society?” And: “What avenues lead to increased financial and programmatic 
effectiveness for nonprofit organizations, and how can such effectiveness be measured 
in the absence of a conventional market or ballot bottom line?”  Indeed, these questions 
have to be expanded and reformulated in the face of the more complicated sectoral 
picture today, where the nonprofit sector increasingly takes on for-profit activities 
and/or works in concert – sometimes in organizational combination – with for-profits 
and government bodies of various kinds.   
That does not mean that Professor Young has to play catch-up.  Indeed, he has 
already more than caught up! For his 1983 book tackled a large and complicated array of 
issues that transcended the simple two-part dichotomy I offered in the introduction to 
the earlier edition. Looking over the wide and complicated array of behavioral questions 
that Professor Young has presented, and so thoroughly addressed, in the body of this 
book – the 11 analytically detailed and rigorous chapters – one realizes that Professor 
Young has tackled an astonishingly broad (and complex) set of questions and data that 
reach every conceivable dimension of entrepreneurship in the nonprofit sector – and, 
indeed, entrepreneurship across all sectoral boundaries. At the same time, he has helped 
us to think about the difficult policy dilemmas we continue to face – e.g., should 
regulatory and tax policies encourage organizations such as funeral homes, nursing 
homes, and hospitals to organize as non-profits – or as for-profits – or as some combined 
organizational form?    
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It is this set of explorations that in 1983 made – and still makes – Professor 
Young himself an enormously important entrepreneur – an entrepreneur of inquiry and 
analysis and scholarship about a hugely important – and internationally unique – sector 
of American economic and social life. 
 
 
John G. Simon  
Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale Law School 
Preface (2013) 
 
 
At our annual executive round table program in the Nonprofit Studies Program of 
Georgia State University this year, our keynote speaker, Prof. Greg Dees, was kind 
enough to cite my work, as set forth in the 1983 edition of this book, as a seminal 
contribution to the study of social entrepreneurship.  If only I had called it “social” 
entrepreneurship rather than “nonprofit” entrepreneurship, Greg mused, I would now be 
universally recognized as the source of this now omnipresent terminology and field of 
study.  Much as I was flattered by Greg’s generous remark, I also began to think about 
its accuracy and the juxtaposition of social entrepreneurship with the original 
orientation and purpose of the book. 
As stated in the original Preface, the primary purpose of the book was “to 
develop the rudiments of a theory of behavior of nonprofit organizations…”  Up to that 
point in time, the theory of nonprofits was based on understanding the “demand” for 
services of nonprofit organizations, principally as nongovernmental providers of public 
goods as developed by Burton Weisbrod, and as providers of “trust goods” where 
asymmetric information led consumers to prefer nonprofits over less trustworthy 
for-profit providers, as developed by Henry Hansmann.  Lester Salamon later 
contributed a third leg to the demand side by explaining government’s demand for 
financing nonprofits to produce public goods, in his theory of third party government.  
By contrast, I was attempting to fill in the supply side by asking the question:  if such 
demand existed, where did the supply come from, what was its character, and what were 
the forces and motivations behind such supply?  This led me to focus on entrepreneurs 
as the source of supply, picking up on a suggestion contained in Hansmann’s original 
work. 
So how does this connect with Greg Dees’s perception that I essentially 
discovered social entrepreneurship?  First, I actually focused on entrepreneurship as a 
generic phenomenon not necessarily confined to the business sector.  There was 
discussion in the entrepreneurship literature about this as well, by McClelland and 
others.  So I wasn’t out to identify a new type of entrepreneur so much as to indicate 
that entrepreneurship was just as important to nonprofits as for-profits.  But yes, I was 
also saying that there was such a thing as a nonprofit entrepreneur.  I did not use the 
term social entrepreneur, but I suspect that if I were to write this book in the 
contemporary environment, I would have to consider such a term, because we now have 
so many more avenues for socially minded entrepreneurs to do their work – not only via 
nonprofit organizations but also through numerous variants of social and hybrid 
businesses, social cooperatives, and so on. 
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Additionally, when I wrote the book I wasn’t out to create or describe a new 
occupation or career path.  However, I did recognize the importance of 
entrepreneurship as a key element of nonprofit management and leadership, and this 
certainly influenced my subsequent research and teaching in this field.  Schools of 
business and management were slow to embrace the broader study of entrepreneurship 
as I had laid it out, and they were not particularly quick to incorporate nonprofits into 
their management education agendas.  But this all changed in the late 1990s and early 
parts of this millennium as the business sector began to appreciate the strategic 
importance of socially responsible behavior, as students pressed for more meaningful 
career paths outside the sometimes sullied fields of high finance and giant 
multi-national corporations, as new millionaires and billionaires began to look outside 
traditional philanthropy for their “social investments,” and as a new generation of 
entrepreneurs began to demonstrate its power and creativity to address social problems 
with innovative solutions.  Social entrepreneurship and its complementary 
phenomenon – social enterprise – thus became required, even popular fare for business 
school curricula and helped expand the more traditional, public administration-based 
curricula in nonprofit management, as well. 
Nonetheless, the question of whether entrepreneurship is really teachable 
remains.  The theory set forth in this book presumes a certain pool of latent 
entrepreneurial talent and motivation.  These days, entrepreneurship (especially social 
entrepreneurship) is very trendy but it remains questionable as to whether we should 
really be trying to encourage everyone to study social entrepreneurship or to become a 
social entrepreneur.  Dees and others now argue that we should pay more attention to 
the support structure to enable social entrepreneurs to be successful, in contrast to 
increasing the number of social entrepreneurs or helping them develop individual 
entrepreneurial skill sets.  Providing robust opportunities for entrepreneurial education 
is certainly helpful but it should also be discriminating and realistic.  Educational 
institutions should ensure that students with requisite talent and dedication are prepared 
for the challenges of the social sector while others are better advised to pursue 
alternative career paths.  This seems particularly true in the field of nonprofit studies 
where students often enter programs with the intent of establishing their own nonprofit 
organizations.  Given the rapidly growing numbers of these organizations and the 
increasingly limited resource base on which they depend, students need to learn about 
the alternatives to striking out on their own, such as working within established 
organizations in various capacities until they can discover how they can be most 
effective professionally and satisfied personally. Overemphasizing entrepreneurial 
careers through narrowly defined educational programming seems a potentially 
dangerous side effect of the growing proclivities of both business schools and public 
administration/nonprofit management programs to pile onto the bandwagon of social 
entrepreneurship. 
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While my book may have helped establish the notion of social entrepreneurship, 
I’m just as gratified by the impact it may have had on the study of supply side behavior 
in the nonprofit and wider social sector.  There is certainly much more attention now 
given to the multifaceted motivations of for-profit entrepreneurs and more skepticism 
about oversimplification of the objective functions of for-profit firms, especially small 
privately owned businesses.  And I believe there is now also greater appreciation for 
the diversity of motivations and styles that drive nonprofit organizations.  I’m pleased 
that the supply side has now been woven into the fabric of economic theory of 
nonprofits, nowhere more skillfully than by Richard Steinberg in the second edition of 
The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook in 2006.  We may never have a simple 
economic model of a nonprofit organization, similar to the profit-maximizing for-profit 
firm of classical micro-economic theory, but at least we now recognize that the interface 
of supply and demand is what ultimately determines the character of goods and services 
produced by the nonprofit sector.  And we also recognize the diversity among 
nonprofits themselves and the differences in output and performance between nonprofit 
and other kinds of organizations.  The notion, developed in my book, that entrepreneurs 
embody a wide variety of styles and motivations and that they can choose among sectors 
and organizational vehicles to best match their preferences with available alternatives, 
has provided some foundation to these new understandings. 
The reissue of this book has also given me the chance to reflect on some of the 
assumptions I made in carrying out my analysis and how they hold up thirty years later.  
There are several simplifications I made that should certainly be revisited in light of 
subsequent scholarship and contemporary developments.  One is the idea, still fairly 
prevalent, that entrepreneurship is a highly individualistic phenomenon that pivots on 
the strong leadership and personality characteristics of heroic entrepreneurs.  While my 
case studies book published two years later in 1985 – Casebook of Management for 
Nonprofit Organizations, which provided much of the empirical basis on which I built 
the analysis for this book – certainly identifies the strong personalities behind nonprofit 
ventures of various kinds, it also makes clear that entrepreneurship requires teamwork 
and often multiple personalities that complement the strengths and weaknesses of one 
another and those of the lead entrepreneur.  Recent works by Spear and others have 
begun to fill in this picture.  Still, to this day, I think that the teamwork aspect of 
entrepreneurship, especially social entrepreneurship, remains under appreciated and 
sparsely studied. 
A second idea in my analysis is that entrepreneurs can be classified into a variety 
of stereotypes according to style and motivation.  This was a convenient analytical 
device that allowed me to develop the concept of screening and sorting of behaviors into 
alternative sectors.  In reality, however, entrepreneurs are more complex and usually 
represent some combination of these (and perhaps other) stereotypes.  Going forward, 
it remains important to understand this, if only to take a more nuanced approach to the 
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study of contemporary social ventures.  Still, the sorting of entrepreneurs with different 
characteristics and proclivities into different fields and sectors, as suggested in recent 
reviews of social entrepreneurship (e.g.,  Zeyen et al,  Hoogendorn et al) remains an 
important area of research with implications for theory and practice.  For example, how 
does the sorting and selection process work now that there are so many more different 
types of hybrid organizational arrangements available for entrepreneurs to choose from?  
Alternatively, is the sorting process and the freedom of entrepreneurs to pursue ventures 
in their own ways becoming less important now, given the growing reliance on 
homogenizing measures such as performance metrics, accountability structures and 
market-based success criteria for social ventures? 
As a relevant aside, I was struck in rereading the book of my pervasive, 
anachronistic use of “he” as the pronoun referencing entrepreneurs.   This was, of 
course, the convention at the time.  Still, I wonder at this point whether my inattention 
to gender biased the specification of entrepreneurial styles and behaviors postulated in 
my theory.  I actually think it did not.  In fact, many of the cases I had in mind while 
developing my analysis involved female nonprofit entrepreneurs.  This was a 
bi-product of my focus on the nonprofit sector where employment and venture 
opportunities were more gender neutral than in other sectors.  And as the male/female 
ratio in the work force has come into greater balance over the past three decades in all 
sectors, I think we would find both genders well represented across the board in the 
spectrum of entrepreneurial types I originally specified. It may still be true that men and 
women should be characterized differently in terms of their proportional representation 
among alternative entrepreneurial types, but I am skeptical of the necessity of specifying 
any particularly male or female entrepreneurial subtypes. Still, continuing work on the 
taxonomy of entrepreneurs, social and otherwise, by Zhara et al and others continues to 
be productive to this day. 
It is notable that my analysis essentially broke the economy up into three basic 
sectors: government, business and nonprofit.  This represented progress at the time, 
since prior to the 1980s the existence of the nonprofit or third sector was hardly 
acknowledged in basic economic texts.  However, one constant theme in the literature 
since then has been the blurring of the sectors, discussed early on by scholars such as 
Ralph Kramer and more recently by David Billis and others. 
How would this blurring affect my analysis now?  Probably in complex ways.  
The existence of new forms of social business, corporate social responsibility programs 
in business corporations, social cooperatives, conglomerates of nonprofit and for-profit 
forms intermingled, and public-private-nonprofit partnerships all provide more choices 
for entrepreneurs. And as Dacin et al observe, these various forms require social 
entrepreneurs to work across sector boundaries with different institutional logics. So the 
sorting process is more nuanced and the possibilities for different kinds of resultant  
social and economic behaviors are so much more varied and subtle.   I think the basic 
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ideas of multivalent entrepreneurship and screening and sorting among sectors and 
industries still apply.  But the results of analysis may not be so simple. It is now less 
easy to say that clear behavioral distinctions apply to the three sectors.  I think they still 
do, but it is no longer a simple matter of distinguishing among three distinct sectors.  
Rather we need to account for the blurring and the more robust set of opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to sort themselves out among alternative organizational vehicles in an 
increasingly complex landscape. 
Finally, recent reviews of social entrepreneurship and nonprofit research have 
identified a few more interesting avenues of inquiry that, in retrospect at least, could 
have been tied into my original analysis.  First, as Zeyen et al suggest, there might be a 
tighter connection between the demand and supply theories than I originally stipulated.  
My analysis suggested that potential entrepreneurship talent and motivation is intrinsic, 
latent and relatively fixed in the work force and eventually manifests and reconciles 
itself with resources and opportunities created on the demand side of the market for 
public goods and services.  Some contemporary thinkers suggest that demand, arising 
from market failure, actually creates new entrepreneurial supply by forcing poorly 
served constituents to take action on their own. While this may be more of an academic 
nuance than a practical issue, further research on this point could have implications for 
how nonprofit and social enterprise supply is stimulated and cultivated, how social 
entrepreneurs are educated, and how social entrepreneurship is brought to bear on the 
solution of social problems. 
Another neglected issue in my analysis is the question of competition.  Are 
social entrepreneurs different from other entrepreneurs because they care more about 
social impacts versus personal rewards, which may require more collaboration than 
competition?   This question is raised by Zeyen et al in the context of how social 
enterprises grow to scale – and whether successful social entrepreneurs are more 
inclined to encourage imitation and replication rather than to protect and grow their own 
ventures.  It seems likely that the growth of nonprofits through federations and 
associations does fit this idea, providing an important window on appropriate social 
enterprise growth strategies.  If I were rewriting the book today, I think I would 
examine this question by asking about the competitive vs. collaborative inclinations of 
my various entrepreneurial stereotypes. 
In all, I am both perplexed and pleased that this book, overall, continues to be 
relevant, despite various anachronisms, such as gender bias and the assumption of 
highly distinct sectors.  John Simon’s original Foreword remains on point with its 
allusions to government retrenchment, financial uncertainty and program effectiveness, 
and other challenges to the nonprofit sector that continue today.  My analysis of the 
nonprofit sector in the context of all three sectors seems prescient despite the blurring of 
sectoral lines.  Some of the policy directions I considered in the original text – such as 
nonprofitization of industries and targeting of resources to nonprofits – seem a bit dated 
in view of today’s  hostility to public  expenditure and wider acceptance of  for-profit  
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supply of public services.  If I were to rewrite the book today, I would probably 
consider the implications of commercialization and greater policy emphasis on 
for-profit participation, rather than policies that move in the reverse direction.  But the 
analytical framework still seems capable of addressing such policy thrusts and their 
implications for nonprofit sector behavior and performance.  Most of all, as various 
contemporary reviews (Zeyen et al; Hoogendoorn et al) observe, social 
entrepreneurship is receiving increased attention as governments struggle to solve 
society’s complex problems, yet this is still considered a developing field of study with 
much yet to be learned and still a dearth of solid empirical research and analysis.     
When Jacques Defourny first proposed that the theme of the 2013 EMES 
Research Conference be titled If Not for Profit, for What, and How?, it felt like my book 
was being resurrected from the dead.  It was long out of print and the original publisher, 
while willing to entertain a whole new rewrite, was happy to grant me the publishing 
rights.  But the thirty year anniversary of the book’s original publication, and the 
energy and diversity of intellectual pursuit manifested in the conference seems to have 
given the book a new life.  This digital edition contains some new essays by colleagues 
that have contributed in important ways to the study of nonprofits, social 
entrepreneurship and social enterprise over the past three decades, and the digital format 
itself allows the possibility of continuing dialogue and expansion of the text. 
It’s a nice feeling.  Thirty years later, I hope and trust my younger colleagues 
will continue to cultivate these rich fields of inquiry in the quest for better understanding 
of how our societies can encourage, support and engage entrepreneurial energies for the 
public good. 
 
 
Dennis R. Young 
June, 2013 
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Studying Nonprofit Entrepreneurship 
from a Behavioral Perspective  
by Fredrik Andersson 
 
 
It has been said that the worth of a book is to be measured by what you can carry away 
from it, and in the case of If Not for Profit, for What?, I particularly want to emphasize 
takeaways for scholars of nonprofit and social entrepreneurship. Dennis Young’s book 
not only offers a deeper and better understanding of the entrepreneurship phenomenon 
in a nonprofit context but also illuminates why this is a significant area needing to be 
researched. To date, If Not for Profit, for What? remains one of the most insightful and 
significant frames for comprehending entrepreneurship and enterprising in the nonprofit 
sector. Yet before highlighting any scholarly implications I would like to present a 
personal note on how I first came in contact with Professor Young’s book.  
In 2006 I was accepted into a program sponsored by the Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation in Kansas City called the Kauffman Entrepreneurship Internship Program 
(KEIP) that combined entrepreneurship theory with practice in the form of seminars and 
a paid internship with a start-up firm or entrepreneurial venture. I decided to apply for 
the KEIP program after stumbling upon Gregory Dees’s white paper on social 
entrepreneurship which he had developed during his time with the Kauffman 
Foundation. I had no idea what social entrepreneurship was but some of the things in 
this brief two-page white paper resonated with my interests in international aid and 
development work and experiences working for nonprofits in both my native Sweden 
and in southern Africa. The KEIP program turned out to be the perfect laboratory to 
explore the intersection between entrepreneurship and the nonprofit sector, and I ended 
up conducting my internship with a Kansas City nonprofit organization. Our 
entrepreneurship seminars were animated, stimulating and (for a Swede) often 
confrontational. A frequent debate was whether any other entity than business 
enterprises could in fact be entrepreneurial. Perhaps due to the fact that the vast majority 
of the members in the class were business school students the idea of entrepreneurship 
manifesting itself in a charity or membership association was very suspect. Someone 
even stated that nonprofit entrepreneurship was an oxymoron. Others proposed that the 
only way for a nonprofit to ever be entrepreneurial was to mimic what businesses were 
doing because without generating commercial revenue entrepreneurship was simply not 
possible.  
An additional issue was to find good and rigorous literature on entrepreneurship 
focusing on the nonprofit sector. While I very much appreciated reading some of the 
classic books in business entrepreneurship including Kirzner’s Competition and 
Entrepreneurship  and  Casson’s  The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory, there was  
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a dearth of in-depth and comprehensive (especially economic) scholarship focusing on 
entrepreneurship in a nonprofit organizational setting. I was given a few handbooks on  
social entrepreneurship to read but they struck me as overly descriptive, normative and 
often atheoretical. My KEIP instructor therefore advised me to contact Professor Bob 
Herman at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Herman had helped build the 
nonprofit management program at UMKC, one of his academic specialties was 
organizational behavior, and he was situated in the Bloch School of Business and Public 
Administration that emphasized entrepreneurship as one of its key academic pillars. So 
if anyone could guide my search for literature it would be Bob Herman.  
When we met a few days later he handed me only one, albeit well-thumbed, book 
by his friend and colleague Dennis Young and said that if I wanted to understand 
entrepreneurship and enterprising in a nonprofit context this was the place the start. This 
was my first encounter with If Not for Profit, for What? and it became my trusted liaison 
for the rest of my KEIP experience. Not only did Young acknowledge that 
entrepreneurship is a universal process that pervades all sectors and industries of the 
economy but that entrepreneurship in the nonprofit sector, as elsewhere, is the frontier 
of a sector's activity, and, as such, studying nonprofit entrepreneurship holds the key to 
revealing and comprehending the driving forces and underlying character of nonprofit 
organizations. This was an epiphany - you can actually study this amorphous thing. A 
year later I entered the interdisciplinary Ph.D. program in the Bloch School with an 
emphasis in nonprofit organizational studies and business entrepreneurship and the rest 
is, as they say, history.  
Much has happened since the original publication of If Not for Profit, for What? 
three decades ago. Today it is seems widely accepted that nonprofits and public 
organizations can be entrepreneurial. In fact, we often hear and read that nonprofits 
ought to become more entrepreneurial as a means to deal with an increasingly turbulent 
and competitive environment, and as a way to generate greater mission impact and 
social transformational change. At the same time, there is also considerable ambiguity 
in current nonprofit and social entrepreneurship scholarship including how to define this 
important phenomenon and how to empirically measure the short- and long-term effects 
of socially entrepreneurial activity. This is precisely why If Not for Profit, for What? 
remains equally relevant today.  The book’s innovative quest for gaining new 
knowledge of nonprofit entrepreneurship as well as its questioning of how to research 
entrepreneurship in the nonprofit sector have always been, and still are, distinguishing 
marks of this text.  
Two things in particular strike me as highly relevant for current nonprofit and 
social entrepreneurship scholarship. First, this book is rare in its pursuit to derive and 
understand entrepreneurship in the nonprofit sector by paying considerable attention to 
the classical (predominantly economics-based) entrepreneurship literature. By doing so 
it, in my opinion, it offers a very stable foundation for nonprofit entrepreneurship 
scholars. After all, for nonprofit and social entrepreneurship to have usefulness it must  
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be able to provide a framework, and explain sets of empirical phenomena that are not 
explained by frameworks already in existence in other fields. I worry that the current 
trouble many researchers have in identifying the distinctive contribution of the field to 
the broader domain of nonprofit studies will sooner or later undermine its legitimacy. 
While I believe there is still much work to do to identify the distinctive domain of 
nonprofit and social entrepreneurship research, I would invite all those working in the 
area to consider If Not for Profit, for What? a highly relevant contribution to that 
discussion. 
Second, Young stresses the importance of studying and understanding nonprofit 
entrepreneurship from a behavioral rather than an outcome-based approach. The 
problem defining any type of entrepreneurship by a specific outcome e.g. generating 
earned income or transformational change is that we lose the ability to study nonprofit 
and social entrepreneurship as it happens, before the outcome is known. If 
transformational change is a necessary outcome criterion we cannot know it until 
afterwards, when such change is realized, whether we were studying nonprofit 
entrepreneurship or not. By pursuing the behavioral approach suggested in If Not for 
Profit, for What? students of nonprofit and social entrepreneurship are offered the 
opportunity to open up that black box in-between initiation and outcomes of new 
innovative ideas. It also makes it possible for researchers to more fully embrace the 
immanent diversity and multiplicity of nonprofit and social entrepreneurship. Thus, by 
concentrating on behaviors and the function nonprofit entrepreneurship/entrepreneurs 
have with regard to nonprofit organizations and the sector at large we end up with a 
more focused scholarly domain that involves the study of nonprofit entrepreneurial 
processes and behaviors as well as their antecedents and effects. 
In closing, Bob Herman requested his copy of If Not for Profit, for What? to be 
returned after I finished the KEIP program and despite searches in numerous bookstores 
I have never been able to obtain a copy of my own. It is therefore exceptionally 
delightful that the decision has been made to reissue the book so that I, my research 
colleagues and my students will have the opportunity to be inspired by it as the field of 
nonprofit and social entrepreneurship progresses.   
 
 
Fredrik O. Andersson is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Midwest Center for Nonprofit 
Leadership, H.W. Bloch School of Management, University of Missouri-Kansas City 
and George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M 
University. 
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Social Entrepreneurship and  
the Legacy of If Not For Profit, For What? 
by J. Gregory Dees 
 
 
Anyone interested in social entrepreneurship should rejoice at the electronic 
re-publication of Dennis Young’s classic If Not for Profit, For What? While Young’s 
book may seem too narrow to those who refuse to be limited to the nonprofit form of 
organization in their pursuit of entrepreneurial solutions to social problems, his insights 
are still relevant, fresh, and applicable to entrepreneurial approaches to social problems 
that choose for-profit, hybrid, or new legal forms, such as the benefit corporation.    
When Dennis Young first published this book, he created a spark that helped start 
the fire behind the emerging field of social entrepreneurship. I can say that with some 
authority, since I was one of the first to catch and transmit that spark by developing 
courses and materials on social entrepreneurship inspired by Dennis’s work. 
Undoubtedly, Dennis would not want to take ownership of everything that is done in the 
name of social entrepreneurship, and in fact, he has not embraced this popular 
movement as actively as others have. Dennis is, above all, a serious scholar devoted to 
the study of the nonprofit sector, and he is not easily caught up in the latest popular 
inferno, even if he helped start it. However, those of us who are caught up in it owe him 
a deep debt for laying the foundations for many of the issues and debates that still 
occupy this emerging space. 
Let me explain how this book was important to me as I began thinking about 
social entrepreneurship, and then say something about how it is still relevant.  
My first encounter with this book happened in the mid-1980s when I was 
teaching at The Yale School of Management, which then offered a Master’s degree in 
Public and Private Management, mixing business, government, and nonprofit in one 
program. Courses were expected to cut across sector boundaries. When, by a twist of 
fate, I was asked to develop a new venture creation course. I knew the students would be 
interested in all kinds of ventures, including nonprofit ventures.  While it was easy to 
find good material on business venture creation, it was much harder on the nonprofit 
side. Fortunately, Woody Powell occupied the office across the hall from me, and he had 
just put together The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. Woody immediately 
directed me to Dennis’s work and specifically to If Not For Profit, For What? Published 
just a few years earlier.   
The power of this book was evident at first reading. It provided a way of 
envisioning entrepreneurship and venture creation in the nonprofit sector that had a 
common theoretical grounding to the approach I wanted to take to entrepreneurship in  
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general—a Schumpeterian approach.  Fortunately, it did not require that nonprofit 
entrepreneurship be commercial in nature. The Schumpeterian approach Dennis takes 
makes entrepreneurship an integral part of the sector, not something grafted on by 
mimicking business. His analysis of nonprofit entrepreneurship provided an excellent 
theoretical grounding that created a clear bridge to entrepreneurship in all sectors. 
Having a unified theory of entrepreneurship that worked similarly in multiple 
environments was (and is) powerful. In addition, the entrepreneurial process Dennis laid 
out for the nonprofit sector was quite consistent with the process others saw in the 
commercial world, without having to result in a commercial venture.  This helped 
provide a unity on the “practice” side, as entrepreneurs of all sorts progress from idea 
generation to resource mobilization to building the leadership team to developing their 
ventures (or programs).  
This perspective stuck with me.  Several years later, when I had the chance to 
offer the first social entrepreneurship course at Harvard Business School, I approached 
it in the same way. That was the spirit of the then new HBS Initiative on Social 
Enterprise. That spirit carried over to the work I did in building the Center for Social 
Innovation at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, and the Center for the 
Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship at Duke.   
As I am writing, it appears that hundreds of schools around the globe offer 
courses on social entrepreneurship and many have initiatives or centers that go well 
beyond individual courses. There are two academic journals devoted to the field: The 
Journal of Social Entrepreneurship and the Social Enterprise Journal. Many books and 
articles are written on the topic each year. Dennis’s influence and ideas permeate these 
efforts, even if they are not always acknowledged. As you read (or re-read) this book, 
you will recognize the influence.  
For those interested in social entrepreneurship, while you are reading, I would like to 
propose questions in three key areas for you to consider. These are questions that might 
help us get even more out of the work Dennis Young did thirty years ago.  
 
1. Schumpeterian Analysis: How would the Schumpeterian analysis Dennis offers 
change if the lens shifts from the nonprofit sector to simply having a social 
mission or objective, regardless of organizational form? What can we learn from 
his analysis that is relevant to social entrepreneurship in general? Are there any 
provocative insights that could stimulate new research?  
 
2. Entrepreneurial Stereotypes: How well do Dennis’s entrepreneurial 
stereotypes apply if we expand the range of organizational structures available to 
include for-profit, hybrid, benefit corporations, cooperative, etc.?  What role  
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could these types play in helping to determine the choice of organizational form? 
What role could the choice of organization form have in shaping the motivations 
of the venture’s leaders? How well do these types hold up to current research on 
entrepreneurial motivations, which we know are wide ranging even in the world 
of for-profit ventures?  Could more analysis of these types shed light on issues 
such as how quickly an organization scales up, how open it is to merger or to 
sharing its intellectual property?  
 
3. Context and Performance:  Are there insights in Dennis’s analysis of 
contextual factors, from accountability mechanisms to policy and legal 
constraints, that could be applied across sector boundaries to improve the 
probability of better performance by social entrepreneurs?  To what extent are 
these dependent on his entrepreneurial types? To what extent could they stand 
independently of that analysis? Given that sector choice strongly affects the 
kinds of incentives and constraints facing an organization, how are different 
choices of organizational forms by social entrepreneurs likely to affect social 
performance, financial performance, and accountability mechanisms? How 
would the new legal forms—Benefit Corporation and low-profit Limited 
Liability Company in the US, and Community Interest Company in the 
UK—affect performance for different entrepreneurs?  
 
You will find many nuggets in this book to stimulate your thinking.  Dig in and enjoy it. 
It helped get the field of social entrepreneurship off the ground and it can stimulate 
further research as we explore better ways to foster entrepreneurial solutions to social 
problems.   
 
 
J. Gregory Dees is Professor of the Practice of Social Entrepreneurship at the Fuqua 
School of Business, Duke University. 
 
  
 
  
Entrepreneurship in a Multi-Sector World 
by Peter M. Frank 
 
 
Dennis Young’s pioneering work exploring entrepreneurial behavior in the nonprofit 
sector was path-breaking in many ways. Thirty years ago this book was published long 
before widespread research into entrepreneurship in the nonprofit sector was popular, 
and it subsequently catalyzed a research stream that also forms the basis for an entire 
academic discipline. Just as other economists failed to account for the entrepreneur in 
the general equilibrium framework, established theory to explain the formation of 
nonprofit organizations was still evolving in the early 1980s yet without attention given 
to entrepreneurial behavior. The theoretical framework grounded in this volume has 
launched a burgeoning research program that includes the established fields of social 
entrepreneurship, social enterprise, nonprofit enterprise, and social ventures. It is rare 
that a book can make such a significant contribution that stands the test of time. Three of 
the key contributions of this work are outlined below. 
 The first, and possibility the most important, contribution Young makes is the 
extension of entrepreneurship theory beyond the profit-making sector. He explains 
entrepreneurship “denotes mobilizing and catalytic activity in all sectors.” This notion 
of entrepreneurial behavior, as phenomena that transcends sector boundaries, lays the 
foundation for a broad understand of how the nonprofit sector emerged and thrives in 
America. Other researchers have helped build the theoretical foundation of the third 
sector, but Young’s entrepreneurial approach best provides a bridge between ideas and 
what is empirically observed. By extending the Schumpeterian entrepreneur from 
commercial activity to nonprofit innovation, this volume explains with myriad 
examples how entrepreneurs establish organizations to fill gaps in the provision of 
goods or services where markets or government lack the incentive to provide.  
Many scholars have continued entrepreneurship theory-building in the nonprofit 
sector, as well as research to explain the existence of the overall sector, and many of 
these efforts extend from Young’s contribution. This volume has helped shape research 
on the role of entrepreneurship in multiple contexts driven by the institutions that 
motivate these decisions. Young rightly points out, “It may be argued that much of what 
is called entrepreneurship constitutes attempts to change, rather than play by the existing 
rules and environmental constraints.” This is a picture of the nonprofit sector that is 
often forgotten but is a beautiful reality of a vibrant civil society. The entrepreneurs who 
shape this sector are those who seek to change the old way of doing things for a new way 
given the existing institutional incentives and constraints. This way of understanding the 
voluntary sector, and the subsequent research stream that flows from it, is an 
unmistakable contribution of this volume. 
  
 
xxix 
 
xxx       If Not for Profit, for What? 
 
Next, this volume encourages the examination of entrepreneurial behavior in the 
voluntary sector but also entrepreneurship that is deemed “social” at its core or ventures 
that seek to fulfill what Jed Emerson calls the “double bottom line.” Social 
entrepreneurship is firmly established as a discipline that expands from nonprofit 
programs to schools of business and departments of public administration. These 
programs have grown substantially during the past three decades. One continual critique 
of social entrepreneurship is that lack of theoretical and conceptual clarity. In schools of 
business social entrepreneurship is often referred to as any venture with a social vision 
or one that creates social value. Others define social entrepreneurship as those ventures 
that reside in the nonprofit sector alone. Young lays the foundation whereby these 
debates and perpetual questions, as to the “what is social entrepreneurship,” are 
answered. It is the manifestation of what results from entrepreneurial activity which 
demonstrates that it is “indeed a real, significant, and widespread phenomenon.” Thus, 
the field of social entrepreneurship owes its theoretical roots to Young’s work as well, as 
this volume brings to bear the economic framework where conceptual questions are 
answered. 
 Finally, this work establishes a lasting contribution to practice in the nonprofit 
sector which has implications for policy. The entrepreneurial approach to understanding 
the creation of nonprofit organizations informs practitioners and policymakers alike by 
explaining the emergence of a sector given the existing institutions. Policymakers are 
then called upon at the institutional level to help facilitate product or service provision 
by impacting the incentives for entrepreneurs to create and innovate. These 
entrepreneurs operate at the grassroots level to ameliorate social problems, establish arts 
organizations, and operate educational programs to name a few examples. This volume 
provides a conceptual framework that clarifies the role of policy. 
 These three contributions represent the profound influence of Young’s work over 
the past thirty years. Researchers in the fields of social entrepreneurship or social 
enterprise as well of those who have expanded theory in the nonprofit sector have relied 
upon this volume to help lay the foundation for their analysis. It is not an overstatement 
to say that this work not only introduced entrepreneurial theory into the explanation of 
the nonprofit sector, but also helped to catalyze analysis of organizational formation in a 
three-sector world. Entrepreneurship exists in a private, public, and nonprofit context 
and Young’s work provides a framework to better understand this multi-sector 
application of a robust economic phenomena. In my own work I have utilized this 
volume as a basis for further analysis into entrepreneurial behavior, and after three 
decades, Young’s research provides a continual source of ideas and conceptual rigor for 
research in the nonprofit sector today. 
 
 
Peter M. Frank is Associate Professor of Economics at the Porter B. Byrum School of 
Business and a Free Enterprise Fellow, The Jesse Helms Center, Wingate University. 
Dennis Young and Supply Side Theory 
by Peter Frumkin 
 
 
For many years, early theories about nonprofit organizations were confined to a 
relatively narrow bandwidth. Many of the early foundational theories of Weisbrod, 
Hansmann, and Salamon were based on some variation on a single common starting 
point: Nonprofit organizations could be understood in some shape or form as responses 
to failures in the government or market to meet demand. To understand nonprofits, one 
simply had to understand the need for goods and services these non-state and 
non-market organizations were meeting and why other sectors could not step up and 
satisfy unmet demand. Against this tide of early theorizing about the origins of nonprofit 
activity, Dennis Young offered a novel idea and approach. Instead of focusing on the 
demand side, what if, Young asked, we turned the tables and looked instead at the 
supply side. The value of his early contribution was and continues to be his focus on the 
way the values, personal traits, and skill sets of individual entrepreneurs are a useful 
starting point in understanding where nonprofit ideas and organizations originate. 
 
I 
 
In the business world, entrepreneurship is an old and trusted idea and practice, which 
has spawned a voluminous literature. Entrepreneurship is an appealing idea because it 
speaks to the desire of many individuals to take control of their lives and financial 
futures. Still, definitions continue to vary as to what exactly an entrepreneur is. The 
entrepreneur has variously been defined as a person who pursues opportunity with or 
without regard for resources currently controlled1, who brings resources, labor, 
materials and other assets into combinations such that their value is greater than before2, 
and who innovates by developing and applying new technology.3 
The importance of innovation to entrepreneurship was the critical insight of 
Joseph Schumpeter, who defined an entrepreneur as someone who “revolutionizes the 
pattern of production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried 
technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a 
new way.”4 By linking the idea of entrepreneurship to that of innovation, Schumpeter 
emphasized the creative aspect of enterprise formation. He also recognized that 
innovation could take many forms, including product innovation, marketing innovation, 
process innovation, and organizational innovation. The driving force behind innovation 
is the entrepreneur and his impulses. “First of all, there is the dream and the will to found 
a private kingdom, usually, though not necessarily, a dynasty…  Then there is the will 
to conquer, the impulse to fight, to prove one’s self superior to others, to succeed for the  
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sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself… Finally, there is the joy of 
creating, of getting things done, or simply exercising one’s energy and ingenuity.”5 By 
focusing on the social motivations of economic activity, Schumpeter attempted to move 
beyond the economist’s usual attraction to explanations based on rational choice and 
efficiency maximization. 
As a behavioral phenomenon, entrepreneurship can quickly become a highly 
creative and personal process. The entrepreneur has a very important role in shaping the 
new organization, which often reflects the founder’s priorities and vision. How then can 
we understand the process through which entrepreneurs gravitate to different kinds of 
undertakings and organizations? The answer is that entrepreneurs are attracted to 
endeavors that fit their personalities, skills and expertise. Stevenson has argued that 
there is a spectrum of entrepreneurial business behavior, one that runs from the pure 
“promoter” who is willing to do anything to achieve the desired result all the way to the 
“trustee” who focuses on the effective use of resources currently at hand.6 While in the 
past the link between personality and entrepreneurial activity has focused on different 
business fields (manufacturing, retailing, professional services, etc.), we now think 
more in terms of entrepreneurship across all three societal sectors. Entrepreneurship is 
now part not only of the business sector, but also a prominent component of the public 
sector, where policy entrepreneurs drive ideas from conception through legislation. 
Social entrepreneurship has been equated with the pursuit of important missions and 
purposes. It is the driving force behind the entry of a new generation of people attracted 
to doing good. 
Entrepreneurship has emerged as a critical determinant of nonprofit ideas and 
programs. Driving this process has been a generation of nonprofit entrepreneurs who 
have approached their work with open minds about nonprofit financing and mission 
definition. Instead of looking at the guidelines of government funders or at the demands 
of certain constituencies, this new group has started with the questions of “what interests 
me?” and “where do I best fit?” Because theories of entrepreneurship are essentially 
behavioral theories, they attempt to develop detailed frameworks and typologies that 
help us organize the range of possible answers to these kinds of questions. Dennis 
Young produced one of the earliest attempts to develop a theory of nonprofit 
entrepreneurship by building a typology of personal traits in the nonprofit world.  
 
II 
 
Young has defined a set of models of nonprofit motivations that are a good starting 
point. Young’s models of entrepreneurs are best thought of as “pure types.”7 In reality, 
many people will represent some combination of the various traits and motivations in 
Young's pure types. A first type, the artist, is attracted to nonprofits by the promise of 
finding a place where his own creative energies can be translated into organizational and 
programmatic reality, where his need to create, nurture and watch organizations grow  
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can be fulfilled.  The professional is more discipline bound and will seek to implement 
the latest insights and ideas in the field. The believer is an entrepreneur who has a strong 
commitment to a cause and formulates his plans to advance a particular moral, political, 
or social cause. The searcher is out to prove himself, to find a niche, and to escape his 
present employment in pursuit of recognition and a clearer sense of identity. The 
independent enters the sector to find autonomy instead of working under others, to be 
the boss who calls the shots, and to avoid shared decision making. The conserver is a 
loyalist who is animated by a desire to preserve an organization’s character and heritage. 
Finally, according to Young, there is the power seeker who is drawn to nonprofit work 
by the possibility of having authority over other people, sometimes for the sake of 
simply having control over others, sometimes to reap financial rewards. 
To build a theory around these pure types, Young goes on to describe a two part 
“screening process,” the first part of which filters the various types of entrepreneurs into 
different fields of nonprofit activity. How does this screening or matching process 
work? Entrepreneurs will gravitate to various parts of the sector depending on four 
factors: (1) the intrinsic nature of the services delivered, (2) the degree of professional 
control, (3) the level of industry concentration, and (4) the social priority of the field.  
In order to understand how this fourfold screening process within the sector 
might operate, consider two different nonprofit organizations, one a homeless shelter, 
the other a major performing arts organization. Some individuals will gravitate to 
shelters because they want to work in a field where services are provided directly to 
clients, where professional standards for service delivery are far from fixed, where many 
small organizations populate the field, and where the need for the given services is such 
that public support for the work is overwhelming. On the other hand, other individuals 
will be attracted to creating an independent theater company because they like the idea 
of working in a context where the client is a bit removed from the daily work of the 
organization, where standards of artistic excellence are determined by a small group of 
opinion makers, where a few organizations dominate the scene, and where public 
support is not a major consideration because work is directed toward pleasing a small, 
well-defined elite group. Obviously, the calling of creating an effective and 
compassionate shelter is very different from that of running a professional theater. Just 
as obviously, believers and searchers are more likely to apply their entrepreneurial skills 
to the delivery of needed social services, whereas artists and independents are better 
suited for the cultural world.  
The goal of behavioral theories of entrepreneurship is to render these 
broad-brush generalizations more concrete and consistent by elaborating both the 
motives of the actors and the characteristics of the enterprises in which these actors 
pursue their work.  
Beyond a filtering by field, entrepreneurs will also be screened by the choice of 
sector they make. Entrepreneurial energies may find expression in public agencies, 
business firms, or nonprofits. This second part of the selection process is driven, accord- 
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ing to Young, by three factors: (1) the desire to realize income, (2) the level of hierarchy 
and bureaucracy that is acceptable, and (3) orientation toward service. Thus, for 
example, controllers who seek financial gain are more likely to gravitate to the business 
sector while searchers are more likely to find their way to nonprofits. Because much 
variation exists across fields within each sector, and because conditions are constantly 
changing within fields, ironclad predictions cannot be made. A screening theory based 
on motives and behavior gives us a framework to think about the ways in which the 
matching process of opportunities with interests takes place and how skills and motives 
come into alignment. 
If one accepts the notion that a behavioral theory of social entrepreneurship 
involves both a typology of motives and a matching or screening process that connects 
these motives to specific parts of the organizational landscape, the challenge then 
becomes one of clearly specifying both these critical elements. While Young’s early 
model moves in the right direction, more work is still needed to define the archetypes of 
nonprofit motivation and the organizational channels that direct these impulses. In 
particular, a more fully elaborated cross-sectoral theory of what draws particular types 
of people to particular types of entrepreneurial ventures is still needed, especially for the 
critical issue of sector selection. Young’s model was rooted in the traditional 
three-sector paradigm and focused on nonprofit organizations, but now that boundaries 
have blurred between nonprofit and for-profit forms, a new theoretical lens is needed.  
Dees’ work on sector selection provides a useful starting point for new theory 
building. Dees has argued that sector selection comes down to four critical 
considerations: 1. efficiency of structure and the ability to mobilize human and financial 
capital; 2. economic robustness and how will the form do in the competitive 
environment; 3. political viability or the extent to which goodwill is needed; and 4. the 
values of key stakeholders. The problem with these four drivers is that they leave out the 
fundamental insight of Young and others that the personality and motivations of the 
entrepreneur will be critical in understanding the fateful choice of organizational form. 
A new model could be developed that builds on Young’s starting point, integrates 
Young’s ideas with those of Dees, and produces a concise yet comprehensive predictive 
model of entrepreneurship in the broader social sector.  
Instead of looking at what pulls donors, staff, and volunteers into nonprofit and 
voluntary organizations, we begin to get a picture of what pushes these individuals 
toward doing good. Some may be attracted to socially oriented businesses, like Levi 
Strauss or Ben & Jerry's while others will be attracted to commercial nonprofits, like 
hospitals. Still others will seek out community groups that are dedicated to a particular 
social cause. It is clear that social entrepreneurship can and does occur in all these 
contexts and many others.  Social entrepreneurs will scan the environment and select 
the causes and organizational forms that best fit their interests and needs.  
Understanding not just how they make this choice in practice but how they should make 
this fateful choice is the challenge of a compelling normative theory of sector selection.  
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Defining this normative theory of sector selection is the next major challenge for the 
field and it is one that owes much to Young’s early work on nonprofit entrepreneurship. 
In this way, the most significant and lasting contribution of Young lies in both 
introducing the supply side perspective and opening new questions for the next 
generation of researchers to examine.  
 
 
Peter Frumkin is Professor of Social Policy at the University of Pennsylvania. 
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The Origins of Social Entrepreneurship 
by Michael O’Neill 
 
 
“Social entrepreneurship” has become big business. The Library of Congress lists 742 
items under this keyword, and those do not include thousands of articles, web sites, TED 
talks, and seminars on this subject and such allied concepts as “social enterprise,” 
“blurring of [nonprofit and business] sector lines,” “hybrid organizations,” “flexible 
purpose corporations,” “social return on investment,” and my personal favorite, 
“low-profit limited liability companies [L3C’s].” 
Most of these items may safely be ignored. Still the one essential book, after 30 
years, is Dennis Young’s pioneering If Not for Profit, for What? A Behavioral Theory of 
the Nonprofit Sector Based on Entrepreneurship (1983; see also Young, 1981). This 
book presents an in-depth analysis of social entrepreneurship (hereafter “SE”) that is 
theoretically strong and filled with real-life examples. 
Here’s what Young’s book has that the later onslaught of SE literature largely 
lacks: solid grounding in the theory of entrepreneurship (rooted in economics but with 
the valuable addition of related sociological, psychological, and 
management/organization theory), broad knowledge of the nonprofit sector, and 
insights about the cross-sector generalizability of entrepreneurialism. 
Young begins with Joseph Schumpeter’s classic analysis of entrepreneurship 
(1934), which was largely focused on the for-profit sector. But Young claims that we 
need to take a much broader view of this phenomenon. He says, “Entrepreneurship is a 
universal process, pervading all sectors and industries of the economy” (1983, p. 43), 
and “Schumpeter’s concept of implementing new combinations seems entirely 
applicable to the production of government, or nonprofit-sector services . . . .” (p. 23). 
Young elaborates this claim by analyzing nonprofit examples of entrepreneurial types or 
models (artist, professional, searcher, believer, etc.), entrepreneurial incentives (pride in 
workmanship, acclaim of peers, creativity, autonomy, etc.), and “venture scenarios” 
(initiative, evolution, organizational renewal, etc.). Into this mix he adds characteristics 
of various industries that support or inhibit entrepreneurship, such as government laws 
and regulations, income potential, professional status, and relative opportunity. 
The book is rich with examples of nonprofit entrepreneurs: Mother Teresa of 
Calcutta, Ralph Nader, Thomas Hoving, Werner Erhard, Charles William Eliot; and 
organizations like the March of Dimes, the Rockefeller Foundation, New York 
University, and the Oregon Shakespeare Festival. The Eliot example is an interesting 
one, since popular literature on entrepreneurship is so heavily weighted toward creating 
something brand new like Facebook (unlike Schumpeter’s focus on new combinations 
of existing means of production). Eliot, president of Harvard from 1869 to 1909—a term  
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of office that must seem almost miraculous to modern university presidents—essentially 
took a small, comfortable, stagnant college and transformed it into one of the world’s 
great universities. Young’s book constantly reminds us that entrepreneurship comes in 
many guises: creating the new, reconstituting the old, making money, fleeing from 
money. 
In a sense, Young’s book brings us full circle: perhaps the “third sector” is really 
the “first sector” with respect to entrepreneurship. It can be argued that, historically, 
entrepreneurial behavior occurs at least as often in what we now call the nonprofit sector 
as in business. Religion is one example. In Christianity alone, Jesus, the apostles, Paul, 
Luther, and the founders of major religious orders of men and women like the 
Benedictines, Franciscans, Dominicans, Jesuits, and Carmelites were entrepreneurs of 
the first order who gave no serious thought to profitmaking or wealth accumulation. The 
great social movements in the United States—temperance, abolition, women’s suffrage, 
civil rights, environmentalism—yield dozens of examples of high-level entrepreneurial 
behavior. Young’s essential contribution is rescuing the concept of entrepreneurship 
from narrow and unwarranted limitation to profit-seeking. 
Young’s analysis has influenced later theories of the nonprofit sector (Steinberg, 
2006). It also has intuitive appeal for nonprofit practitioners, many of whom experience 
the entrepreneurial realities of their everyday work. However, it is important to note not 
only the strengths of this important book but also the paths it chose not to tread. Young’s 
central contribution is showing in detail—again, both theoretically and with many 
concrete examples—that a broader and deeper view of entrepreneurship can explain 
much nonprofit behavior, that Mother Teresa is every bit as much an entrepreneur as 
Steve Jobs. By contrast, much of the SE literature and experimentation in the last 30 
years has been about developing new organizational models that attempt to combine the 
virtues of business and the virtues of nonprofits (“hybrids”). Young’s theory in If Not for 
Profit, for What? is essentially agnostic on the latter question (one hopes that he has in 
mind a future book on that topic). The potential of SE in the latter sense is the subject of 
some scholarly debate and much boosterism. SE may or may not be the coming of a new 
age, “the fourth sector,” as some have termed it. In the meantime, it is useful for both 
scholars and practitioners to know that Young’s book established beyond all reasonable 
doubt the fact that entrepreneurship is alive and well in the nonprofit sector, as it is in the 
business and government sectors. 
 
 
Michael O’Neill is Professor Emeritus of the School of Management, University of San 
Francisco 
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Nonprofit Entrepreneurship as  
‘Interesting Science’ 
by Gordon E. Shockley 
 
 
I could not help but think of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science when re-reading 
Dennis Young’s classic If Not for Profit, for What? for this 30th anniversary edition.  In 
particular, Popper’s comments on “interesting” science resonate.  “Yet we also stress 
that truth is not the only aim of science,” Popper (1985) writes. “We want more than 
mere truth; what we look for is interesting truth – truth which is hard to come by” (p. 
190).  Similarly, he writes elsewhere that “…we are not simply looking for truth, we 
are after interesting and enlightening truth, after theories which offer solutions to 
interesting problems” (Popper, 1989, p. 55).  Popper seeks not just mundane, common 
knowledge but interesting scientific knowledge: interesting truth addressing interesting 
problems.  I thought of Popper when reading Young’s If Not for Profit, for What? 
because it is an interesting work, one that not only has informed and addressed an 
essential and enduring question of the nonprofit sector: What motivates people to work 
and, more precisely, to act entrepreneurially, in nonprofit organizations?  At the same 
time, Young’s book also adumbrates the global movement of social entrepreneurship 
that we are in the middle of today, 30 years after its publication.     
 “This book asks, simply: if it isn’t profit, what drives enterprising individuals, 
women and men, to pursue their ventures in the nonprofit context?” And so Young 
poses this essential and enduring question of the nonprofit sector on page 2 of If Not for 
Profit, for What? (1983).  Pursuing profit is a sufficient, though at times simplistic, 
motivation for commercial behavior.  Vote-getting and re-election serve as a probably 
more frequently simplistic but still adequate motivation for public-sector behavior.  
But there is no analog that describes the motivation of behavior in the nonprofit sector.  
As Young puts it, 
We are all familiar with the profit-seeking businessman in the commercial sector. 
We think of the ambitious vote-gathering politician in government. These 
stereotypes help us conceptualize what makes the business and government sectors 
function. In the nonprofit sector, however, there seems to be no counterpart—no 
obvious leadership agent that captures the essence of that sector’s drive and 
motivation. (p. 1)  
Young finds not a single but rather a composite explanation of nonprofit behavior. “A 
third approach to the investigation of entrepreneurial behavior [and Young’s approach] 
is to recognize the diversity of motivations by postulating alternative stereotypes … ”   
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The advantage of this approach is that it “incorporates a variety of competing objectives, 
because it recognizes that given motivations and styles may be distributed differently 
among individuals in the relevant entrepreneurial population and may be pursued in 
different ways” (p. 63).  These different stereotypes – artist, professional, believer, 
searcher, independent, conserver, power seeker, and income seeker – correspond to 
different employment choices (specifically, see Table 5-1: Entrepreneurial Stereotype 
Models on p. 67 and Figure 7-1: Nominal First Preferences of Entrepreneurs by Sector 
on p. 100).  “For the social scientist,” Young concludes, “the principal lesson here is 
that the inherent diversity of participation in nonprofit organizations preordains failure 
in the search for any single, satisfactory, homogeneous model of a generic corporate 
nonprofit firm” (p. 161). Young’s composite, positive, matrix-like description of 
nonprofit behavior in the absence of profit and vote-gathering remains “interesting” in 
the Popperian sense (i.e., interesting truth addressing interesting problems) to this day.   
 Possibly Young’s singular, most remarkable achievement in If Not for Profit, for 
What? is presaging the social entrepreneurship movement now at high tide.  If not the 
first, Young was certainly among the first few to link entrepreneurship to nonprofit 
behavior.  Bill Drayton and Ashoka, Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank, and Fazle 
Abed and BRAC had begun their work, but their work and that of many, many others 
were still decades from crystallizing into what we now recognize as social 
entrepreneurship.  “Nonprofit entrepreneurship” – or entrepreneurial behavior pursued 
in the non-market, apolitical context of nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations – 
could be seen as an early or specialized form of social entrepreneurship.  Furthermore, 
Young helps us to understand how social entrepreneurship has evolved into a 
multi-sector, collaborative effort to address social problems at both the global and local 
levels.  Researchers as diverse as Gregory Dees, Jacques Defourney, Paul Light, Alex 
Murdock, Alex Nicholls, and Marthe Nyssens all have insisted to various degrees that 
social entrepreneurship crosses sectors, which is to say, commercial, public, and 
nonprofit sectors all have important roles to play in addressing social problems.  
However, Young’s stereotypes that lie at the core of his behavioral theory of nonprofit 
entrepreneurship remind us that different people choose different organizations, 
industries, and sectors by the predilections of their stereotypes.  Young writes, 
In particular, I assert that there is a strong correlation between the motives that the 
entrepreneur will ultimately exhibit (when he begins to venture) and the character 
of organizations in which he chooses to become employed and gain experience. 
[This] reference to the various types of entrepreneurs—believers, power seekers, 
and so on—will apply to latent motivations that may not yet have become manifest 
but are presumably part of the individual’s consciousness at the stage of choosing 
an organization for which to work.  (p. 90) 
Young demonstrates that social entrepreneurship is always a cross-sectoral effort 
because entrepreneurs work in all sectors,  industries,  and organizations.  As Young  
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puts it, “Entrepreneurship is a universal process, pervading all sectors and industries of 
the economy” (p. 43). 
 Young’s If Not for Profit, for What? remains a powerful and trenchant book even 
30 years after its publication.  It has been an honor for me to contribute to its 30th 
anniversary edition.  
 
 
Gordon Shockley is Associate Professor of Social Entrepreneurship, Arizona State 
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If Not for Profit for What? and 
the Frontiers of Nonprofit Sector Research 
Richard Steinberg 
 
 
When Dennis told me of the electronic reprinting of his classic book and asked me to 
write this commentary, I was thrilled.  The original publication had enormous influence 
on my research career, which was then at the formative stages.  Upon rereading it for 
this review, I found that the task of building on this work is still fresh and barely begun.  
For the book title is one of the big questions that define our field of philanthropic and 
nonprofit studies, up there with “what makes people volunteer their money, time, and 
treasure?” and “which activities are best assigned to which sectors?” (Weisbrod, 1978). 
 It was an exhilarating time when the book first appeared.  Prior to 1975, there 
was nothing like a unified academic field studying nonprofit organizations.  There were 
pockets of research in specific disciplines like law, social work, sociology, economics, 
or history and in specific fields of activity like arts management, educational 
administration, church administration, or health services administration. In 1975, the 
cross-disciplinary academic field began to gel with the publication of 86 research 
studies commissioned under the leadership of Gabriel Rudney by the Commission on 
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, better known as the Filer Commission. That 
growth and consolidation continued under the leadership of John Simon as the Program 
on Non-Profit Organizations (PONPO) at Yale University beginning in 1977.  It was at 
PONPO that Dennis’s initial work on nonprofit organizations began to flourish with the 
case studies that underlie this  book (Grennon, Barsky, and Young, 1980) and, one 
month later, the theory of entrepreneurial sorting (Young, 1980).  
Economic models of nonprofit organizations began, to my knowledge, in 1966, 
with Tullock’s paper on budget-maximizing versus service-maximizing nonprofits.   
Other models specified a variety of alternative objectives, such as output maximization, 
income maximization, social welfare maximization, and quantity-quality tradeoffs.  
Each paper proposed an objective and constraints and mathematically derived 
behavioral predictions for that objective.  And thus ended what I have elsewhere called 
the first wave of nonprofit modeling (Steinberg, 2004).  Valuable as it was, the first 
wave could not answer any of the big picture questions.    Which organizations chose  
_______________________ 
1 Peter Dobkin Hall (e.g., 2006) argues that coherent conceptions of “the nonprofit sector” began in the decades 
following World War II, as an effort to “describe and classify the organizational domain for tax, policy, and 
regulatory purposes.” (p. 32). 
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which objectives and why?  Is the organizational choice of objectives fixed or 
malleable over time?  How do organizations behave in markets that contain a variety of 
differently-motivated organizations?  
Dennis’s earlier PONPO working papers and this book catapulted the field to 
what I have called the third wave of nonprofit theories.  This wave is still at an early 
stage, containing integrated theories in which the objectives of nonprofit and competing 
organizations emerge naturally from the decisions of individuals within a technical, 
socio-demographic, and policy environment.   Notably, Dennis’s framework is 
thoroughly cross-disciplinary, challenging the simplifying assumptions embedded in 
single-discipline analyses.  Attempts to interpret his book in any of the prevailing 
paradigms in economics, sociology, management, or organizational behavior will 
succeed.  But this book doesn’t favor any of those paradigms, and challenges 
disciplinarians to think more broadly. 
Briefly, I believe the main contributions of this book are: 
• The search for a single model of nonprofit objectives, and hence behaviors, 
is fruitless. 
• Yet objectives are not randomly distributed, but are systematically 
determined by forces that can be studied and manipulated through public 
policy. 
• In particular, entrepreneurial traits of those who create and/or transform 
organizations matter. 
• Entrepreneurial traits are distributed among potential entrepreneurs, but a 
sorting process imperfectly matches different types to different 
activities/industries and sectors. 
• Public policy can have perverse effects when they affect entrepreneurial 
sorting. 
Another contribution may turn out to be vital for further development of the field.  
Dennis proposed that a useful way to classify entrepreneurial traits is into the following 
eight stereotypical types of entrepreneurs: Artists (subtypes Architects and Poets), 
Professionals, Believers, Searchers, Independents, Conservers, Power Seekers 
(subtypes Players and Controllers), and Income Seekers. With little follow-on research 
using this taxonomy, it is too soon to tell how successfully it will be used. 
Dennis was ahead of his time in rooting his theory of nonprofit objectives and 
behaviors in the literature on entrepreneurship.  The concept was hardly new in 1983, 
when the book was first published.  Google Scholar finds 1,220 books and articles on 
the subject that year.  But academic interest in the subject has exploded,  with 35,100 
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books and articles listed in 2012.2  More recently, interest in social entrepreneurship 
has taken off.  Young’s analysis clearly can be extended to the theory of social 
ventures, whether they take place in for-profit, nonprofit, or hybrid organizations. 
Since 1983, the scholarly community has grown and matured and we are ready to 
take the next steps in the research program suggested by this book.  Here are some 
possibilities, either specified in the original book or advanced here: 
• Entrepreneurial types:   
o Can entrepreneurs be reliably classified into Young’s taxonomy?  Are 
the classifications of different raters consistent?  Would a factor analysis 
of entrepreneurial traits produce factors similar to those postulated by 
Young?  Are there existing psychometric scales that are useful for 
classifying type?  If not, can we develop and validate such scales? 
o How stable is the entrepreneur’s type over time?  Are some types more 
stable than others?  If type is malleable, are there public policies or board 
practices that can help undesirable types evolve into more appropriate 
types?   
o The only study I know of that examined entrepreneurial traits across 
sectors (Rawls et al., 1975) is old, has a limited sample, studied managers 
but not others who may play an entrepreneurial role (e.g., board members; 
major donors; foundation grant makers) and did not look for differences 
across industries involving nonprofits.  We need more.  
o We need empirical work that links managerial preferences over nonprofit 
activities to the type taxonomy.  
• Effects of entrepreneurial sorting:  
o How predictive is evidence of entrepreneurial type for subsequent 
organizational behaviors? How do organizational dynamics and politics 
change the granting of power to competing entrepreneurs?  How 
enduring is the founder’s vision in this evolution of power? 
o When does entrepreneurial sorting enhance or detract from organizational 
legitimacy?  Do different entrepreneurial types set different goals and 
behaviors towards distributive justice?  What are the relations between 
entrepreneurial type and the associative and expressive dimensions of 
nonprofit behavior?   
o What are the mechanisms governing entrepreneurial influence over 
organizations?  How do public policy and the structure of governance 
affect entrepreneurial influence? 
• Who are the entrepreneurs?  How prevalent is entrepreneurial behavior among 
managers, funders, board members, and perhaps others? 
_______________________ 
2 http://scholar.google.com/, accessed 6/15/2013. 
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• Sorting of other stakeholders: There has been a small amount of research since 
the book was first published that looks at the sorting of consumers (e.g., Hirth, 
1999), line workers (e.g. Mirvis, 1992;  Slivinski, 2002), and volunteers (e.g. 
Segal and Weisbrod, 2002) across sectors.  I speculate that entrepreneurs will 
consider sorting of other stakeholders when considering whether to form or 
transform a nonprofit organization. Are there tractable ways to analyze the 
sorting of other stakeholders with that of entrepreneurs as a multistage game? 
• Relation to disciplinary paradigms:  What else can be brought from organization 
ecology, institutional, life cycle, resource dependency, neoclassical, and other 
organizational behavior theories into Young’s framework?  When should we 
discard specifics from each of these theories to make them more useful in the 
nonprofit and mixed sector settings? 
• Formalization.  Young’s framework is presented verbally.  Since then, I and 
others have attempted to formalize aspects of his framework in economic models 
(e.g., Preston, 1992;  Steinberg, 1993;  Eckel and Steinberg, 1993;  Bilodeau 
and Slivinski, 1996;  Steinberg, 2011). 
o Advantages: Mathematical models allow us to better characterize 
equilibria.  When does a single entrepreneurial type sort into a single 
sector/industry niche (that is, when is there a separating equilibrium)?  
When do multiple types sort into niches (pooling equilibria).  Formal 
models also test the consistency of each conclusion with the set of 
simplifying and other assumptions made for tractability and external 
validity.  Formal models allow us to extract causal meaning from 
empirical work.  Finally, formal models allow us to more carefully 
compare the positive (which types of entrepreneurs sort into which 
niches?) and the normative (which types should, in the interest of society, 
be assigned to which niches?). 
o Cautions:  Young’s framework is far too vast to incorporate into a single 
and tractable model.  A more intuitive approach is needed to put the 
various formalizations of pieces of the problem into the big picture laid 
out in this book.  Although Young’s warning that (p. 61) “a theory based 
on entrepreneurship inherently conflicts with the 
constrained-optimization approach of neoclassical economics” seems 
incorrect in light of progress since then, his related points remain relevant 
(pp. 61-2):  “[Theory] requires more of a behavioral framework in which 
innovation and rule- and process-changing activity is explicitly 
recognized.” 
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With or without these tests and refinements, Young’s framework can be extended 
to a variety of additional applications.  The dynamics of markets containing nonprofit 
organizations (entry, exit, merger, and intersectoral conversions) can be analyzed.  The 
effects of within-sector and cross-sector competition can be analyzed in terms of 
whether equilibria are separating or pooling.  The analysis of the merits of various 
public policies are already contained in the book, but there is room for many more 
applications. 
Therefore, republication of this book is timely, as the field has, perhaps, finally 
caught up with Dennis Young’s original insights.  For the many new and established 
scholars looking for research topics, I heartily commend this book. 
 
 
Richard Steinberg is Professor of Economics, Indiana University-Purdue University 
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If Not for Profit, for What?: 
Ahead of its Time 
by Simon Teasdale 
 
 
Dennis Young is one of the most thoughtful and thought-provoking academics in the 
area of nonprofit studies and I am fortunate to have had the pleasure of working with 
him and visiting Georgia State University. In 2012 I was organizing the International 
Social Innovation Research conference which was timetabled to take place in the same 
week as the NCVO Researching the Voluntary Sector conference - the UK’s national 
research event for the nonprofit sector. I suggested to the organizer of the NCVO 
conference that we could pool resources to attract a big name speaker to provide a 
plenary session at both events. Not unreasonably the NCVO conference organizer was 
skeptical that anybody giving a keynote presentation at a predominately social 
entrepreneurship conference would be suitable for an audience of nonprofit scholars, at 
least until I mentioned Dennis Young. Dennis was able to provide excellent plenaries at 
both conferences demonstrating a rare ability to straddle the divide between social 
entrepreneurship and nonprofit studies. This of course will come as no surprise to 
readers of his book If Not for Profit for What? A Behavioral Theory of the Nonprofit 
Sector Based on Entrepreneurship, which was published 30 years ago this year.  
As the other commentators already provide an excellent overview of the book I 
have decided to use this opportunity to briefly explore the influence of the book on the 
fields of nonprofit studies, social enterprise and social entrepreneurship. A quick search 
on Google Scholar at the start of June 2013 reveals that the book has been cited 305 
times. Dennis was probably the first author to apply entrepreneurship theory to the study 
of nonprofits to help determine why some entrepreneurs choose to operate in the 
nonprofit sector. Since then, and particularly in the new millennium, the development of 
a “new” field of social entrepreneurship has seen considerable attention paid to similar 
questions using similar theories in attempting to make sense of social entrepreneurship. 
Given this relevance to at least two relatively established academic fields each with their 
own journals, I was somewhat surprised therefore that the number of citations wasn’t 
even higher. 
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Table 1: Citations to If Not for Profit broken down by year of publication, derived from 
Google Scholar, 05 June 2013 
 
 
Year 
 
Citations 
 
Cumulative Citations 
1983 1 1 
1984 2 3 
1985 1 4 
1986 8 12 
1987 4 16 
1988 3 19 
1989 4 23 
1990 5 28 
1991 6 34 
1992 3 37 
1993 6 43 
1994 5 48 
1995 1 49 
1996 6 55 
1997 9 64 
1998 5 69 
1999 4 73 
2000 7 80 
2001 6 86 
2002 6 92 
2003 20 112 
2004 12 124 
2005 10 134 
2006 20 154 
2007 11 165 
2008 10 175 
2009 18 193 
2010 19 212 
2011 18 230 
2012 15 245 
2013 3 248 
Notes: Two citations occurred prior to the date of publication. Three citations are 
undated. 
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Table one reveals a breakdown of 2531 of the citations by year of publication. A 
glance at the graph derived from this data showing cumulative citations over time (see 
Figure 1) suggests that If Not for Profit was ahead of its time when first released. Only 
16 authors cited the book in the first five years after publication, and eight of these were 
in a single year (1986). The next three five year periods saw steady if unspectacular 
progress: 21 authors cited If Not for Profit between 1988-1992, 27 authors between 
1993-1997, and 28 authors between 1998-2002. However the last decade (from 2003) 
has seen the annual rate of citations increase by more than 150%: there were 73 citations 
between 2003 -2008, and an additional 73 citations in the most recent five year period 
(2009-2013). This is certainly unusual for an academic text. According to Thomson 
Reuters the “generalized citation curve” suggests that citations peak after three years, 
and that an article’s “half-life” (whereby 50% of total citations are reached) occurs after 
six years2. If this had been the case with If Not for Profit then the 19 citations achieved 
by 1989 would have marked the half-life. Over the next 24 years citations would have 
gradually tapered leaving a cumulative total of 38, and I would almost certainly not be 
writing this introduction to the new edition. 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of citations to If Not for Profit over time 
 
 
                                                 
1 Google Scholar contains two versions of If Not for Profit. This analysis is derived from the 255 articles citing the 
original (1983) version. 
2 http://www.elsevier.com/editors/journal-metrics#impact-factor  
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We can also gain some idea of the influence of Dennis’s work by looking at the 
articles, authors and books which cite him. Opening up the relevant link from Google 
Scholar reveals a veritable Who’s Who of the great and the good in the world of 
nonprofit studies. The first page contains luminaries such as Burton Weisbrod, Henry 
Hansmann, Susan Rose Ackerman, Helmut Anheier, Jacques Defourny and Janelle 
Kerlin (who is fortunate enough to have been mentored by Dennis). Dennis’s influence 
has also spread beyond the confines of nonprofit / social entrepreneurship, with his work 
being cited in mainstream entrepreneurship texts such as Barbara Bird’s (1989) classic 
Entrepreneurial Behavior. However this list also hints at the divide between those 
writing about nonprofits (most of whom are represented) and the newer social 
entrepreneurship field which is hardly represented among the most influential texts 
books citing If Not for Profit. This is particularly surprising given that Dennis’s work, 
loosely based on behavioral economics, would seem to have greatest relevance to the 
current struggles to make sense of why some people become social entrepreneurs. Only 
two (Dees and Anderson, 2006; Sharir and Lerner, 2006) of those 25 publications with 
over 100 citations citing If Not for Profit can be firmly located within the social 
entrepreneurship literature , although articles by Jacques Defourny (2001), Marthe 
Nyssens (2010),  and Janelle Kerlin (2006) begin to bridge the gap through their 
primary focus on social enterprise.  
To some extent the lack of attention paid to If Not for Profit by the social 
entrepreneurship literature might conceivably be explained by much of this literature 
being published in the last decade and so not having sufficient time to build up citations. 
But this argument is somewhat negated when searching on Google Scholar using the 
keyword “social entrepreneurship.” One has to trawl through 20 articles (half of which 
have over 300 citations) before arriving at the first article to cite If Not for Profit (Dees 
and Anderson, 2006).  While two of the most highly cited articles in the social 
entrepreneurship literature do cite If Not for Profit (the aforementioned works by Sharir 
and Lerner (2006), and Dees and Anderson (2006)), with the exception of the recently 
published review of the field by Bacq and Jansenn (2011) and Gordon Shockley’s 
application of Schumpeter and Kirzner’s theories to social entrepreneurship (2011), the 
social entrepreneurship literature would seem largely ignorant of Dennis’s work. No 
other articles with ten or more citations themselves, and citing If Not for Profit, would 
reasonably be considered primarily located in the social entrepreneurship literature.  So 
what else might explain If Not for Profit experiencing such a dramatic rise in citations 
since 2003? 
The answer is hinted at in articles by Jacques Defourny and Marthe Nyssens 
(2010) and Janelle Kerlin (2006). Both papers note a distinction between (mainly US 
based) authors writing about social entrepreneurship and (mainly European) authors 
writing about social enterprise, while noting that there has been some crossover in 
recent years (of which of course both articles are examples). Returning again to Google  
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Scholar a cursory analysis suggests that Dennis’s work was picked up relatively early by 
European authors writing from a social economy tradition. In particular early work by 
members of the EMES network would seem to have introduced If Not for Profit to 
European scholars. Dennis was invited to speak at an early international conference on 
social enterprise organized by EMES members at Trento University in 2001. Since then, 
and particularly since 2003, Dennis’s work has been cited in numerous articles by 
authors related to EMES, including Evers and Laville (2004), Thomas (2004) and 
Borzaga (2004). 
This somewhat cursory analysis of the influence of If Not for Profit as 
determined by its citation record suggests that the book was clearly ahead of its time and 
took a number of years to be recognized for the classic it surely is. Nonetheless many of 
Dennis’s contemporaries recognized its value in their own (often more highly cited ) 
works. The book has consistently achieved high citation rates among nonprofit scholars. 
Around the turn of the millennium If Not for Profit began to achieve acclaim in Europe, 
particularly among social economy scholars, and citation rates doubled.  However even 
today, only a very small number of influential articles from the social entrepreneurship 
literature refer to Dennis’s work. It might be that recent articles by Shockley (2011) and 
Bacq and Jansenn (2011) pave the way for Dennis’s work to be taken up by a third group 
of scholars. This freely available reissue of the book will help introduce Dennis’s 
seminal work to a wider audience. Indeed, the book is probably timelier now than it was 
30 years ago. 
 
 
Simon Teasdale is Research Fellow at the Third Sector Research Centre, University of 
Birmingham, and Associate Editor of Social Enterprise Journal. In August 2013, he will 
be taking a new position at the Yunus Centre for Social Business, Glasgow Caledonian 
University. 
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Foreword (1983) 
 
 
Dennis Young's study of entrepreneurship in nonprofit organizations emerges at a 
strikingly appropriate moment in the long history of the U.S. voluntary sector. This 
country has, since its early days, relied heavily on voluntary nonprofit institutions to 
carry out a wide range of important social and economic tasks—relied on them more 
heavily, it seems clear, than any other modern society. But in recent years new pressures 
have been imposed on the nonprofit sector. It faces new and more urgent demands, 
generated by the high level of social and cultural services that the American people have 
come to accept—services that have become more difficult to provide in the face of 
inflationary pressures, reduced or unreliable endowment returns, and, most recently, 
dramatic governmental retrenchment. For the nonprofit sector, this is a time of great 
demand and constraint. 
As a result, two central questions about the U.S. nonprofit sector have become 
more salient than ever before. First, what functions should the nonprofit sector take on, 
expand, reduce, or abandon—in other words, what is an efficient, equitable, and 
otherwise appropriate division of labor among the nonprofit, governmental, and 
for-profit sectors of our society? Second, what avenues lead to increased financial and 
programmatic effectiveness for nonprofit organizations, and how can such effectiveness 
be measured in the absence of a conventional market or ballot bottom line? 
Neither of these issues can successfully be tackled without a better understanding 
of the incentive systems that work in the nonprofit sector and that distinguish that sector 
from the worlds of government and commerce. We must know more about the factors 
that screen individuals—managers, founders, employees, donors, and volunteers—into 
one of these three sectors, and more about the incentives affecting their behavior once 
they have been screened. These incentive systems have a great deal to do with the way 
different types of organizations behave—and therefore with the appropriate division of 
labor among organizations. They also have a great deal to do with how nonprofit 
organizations can improve and measure their performance. 
For most of Dennis Young's scholarly life, he has studied alternative institutional 
arrangements for delivering human services and the incentive structures that 
characterize the organizational alternatives. His books on day care and foster care broke 
new ground. Accordingly, when Yale launched its Program on Non-Profit 
Organizations in 1977, one of the very first people to whom we turned as a possible 
participant was Professor Young. To the great delight of those of us who were designing 
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the research agenda for this new program, Professor Young was interested in exploring 
one crucial aspect of the incentives picture: the role of entrepreneurs, those managers 
and founders of nonprofit organizations who succeed in building or giving new life to 
voluntary organizations as a result of their own imagination, drive and talent. Professor 
Young was fascinated by the question of what, in a world without conventional profit 
incentives, distinguishes entrepreneurs from those in the worlds of government and 
commerce. We usually associate the word entrepreneur with the for-profit 
arena—indeed, it is a reflection of our limited view of the U.S. economic system that 
when entrepreneurship is mentioned for the first time to most observers, the common 
reaction is: "How can there be entrepreneurial activity without profit?" or "You mean, I 
suppose, a study of how nonprofits can save themselves by engaging in commercial 
enterprise." 
This book should open the eyes of those who entertain so narrow an 
understanding of entrepreneurship. The culmination of Professor Young's imaginative 
and energetic travail over the past few years, this book makes it clear that the 
entrepreneurial spirit is remarkably alive in the nonprofit world, and that entrepreneurial 
activity extends well beyond the production of commercial revenue for nonprofit 
groups. (His work also required enormous patience, for nothing is harder than corralling 
a score of exceedingly busy entrepreneurs, not necessarily interested in scholarship, and 
getting them to sit still long enough to discuss their work and dreams and frustrations.) If 
Professor Young's painstaking empirical work, reflected in 21 case studies of 
entrepreneurship, did nothing more than document the existence of this behavior, so 
widely doubted or underestimated, it would represent a considerable contribution. But 
Professor Young's work, by casting a new light on the incentives that spawn 
entrepreneurial activity in all three organizational sectors, also gives us a far better 
understanding of the behavior of the various organizational species that inhabit our 
society. As a result, this work advances by a giant step the twin missions mentioned 
earlier: developing a better understanding of the division of labor among sectors, and 
promoting effectiveness within the nonprofit world. 
Professor Young thus brings us much closer to developing a general theory of the 
role and performance of the nonprofit sector in the United States. At the same time, he 
helps us to think about the difficult policy dilemmas that will arise more and more often 
in the years to come. (These include, for example: Should regulatory and tax measures 
encourage all organizations in a given industry such as the nursing home, or hospital, or 
funeral parlor to become nonprofit? Or to become for-profit? Should we more tightly 
police the behavior of the managers of voluntary organizations? Or should we loosen the 
restrictions on their pecuniary rewards?) In addition to these insights, Professor Young's 
work gives us an extra dividend: it helps us to understand the wellsprings of 
entrepreneurial activity outside the nonprofit sector, at a time when there is acute 
concern about the level of dynamic and innovative activity in U.S. industry. 
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A brief account of the Yale Program on Non-Profit Organizations indicates how 
nicely Professor Young's scholarship fits into the program's overall work. The program 
is an interdisciplinary center for research on the world of nonprofit institutions: their 
past, present and potential role in our social order, the financing and management 
problems they face, their impact on the government and business sectors, and their 
patterns of governance and accountability. Located within Yale's Institution for Social 
and Policy Studies, the program was launched by Yale's former president, Kingman 
Brewster, as a way of redressing a long tradition of scholarly neglect of voluntary 
institutions. Despite the wide variety of social and economic tasks these institutions 
perform in the United States, our nonprofit sector has been the least studied and the least 
well understood aspect of our national life. 
The Program on Non-Profit Organizations seeks to stimulate academic inquiry 
and attention, to build a body of data, theory, and analysis about the nonprofit sector, 
and to generate research that will help resolve major policy and management issues 
confronting nonprofit organizations. Approximately 150 senior and junior scholars have 
participated in the program, representing a wide range of disciplines and using many 
approaches. Approximately 100 articles, working papers, reports and book manuscripts 
have emerged to date. As this preface is written, the program is entering its second 
five-year phase of activity, in which it will explore new research territory; consolidate, 
on the basis of several cross-cutting themes, much of the work of the first five-year 
phase; and seek new ways to spread the results of this research to a variety of 
nonscholarly as well as scholarly audiences. 
As we look back on the first five-year phase of this program, a paramount source 
of pride and pleasure is the work of Dennis Young, which we have been privileged to 
sponsor and which now reaches the general public with this book. 
 
 
John G. Simon 
Chairman, Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Yale University 
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The primary purpose of this book is to develop the rudiments of a theory of behavior of 
nonprofit organizations on which public policies that govern the use of these 
organizations for public service can be intelligently based. A review of literature on 
nonprofit organizations is presented to give the reader a sense of the state of existing 
theory and knowledge about these agencies. The function of entrepreneurship serves as 
the point of departure for theory development, necessitating considerable review and 
discussion of this subject. Thus clarification of the entrepreneurial process and its role in 
the nonprofit sector occupies a major part of this book and is presented as an important 
ancillary contribution. 
Theory development must be based in empirical observation if it is to be relevant 
to problems of the real world. To a large extent, documentary literature and the author's 
general experiences fill this need, but the unique formulation of a theory based on the 
combined areas of entrepreneurship and nonprofit organizations also calls for original 
fieldwork. That field-work is documented by case studies in the child-welfare sector, 
available separately but referred to in this book as the author's field studies or observed 
cases. (See "Human Service Enterprise: Case Studies of Entrepreneurship in Child 
Welfare," Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Institution for Social and Policy 
Studies, Yale University, 1981.) 
As this book moves from review and clarification of the nonprofit sector and 
entrepreneurship to development of the theory itself, the style of analysis changes as 
well. The early discussion is basically factual and documentary in character, leaning 
heavily on published material. As the theoretical framework is laid out (in chapters 5 
through 8), the discussion becomes more inferential, assertive, and even speculative, as 
assumptions are made and hypotheses offered on the motives and mechanisms through 
which entrepreneurial activity influences the behavior of the nonprofit sector. Although 
the assumptions and specifications are based on insights derived from observation, the 
formulation is necessarily judgmental and open to debate. Statements in this part of the 
book should thus be viewed as informed intuition rather than hard fact, and the 
theoretical framework as a whole must therefore be regarded as somewhat rough and 
tentative, welcoming both logical refinement and empirical verification, but, it is hoped, 
ringing true in its essential thrust. 
Once the rudiments of the theory have been discussed, the book turns to a 
deductive mode of argument. Implications are derived for the performance of public ser- 
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vices, assuming the implementation of alternative public-policy measures that affect the 
use of nonprofit organizations. This analysis is based on the application of logic, but its 
results still depend on the veracity of the theoretical assumptions. 
The basic purpose of the book is served in these last two stages. The theory of 
nonprofit behavior is set out so that social scientists may use it as a springboard for 
further conceptual refinement and as the basis for formulating hypotheses for empirical 
testing. The policy implications are offered so that, pending acceptance of the 
theoretical framework, the merits of alternative programs can be more insightfully 
debated. 
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1   Overview 
 
Although the histories of some nonprofit-sector organizations go back hundreds of 
years, often predating existing organizations in business and government sectors, the 
roles and behaviors of nonprofits in the modern world are less well understood than 
those of organizations in other sectors. In the United States, nonprofits are alternatively 
viewed as organizational devices to avoid taxation or as panaceas that would rid certain 
industries of their greedy, self-serving elements, as trusted institutions that preserve 
cherished cultural and social-welfare traditions or as unfair and wasteful competitors to 
profit-making enterprise or government-service provision. 
Why has the nonprofit sector been such an enigma and a mystery even to 
well-educated people? One reason is that there is no simple way of associating nonprofit 
organizations with a clear-cut purpose or with leaders to whom simple labels and 
motives can be applied. We are all familiar with the profit-seeking businessman in the 
commercial sector. We think of the ambitious vote-gathering politician in government. 
These stereotypes help us conceptualize what makes the business and government 
sectors function. In the nonprofit sector, however, there seems to be no counterpart—no 
obvious leadership agent that captures the essence of that sector's drive and motivation.  
Are there such entrepreneurial agents? Suppose that the following headlines appeared in 
the business section of the New York Times: 
New Organization Takes Hold amid Decay of the South Bronx 
Agency Established to Computerize Management Information for Local Service 
Industry 
Harlem Service Organization Separates from Parent Company 
Historic Merger of Two Organizations Results in One of the Largest Firms in the 
Industry 
From Modest Beginnings, Agency Grows into a Thriving Multimillion-Dollar 
Statewide Organization 
Good Business Management, Aggressive Merger Policy Moves Agency from 
Near Collapse to Industry Leadership 
Agency Opens a New Division; Hopes and Fears Expressed over Effects of New 
Service Mode on Stability of Overall Operations 
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These could easily be typical stories of entrepreneurial activity in the commercial 
sector. However, these headlines also succinctly summarize instances of enterprising 
activity in the nonprofit sector of the economy— specifically, a few of the author's 
fifteen child-welfare-related, nonprofit case studies. The fact that such cases can be 
described in the same terms used to describe commercial ventures demonstrates that 
entrepreneurial leadership is not limited to the business sector (or to government) but is 
characteristic of the nonprofit sector as well. 
One purpose of this book is to focus the attention of scholars, managerial 
practitioners, and social policymakers on this heretofore neglected area of social and 
economic behavior—entrepreneurship in the nonprofit context, and the different 
motivations, risks, constraints, and environmental circumstances guiding enterprising 
behavior in this arena. A more fundamental purpose of this book, however, is to develop 
a theory of behavior for nonprofit organizations. Such a theory must be built on an 
understanding of the driving forces behind organizational actions. Clearly, the study of 
entrepreneurship is an intellectual window on this question. Where are the driving 
forces more clearly at work than at the leading edge of activity cut by a sector's 
entrepreneurs? Hence, where else is the motivational basis for activity in a sector more 
likely to be revealed? For example, in the for-profit sector enterprising behavior is 
generally believed to be motivated by material gain, with entrepreneurial managers and 
capitalists exhibiting their motives in response to market opportunities for such gain.  
What, then, of the nonprofit sector? The nonprofit sector, like others, is composed of 
many constituent groups that help shape the economic and organizational 
environment—managers, workers, board members, clients and consumers, donors and 
philanthropists, and government regulators, for example. As a prime source of insight, 
however, it is useful to focus on entrepreneurs, their motives, and the influences that 
affect their decisions and fundamentally shape the activity of the nonprofit sector. 
Field studies show strong and diverse motivating factors in the nonprofit arena 
and entrepreneurs as dynamic as those who work in the profit sector. In this book the 
author's case studies and other reports of entrepreneurial activity in the literature are 
used as the basis for classifying these motivations. This book asks, simply: if it isn't 
profit, what drives enterprising individuals, women and men, to pursue their ventures in 
the nonprofit context? That starting point is used to build a theoretical framework that 
extrapolates from entrepreneurial motivations to behavior of organizations and sectors 
as a whole. 
To what end is this theory-building exercise directed? In short, the purpose is to 
extend scholarly understanding of nonprofits and to contribute to policy discussions 
concerning the use of these agencies to deliver public services. Certainly, as discussed in 
the next chapter, there is a growing academic interest in the theory of nonprofit 
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organizations. The nonprofit sector still constitutes a lacuna for scholars, however, 
particularly for students of microeconomic theory. What are the reasons and 
justifications for establishing nonprofit organizations, and how can a theory of the firm, 
analogous to the classical theory of the profit-making firm or the newer economic 
models of government bureaus be developed for nonprofits? Scholars have only 
recently begun to seriously address such questions. This book is intended to contribute 
to this embryonic literature, but in an unconventional way, by constructing a behavioral 
theory based on the processes of screening, or self-selection, through which 
entrepreneurs with alternative motivational leanings choose the industries and sectors in 
which they engage in enterprising activity. The theory developed here views nonprofit 
organizational behavior not in isolation, but in the context of other sectors that exist 
alongside it. The thrust of the theory is that entrepreneurs of different motivations and 
styles sort themselves out by industries and economic sectors in a way that matches the 
preferences of these entrepreneurs for wealth, power, intellectual or moral purposes, and 
other goals with the opportunities for achieving these goals in different parts of the 
economy. Once screened, such entrepreneurial agents are assumed to be largely 
responsible for giving each sector its particular behavioral flavor and performance 
characteristics. 
Important, substantive differences exist between the screening, or self-selection, 
model of behavior developed here and the constrained maximization approach of 
conventional microeconomic theory of the firm. The latter postulates that an agency 
(nonprofit or otherwise) has some clear objective function that it maximizes, subject to a 
budget or other resource limitation. We can gain a glimpse of the difference between the 
two approaches by considering what would happen if additional monies were suddenly 
granted to nonprofit agencies in a given industry. The conventional theory predicts more 
of the same type of behavior, that is, achievement of the original objective, but at some 
higher level of output. The screening framework, however, anticipates more 
fundamental changes in purpose and direction as shifts occur among sectors in the 
distribution of entrepreneurial motivations. 
In general, an advantage of the multisector framework over narrower and more 
monolithic approaches to modeling of nonprofits is that it seems more capable of 
considering the potential effects of changes in ground rules and opportunity structures 
that alter the position of nonprofits in an industry relative to organizations in other 
sectors. For example, what happens if nonprofits are favored by government in funding, 
licensure, or taxation in a particular industry? In essence, the screening theory 
anticipates that the distribution of entrepreneurial talent will be altered, with consequent 
implications for the sector's motivational content and, hence, behavior, over time.
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This kind of difference in thrust between the conventional approach and the approach 
taken here, with its concomitant implications for both scholarly understanding and 
practical policy formulation, constitutes the most important contribution of this book. 
Many important policy issues hinge on improved understanding of the behavior 
of nonprofit organizations. For example, various societal forces have conspired in recent 
years to threaten the viability and independence of nonprofit institutions in higher 
education, social services, and a number of other areas. Are these institutions worth 
saving? If so, what are their special virtues and what are the implications of rescuing 
them with public dollars? Answers to such questions require knowledge of how such 
agencies perform under alternative opportunities and constraints, compared with 
institutions from other sectors that might replace them. 
In other areas, particularly in the fine arts and museums, where nonprofits hold 
dominant positions in industries that have traditionally been privately funded in the 
United States, government has moved toward greater public subsidies, in part to permit 
expansion and greater citizen appreciation and participation. Should such support be 
confined to nonprofits? Can the infusion of such resources be expected to change the 
behavior of these nonprofit organizations? By attracting a wider spectrum of entre-
preneurial motivations, the answer may well be yes. Clearly, a fuller understanding of 
nonprofit behavior would be helpful in the consideration of these matters. 
In still other industries, the problems associated with service provision in the 
governmental or proprietary sectors have prompted policymakers to consider a more 
significant role for nonprofits in providing services. In certain areas of applied research, 
for example, nonprofit think tanks have been created as alternatives to use of proprietary 
consulting firms or in-house government staffs. In large proprietary sectors, such as day 
care and nursing homes for the elderly, abuses have led to serious proposals to 
"nonprofitize" these industries. Again, evaluation of these proposals requires some 
conceptual basis for understanding how such a policy can be expected to affect the 
behavior of participating nonprofit agencies. 
At first, the oil-and-water-like mix of the two subjects—entrepreneurship and 
nonprofit organizations—may seem strange. Most of us have been acculturated to the 
notion that entrepreneurship is solely a function of the commercial marketplace. To the 
contrary, however, entrepreneurship is the key to unlocking some of the doors to better 
understanding of the world of nonprofit organizations. 
This book divides into two parts. Chapters 2 through the first half of chapter 5 
describe nonprofit organizations and the entrepreneurship process, establishing the 
background for the theory developed in the rest of the book. Chapter 2 provides a 
general discussion of the nonprofit sector, its size and character in the United States
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and the contributions scholars have made to date toward understanding why it exists and 
how it behaves. 
Chapter 3 develops the concept of entrepreneurship, explaining that contrary to 
some popular notions, entrepreneurship is not confined to the profit-making sector but 
accurately denotes mobilizing and catalytic activity in all sectors. The chapter also 
provides examples of nonprofit entrepreneurial activity in various parts of the service 
economy. Chapter 4 extends the discussion of entrepreneurship by describing some 
typical scenarios for venture activity and the economic and social conditions in which 
they take place. The first part of chapter 5 reviews the literature on motivations that 
underlie entrepreneurial behavior. 
The latter part of chapter 5 begins to establish a theory of nonprofit behavior by 
specifying stereotypes intended to capture the alternative motivations and styles of 
entrepreneurs. 
Chapters 6 and 7 outline the processes of screening through which alternative 
entrepreneurial types are sorted into industries and into economic sectors within 
industries. These chapters identify the structural factors that cause particular varieties of 
entrepreneurs to select careers, employment, and venture initiatives in certain 
organizational contexts rather than in others. As such, sectors of a given economic and 
organizational character can ultimately be associated with particular mixes of 
motivational and behavioral patterns. 
Chapter 8 presents a postscreening perspective by assuming that entrepreneurial 
populations have been sorted into place and asking how the behavior of (screened) 
entrepreneurs will be shaped by the constraints of the sectors in which they operate. The 
discussion explicitly recognizes the relatively loose accountability structures associated 
with nonprofit organizations, and hence the margin of discretion afforded entrepreneurs. 
As such, ultimate behavior patterns will reflect both entrepreneurial indulgence in their 
own motives and adaptation to the rules imposed by the structures in which they operate. 
Chapter 9 is a slight but significant digression, which considers the long-term 
behavioral implications of entrepreneurial activity. Here it is argued that differences in 
entrepreneurial motivation (resulting from screening) affect organizational behavior not 
only at the time of venture start-up but also over time. Specifically, the strength of 
entrepreneurial commitments to particular ventures and host organizations is seen to 
vary by type of motivation, leading to differences in the long-run success probability as 
well as the long-run consistency of behavior of the organizations in which entrepreneurs 
work. 
In chapter 10, the theory is brought together and given a normative light by 
focusing on social-performance criteria and public-policy alternatives. Various 
entrepreneur-based behavior patterns are considered in terms of four fundamental
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criteria—trustworthiness, responsiveness, efficiency, and innovation. Subsequently, 
five major types of public-policy thrusts are considered: (1) the proposal that all 
agencies in an industry be made nonprofit; (2) the restriction of entry by new 
organizations into the nonprofit sector; (3) the professional licensing of personnel in a 
given industry; (4) the targeting of public resources to the nonprofit sector of a given 
industry; and (5) more intensive policing of the regulatory constraints that apply to 
nonprofit organizations. These kinds of policies are seen to alter the screening and 
internal accountability mechanisms of sectors in an industry, and hence the behavioral 
tendencies and social-performance patterns that emerge. Thus the theoretical framework 
proves to be useful in developing the implications of public-policy initiatives over a 
range of options. 
Overall, the analysis developed in the latter part of this book may be 
characterized as a descriptive, sector-level theory of behavior. It is sector-level in the 
sense that it describes in a qualitative way the statistical tendencies and patterns of 
entrepreneurial populations and groups of organizations in an economic sector, rather 
than pinpointing specific deterministic objectives and outcomes at the level of 
individual organizations or people. In particular, the phenomenon of screening by which 
entrepreneurs are seen to sort themselves into different economic sectors, described in 
chapters 6 and 7, may be thought of as a random process that allows deviations, 
mistakes, and changes of mind by individuals and is subject to idiosyncrasies of context, 
history, and other elements of chance but still provides a roughly accurate picture of 
outcomes in the sectoral aggregate. 
The theory developed here is also essentially descriptive, or positive, in 
character, in the sense that it models the world as it appears to be rather than as it should 
be according to some criterion of social justice or efficiency. Rather than trying to 
directly uncover the logic or justification for having particular industries organized in a 
certain way, this book asks why, in light of ambient economic and organizational 
conditions, we tend to observe certain patterns of behavior. However, chapter 10 finally 
does attempt to draw from this descriptive analysis some normative implications for 
social performance and public-policy formulation. 
A final word about research sources is in order here. Much of the thinking 
contained in this book derives from my experiences in developing the aforementioned 
series of twenty-one case studies which focus largely on child care but cover a variety of 
services, including management-information, consulting, education, and mental-health 
services. The cases include the founding of new organizations as well as the formation 
of new programs within existing organizations in the nonprofit, proprietary, and 
government sectors. 
The case studies provide a source of depth, because each one probes intensively 
into the circumstances and motivations for the venture at issue. Obviously, however,
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the relatively small number of cases required that other sources be investigated as well. 
Thus many references from the literature and the news media, cited throughout the 
book, have been consulted to enlarge the perspective and to put the insights derived 
from the cases into broader focus. 
 
  
2   The Nonprofit Sector 
 
Current interest in the private nonprofit sector of the American economy, by scholars 
and policymakers, has been stimulated by both the growing significance and the recent 
struggle of many organizations in this category.1 The absolute size of the nonprofit 
sector only hints at its importance. Although sector definitions differ, there is agreement 
that the private nonprofit sector constitutes about 5 percent of overall economic activity, 
by various measures. Calculations by Ginsberg (1973) show that private nonprofits 
account for approximately 8 percent of employment and 5 percent of gross national 
product (GNP).2 Tideman (1974), using a more restricted sector definition, estimates 
employment at 5 percent.3 According to estimates made by Weisbrod, private nonprofit 
organizations, in particular, those designated as exempt from corporate taxes by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), represented 5.2 percent of all corporations, 
partnerships, and proprietorships in the United States in 1979, received 3.5 percent of all 
revenue, and held 4.3 percent of the total assets of business firms in 1975-1976.4 Other 
estimates of assets are higher.5 
More important, however, the nonprofit sector is concentrated in such strategic 
areas as health, education, and social services (welfare), which together in 1976 
represented 64 percent of all nonprofit revenue.6 Nonprofits represent a major 
proportion of member institutions in such key service sectors as hospitals, residential 
facilities for the handicapped, disturbed, or dependent, museums, and colleges and 
universities. Furthermore, in the performing arts, religion, advocacy, and research, 
private nonprofits constitute significant, if not overwhelming, proportions of industrial 
activity. 
Moreover, as Weisbrod and others have indicated, the nonprofit sec-
tor—specifically that part of the sector comprising organizations to which contributions 
are tax deductible—seems to be growing somewhat faster than the rest of the economy. 
Whereas the number of profit-making firms (proprietorships, partnerships, and 
corporations) increased roughly 3.3 percent per year in the early 1970s (1970-1975),7 
the number of nonprofit firms of tax-deductible status increased at a rate of 7.3 percent 
per year (1971 -1976).8 Similarly, gross receipts of these two sectors exhibited annual 
rates of increase during the same periods of 15 percent versus 20 percent. Over a longer 
term, Hirstand reports that nonprofits' expenditures moved from 3 percent of GNP in 
1960 to 5 percent in 1973,9 and Clarkson indicates that the number of private, tax ex- 
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empt organizations reported by the IRS more than tripled between 1965 and 1972.10 
Nonetheless, amid this apparent prosperity there is serious worry about the future 
of many nonprofit organizations and the viability of the sector as a whole. The concern 
is especially acute in certain industries. For example, in higher education the Carnegie 
Council reports that one-quarter of private colleges are in trouble.11 At a time when rates 
of failure among commercial business firms are declining12, financial failures among 
organizations in a wide variety of areas—higher education, social service, the arts, even 
hospitals—are commonplace; indeed, proposals to merge and consolidate to preserve 
existing operations are almost routine. Furthermore, as government has come to finance 
a large proportion of the services delivered by nonprofit organizations, especially 
research, health care, social services, higher education, and the arts, serious concerns 
have arisen over the flexibility and vitality of this once truly independent sector. (See 
Rose-Ackerman and Nielson for a review of financing patterns.)13 
If there is any agreement among observers on what is happening to the nonprofit 
sector, it is that this sector is changing. Agencies are dropping out, consolidation is 
taking place, finances are shifting, yet the number of new organizations is also growing, 
apparently faster than in the profit-making sector, and substantial numbers of innovative 
programs are developing. Charitable contributions are faltering as giving declines as a 
proportion of GNP,14 but governmental financing and sales revenues have grown 
significantly.15 By Weisbrod's calculation, volunteer labor devoted to nonprofit 
organizations has outpaced the general growth in the labor force in the 1960s and 
1970s.16 
If scholars are to understand the changing role of the nonprofit sector and the 
behavior of its member organizations and if policymakers are to deal intelligently with 
issues concerning the use and regulation of nonprofits for public purposes, then a more 
precise and robust knowledge base will ultimately be required—not just statistical 
information but a better conceptual frame of reference than is presently available. First, 
the nonprofit sector must be broken into its component parts and member organizations 
classified by their various types and purposes, because this sector seems much too 
diverse to be understood by a single characterization or model. Second, a theory must be 
developed for explaining the existence of nonprofits in terms of their special advantages 
and roles vis-a-vis governmental and profit-making organizations. Third, behavioral 
models must be synthesized to explain how nonprofit organizations decide on the 
nature, quantity, quality, costs, and other aspects of their services and operations. 
Despite the novelty of the study of nonprofits as an academic discipline and the 
enormity of the subject, scholars have already made important contributions to these 
classification, theory-building, and modeling tasks. 
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Classification of nonprofits must begin with a definition. What is a nonprofit 
organization? The basic answer, offered by Hansmann, is that an organization is 
nonprofit if it is prohibited by law from distributing surplus revenues (that is, receipts 
less expenditures, or profits) to individuals (owners).17 This is the so-called 
nondistribution constraint, which requires that employees of a nonprofit organization 
receive reasonable salaries not directly determined by the organization's financial 
performance and that there be no owners or shareholders who receive dividends. As 
Hansmann is quick to indicate, nonprofit organizations may generate financial 
surpluses, but these must be retained or spent on activities consistent with the 
organization's purposes. 
The nondistribution constraint is not very limiting in the kinds of organizations 
that it encompasses. For example, all organizations classified as exempt from corporate 
income tax by the IRS fit this definition. In particular, the IRS's Activity Code of 
Exempt Organizations, which, as Feigenbaum points out, serves a function similar to the 
Standard Industrial Code (SIC) for the profit-making sector, covers the following major 
functional categories: religious activities; schools and colleges, including research; 
cultural, historical, and other educational activities, including museums; other 
instruction and training activities; health services; business and professional 
organizations; farming and related activities; mutual organizations, including mutual 
insurance companies and savings banks and farmers' cooperatives; employee- or 
membership-benefit organizations, including labor unions and fraternal orders; sports, 
athletic, recreational, and social activities, such as country clubs; youth activities, such 
as Boy Scouts; conservation, environmental, and beautification activities; housing 
activities; inner-city or community activities; civil-rights activities; litigation and legal 
aid; legislative and political activities; advocacy; and additional categories that 
encompass counseling and assistance to needy individuals, community chests, 
cemeteries, emergency relief, and so on.18 Such a bewildering array of activity in which 
tax-exempt nonprofits are involved makes classification all the more important. Nor, as 
Hansmann points out, is the IRS list of tax-exempt organizations a complete catalog of 
nonprofit activity.19 Nonprofit laws of incorporation vary considerably by state. In some 
states with liberal incorporation laws a wide range of activities may take place in 
nonprofit form; in other states with more restrictive laws nonprofits are confined to 
more narrowly defined charitable and public purposes. 
One way to classify nonprofits is to distinguish tax-exempt agencies to which 
charitable contributions are deductible from personal income taxes from those to which 
contributions are not deductible. The latter group consists of mutual-benefit 
organizations, such as farm bureaus, insurance agencies, unions, trade associations, and 
clubs that provide services and benefits only to their members. Tax-deductible 
organizations are assumed to serve a broader purpose, to which the general
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public may wish to contribute or from which it may receive benefits. 
Hansmann takes a somewhat different angle in classifying nonprofits, noting that 
exemption by federal and state governments is somewhat arbitrary and irregular. He 
chooses to focus on more fundamental aspects of financing and managerial control.20 In 
terms of financing, Hansmann differentiates donative from commercial nonprofits, the 
former being primarily dependent on charitable contributions for support and the latter 
depending mostly on revenues from sale of services to individuals or to governments via 
fee-for-service contracts. On the managerial dimension, Hansmann distinguishes 
mutual from entrepreneurial nonprofits, the former being controlled by patrons or 
members through a democratic process and the latter controlled by a self-perpetuating 
board of directors independent of the membership or clientele. Hansmann's 
classification is really a two-dimensional spectrum, because many nonprofits exhibit 
mixtures of contributory and sales financing and membership versus trustee control. 
Nonetheless, it is a useful classification for differentiating prominent varieties of 
nonprofit organizations in a rough way. For example, political lobby groups, such as 
Common Cause or college alumni associations, are mutual-donative nonprofits; country 
clubs or professional associations, for example, the American Economic Association, 
could be classified as mutual-commercial nonprofits; charities such as the Salvation 
Army, the Red Cross, or free museums are donative-entrepreneurial organizations; and 
hospitals, nursing homes, and research institutes are basically 
entrepreneurial-commercial in nature. Some nonprofits are harder to classify in terms of 
Hansmann's four-way scheme. Universities, for example, are financed by both tuition 
and contributions and are governed by trustees who are often elected from the ranks of 
alumni (who can be viewed as patrons or members). 
There are, of course, many other dimensions along which nonprofit organizations 
can be differentiated. Nonprofit organizations vary tremendously in size, from those 
with annual operating budgets of $100,000 or less to those with annual budgets in the 
tens of millions of dollars. Another differentiating characteristic of nonprofits is the 
style and culture of an agency— for example, its orientation toward business 
management and efficiency or toward professional disciplinary interests and research 
and toward self-determination versus orientation to a larger system or network of 
agencies.21 As indicated by Sarason,22 Lehman,23 and others, the presence of networking 
is a significant phenomenon in the nonprofit social and health services. One important 
facilitator of such a network orientation is the affiliation of organizations with charitable 
or planning systems, such as The United Fund or health and welfare councils. A 
particularly important affiliation in some areas—especially in social services, health, 
and education—is the connection to a religious system, for example, the Catholic Char- 
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ities or the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies. In a number of the author's case studies 
membership or lack of membership in a federation is seen to significantly influence 
organizational behavior. 
Within this taxonomic state of understanding of nonprofit organizations it is 
possible to focus on particular varieties for more intensive study. My concern here is 
with entrepreneurial, commercially oriented nonprofits, because these are the nonprofit 
agencies primarily engaged in public-service delivery. Variations in the sources of 
financing and control will be of special interest. Concentration will also center on 
"deductible" organizations, which are generally formed with some element of public 
purpose in order to solicit private donations. Attention is not confined to agencies of a 
particular size, style, or affiliation, however. My interest is to reflect broadly on the 
activity of nonprofits in the delivery of general public services in areas such as social 
welfare, health, education, research, and the arts, where, conceivably, services may be 
carried out through the public or profit-seeking sectors as well. In this manner, I hope to 
be able to highlight the process of sector choice as well as the behavioral implications of 
the nonprofit alternative. 
The theory explaining the existence of, or rationale for, nonprofit organizations 
has various strands. Contributions by Weisbrod and Hansmann are some of the most 
notable to date. Weisbrod essentially asserts that nonprofit organizations have arisen as 
a consequence of unsatisfied demands for public goods.24 This is a kind of 
government-failure argument, wherein the public sector is seen as unable to satisfy the 
demands of some groups who desire a greater quality or quantity of some public 
services. Hence these groups organize on a voluntary basis to satisfy the collective 
demand neglected by the government. The large group of donative organizations 
supported by charitable contributions for which there is no direct quid pro quo would 
seem to offer services with a strong public-goods character. Commercial nonprofits of 
the mutual variety, supported by membership contributions, also appear to provide 
collective goods for their admittedly limited publics, and those of the entrepreneurial 
variety are often financed by public fee-for-service funds and hence are agents if not 
architects of public purpose. 
Hansmann comes to his explanation of nonprofits from the opposite direction of 
market failure,25 basing his analysis on earlier work of Nelson and Krashinsky in the 
area of day care for young children.26 Hansmann argues that nonprofits arise in areas of 
activity where the consumer is disadvantaged in his ability to discern or evaluate the 
quality of services. In essence, Hansmann observes that nonprofits are viewed as more 
trustworthy by the consumer because of the presence of the nondistribution constraint, 
which reduces the probability that management will make sacrifices in the quality of 
services to increase financial returns. Thus nonprofits arise in such areas as nursing 
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homes, child care, hospitals, education, and research either because consumers 
(children, the sick, and so on) are incompetent judges or because the services involved 
are too complex for the layman to evaluate. 
An alternative way of characterizing the trustworthiness argument is to view the 
problem as an asymmetry of information between producers and consumers.27 Michelle 
White uses this perspective to explain why profit-making, nonprofit, and governmental 
suppliers are observed to exist simultaneously in a given area of service, such as day 
care or nursing care.28 White argues that consumers, or consumer agents, for example, 
parents, make trade-offs between having to spend time monitoring inherently less 
trustworthy profit-making suppliers and using the less market-responsive (but more 
trustworthy) services of nonprofits or governments. Trustworthiness is seen to increase, 
and hence monitoring costs to decrease, as one moves from profit-making to nonprofit 
to public suppliers, whereas responsiveness to consumer preferences, that is, provision 
of desired price-quality combinations, is seen to vary in the reverse direction. Thus the 
marginal value of a person's time, that is the time available for personally monitoring 
service quality, determines his sectoral selection of suppliers. This value of time can be 
expected to vary by income and other variables, hence organizations in each sector can 
be presumed to attract different classes of consumers. 
There is an interesting closure between the public-goods and trust rationales for 
nonprofits, posed recently by Weisbrod.29 In particular, Weisbrod observes a growing 
public demand for trustworthy institutions as goods and services become more 
technologically complex over time (such as medical care, energy production, food 
additives, legal liabilities, and so on). Hence he speculates that the growth of nonprofits 
is a response to this demand. 
Since de Tocqueville's time, the vitality of the American democracy and 
economy has been seen to lie in the diversity of its economic and political system, owing 
in part to the ability of citizens to organize themselves on a private, voluntary basis. 
Thus a traditional argument for nonprofit activity is its character of public-spirited 
action, independent of government, decentralized and flexible, yet still 
community-oriented in nature. As explained by Douglas, the nonprofit sector is able to 
serve this function because it is free of the categorical constraint that requires 
government to provide its services on a fairly equal basis to all citizens: 
The extent to which the categorical constraint will limit the freedom and constrain 
the flexibility of the public sector will vary . . . somewhat according to the system 
of government. . . .Yet there must be a limit to the extent to which the law can bend 
. . .  if the principle of equality before the law is not to be broached. . . .The private 
non-profit sector has something of the same flexibility of the market sector, but . . . 
can apply its flexibility to public goods. . . .[T]he government sector has 
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the . . . drawback that it is unable to allow citizens to opt out and must therefore 
either perpetrate the injustice of compelling citizens to contribute to a service of 
which they disapprove, or . . . fail to produce a service needed by [some] . . .  de-
serving groups.30 
The rationale of independent and diverse public-oriented provision certainly 
appears to underlie the justification for political lobbying organizations, charities, and 
other activities that Hansmann might classify as mutual or donative nonprofits. It would 
also seem to apply to entrepreneurial-commercial nonprofits in such service-producing 
activities as child care, hospitals, museums, and schools, where the presence of 
nonprofits serves as a counterweight to potentially more monolithic governmental or 
profit-seeking domination and as an independent source of innovation, treatment 
methodology, and policy concepts. 
Several scholars have postulated positive models of the behavior of nonprofit 
organizations. Interestingly there is not a particularly good fit between the conceptual 
rationale for nonprofits as providers of public goods and as fiduciaries for troubled 
consumers and the stipulated behavioral propensities postulated in existing economic 
models. Niskanen, for example, describes the nonprofit organization as a 
revenue-maximizing entity from which agency management derives personal utility 
from power, prestige, monetary benefits, and so on.3' Tullock provides a parallel model 
for charities,32 and Pauly and Redisch view the nonprofit hospital as a device for 
maximizing physicians' incomes.33 Etzioni and Doty also take special note of 
income-increasing tendencies within nonprofits.34 Feigenbaum, following the 
managerial-discretion approach of Williamson35 and Migue and Belanger,36 postulates 
that nonprofits will, in effect, maximize profits (surpluses of revenues over minimizing 
costs), which are then used for both demand stimulation and managerial reward.37 
James models the nonprofit university as a source of utility for faculty.38 In this 
model, revenues from undergraduate teaching are seen to subsidize the research and 
graduate-school activities that the faculty prefer. Alternatively, Newhouse characterizes 
the hospital as an output-maximizing agent, subject to physicians' choices of appropriate 
quality of services.39 Carlson follows a similar approach.40 Clarkson provides a catalog 
of such economic models for describing nonprofit and other types of firms.41 
The chasm that separates the rather noble-purposed explanations of nonprofit 
activity from the skeptical, almost cynical assumptions of the positive-modeling 
approaches can be bridged by one view of nonprofit development: nonprofits are 
formed and authorized in response to particular public needs—the provision of certain 
public goods and the delivery of certain services that require a fiduciary relationship 
with the consumer. Certain legal requirements are imposed and privileges granted to
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nonprofits, most notably the nondistribution constraint and tax relief, to encourage 
compliance with the intended purposes. However nonprofit actors (management) 
ultimately attempt to test these constraints and manipulate them toward selfish ends. In 
so doing they may be more successful than their more idealistic colleagues in ensuring 
their own survival. Hence the noble-purposed nonprofit becomes a means to selfish 
ends. 
Such a view is characteristic of the assume-the-worst, homogeneous maximizing 
school of economic modeling, which has enjoyed success in application to the 
profit-seeking sector (for example, the assumption that all managers maximize profits) 
and some success with respect to the public-sector, for example, the budget-maximizing 
models.42 Recently, however, the more simplistic homogeneous models have been 
called into question. In the corporate, profit-making sector, for example, it has been 
recognized that the separation of ownership from managerial control undermines the 
assumption of profit maximization. Managers often have the opportunity to indulge in 
individual expense-preference behavior, some of which might be community minded, 
professionally oriented, or otherwise nonpecuniary in purpose.43 In the public sector, in 
the current era of tax-limiting fervor, simplistic assumptions about budget maximizing 
will have to be reconsidered as bureaucrats and politicians find rewards for cost cutting 
as well as for program expansion. 
In the nonprofit sector, some models have recognized benevolent or 
nonpecuniary motivations associated with nonprofit activity. Both Weisbrod and 
Hansmann have considered the differential motives that draw employees and managers 
to the nonprofit sector. Hansmann postulates two types of managers—those solely 
interested in pecuniary gain and those also interested in managing institutions of high 
quality. He shows that the reduced monetary reward offered by nonprofits acts as a 
signaling device to attract quality-oriented managers and, as a result, nonprofits will 
produce outputs of higher quality.44 Weisbrod follows a similar line in his analysis of the 
employment choices of law-school graduates.45 Differentiating between those graduates 
primarily interested in money and those interested in public-interest legal work, 
Weisbrod finds that graduates who join public-interest firms accept significant pay 
reductions relative to graduates with equivalent credentials who work for profit-making 
law firms. 
The works of Hansmann and Weisbrod in the nonprofit sector and work by 
Tullock46 and others (Daly)47 in the public sector emphasize the process of screening in 
the labor market as the salient mechanism through which different sectors of the 
economy acquire their motivational characters. Screening or self-selection occurs on the 
basis of differences in structural variables among sectors (supply-side aspects, as Daly 
calls them), such as income potential and intrinsic character of the work to be 
performed. The differential filtering of motivation into sectors that allow room for man- 
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agerial discretion determines the ultimate behavior of firms. Thus, for nonprofits, 
according to Hansmann's and Weisbrod's analyses, the screening process may be 
expected to produce organizational activity that is less tuned to pecuniary 
aggrandizement than that of firms in the profit-making part of the economy. 
Because of the nonprofit sector's size and diversity, full clarification of the 
behaviors of nonprofit organizations will require extensive work by researchers. The 
screening approach articulated by Hansmann and Weisbrod, particularly if coupled with 
empirical investigation, seems likely to be one of the more fruitful strategies for several 
reasons. First, this approach recognizes that the nonprofit sector exists not in isolation, 
but in conjunction with other sectors, in most fields of activity. Second, the screening 
approach acknowledges seemingly obvious differences in motivations among partici-
pants within any given field of economic or social endeavor and the common existence 
of maneuvering room to indulge these motivations. Third, the screening approach 
postulates that differences in the character of nonprofits versus other forms may appeal 
to people with certain motivations more than to others. Thus the structural 
characteristics and opportunities for managerial discretion offered by nonprofits interact 
with the pool of motivations of potential participants to produce behaviors that 
distinguish this sector from others. Furthermore, such results may be expected to vary 
by field or industry, as the motivations of potential entrants and the structural charac-
teristics also vary among industries. 
In this book, the idea of screening is used to help explain the differential behavior 
of organizations in the nonprofit sector by focusing on a particular class of 
participants—the entrepreneurs who mobilize people and resources required to 
establish new organizations or implement major new programs or policies. In this way I 
intend to illuminate the reasons that economic activity takes place and that particular 
types of entrepreneurs participate in the nonprofit sector, and to discern the behavioral 
tendencies of nonprofits that derive from this selection process. That effort begins with a 
discussion of entrepreneurship in the next chapter. 
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3    Entrepreneurship 
 
With few exceptions modern economists have paid scant attention in their conceptual 
work to entrepreneurship.1 Conventional microeconomic theory is static, monolithic, 
and strictly structural in nature, concerned with the interaction of aggregate demand and 
supply functions (based on simple stereotypes of consumers and firms) and providing 
minimal insight into the range and variety of behavior of individual consumers or 
producers. In this same style, the theory views the interaction of supply and demand as 
an impersonal, automatic equilibrating process and is not concerned with the individuals 
and dynamic processes through which demanders and suppliers are brought together 
into new and changing markets. This structural bias of theory—particularly the 
inattention to market-making behavior—precludes most economists from seriously 
studying entrepreneurship and leaves the concept of entrepreneurship somewhat 
ambiguous and unclear. 
In everyday usage the term entrepreneurship is associated with the organizing 
and managing of risky economic ventures for profit.2 Scholars who have wrestled with 
the concept differ with this definition, and with each other, in terms of its emphasis on 
risk and profit, its lack of focus on innovation, and its failure to distinguish the 
entrepreneurial function from that of the manager, the capitalist or financier, or the 
inventor. As Hoselitz indicates: "A study of economists' opinions on entrepreneurship 
leads to strange and sometimes contradictory results. Some writers have identified 
entrepreneurship with the function of uncertainty-bearing, others with the coordination 
of productive resources, others with the introduction of innovations, and still others with 
the provision of capital."3 
Two questions arise concerning the definition of entrepreneurship. First, on what 
basis can this term be used in non-profit-making parts of the economy? (Clearly this 
practice is at odds with common usage.) Second, what specifically does 
entrepreneurship comprise? A precise idea of what is involved in entrepreneurship is 
needed in order to analyze its implications. Joseph Schumpeter, in his analysis of 
economic development, gives the classic definition of entrepreneur.4 Schumpeter 
defines the entrepreneur as the individual who implements "new combinations of means 
of production." There are five possible types of these new combinations: (1) the 
introduction of a new economic good; (2) the introduction of a new method of 
production; (3) the opening of a new market; (4) the conquest of a new source of raw 
materials of half-manufactured goods; and (5) the carrying out of the new organization 
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of an industry, such as the creation or breaking up of a monopoly. 
Schumpeter clearly focuses on implementation of change and innovation, as do 
other writers. For example, Angel, who studied development of the sun-belt cities of the 
United States, calls entrepreneurs "innovative capitalists."5 Matthew Josephson, who 
wrote on nineteenth-century industrial development, defines the entrepreneur as "one 
who feels the turn of the current before others."6 Collins and Moore, who studied 
individuals who undertook new business enterprises, define entrepreneurship as "the 
catalytic agent in society which sets into motion new enterprises, new combinations of 
production and exchange."7 
Although the focus on innovation narrows the definition of entrepreneur from the 
broader concept of manager ascribed to by Marshall, the role of innovation in 
entrepreneurship can be overemphasized.8 As Schumpeter indicates, entrepreneur is not 
synonymous with inventor or idea generator, for new ideas must be implemented to 
effect new combinations. Nor is the focus on innovation restricted to originality. 
Although Angel asserts that entrepreneurs differ from nonentrepreneurs because the 
latter "seek only to accumulate capital by mimicking established business methods. . ."9, 
Schumpeter's definition would include mimicking behavior if it took place in a new 
context, for example, existing services to a new consumer group. 
Entrepreneurship is usually associated with risk taking. As noted by Collins and 
Moore, "In the popular conception . . . the independent entrepreneur is a risk-taker—a 
man who braves uncertainty, who strikes out on his own, and who—through native wit, 
devotion to duty, and singleness of purpose—somehow creates business and industrial 
activity where none existed before."10 Schumpeter's definition, however, quite 
purposefully contains no explicit reference to risk. Schumpeter's point is to separate the 
role of entrepreneur from that of capitalist and to indicate that entrepreneurs may 
undertake no special financial risk in developing new enterprise, as it is others' capital 
that they are employing: 
The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer. . . .The one who gives credit comes to 
grief if the undertaking fails. For although any property possessed by the 
entrepreneur may be liable, yet such possession of wealth is not essential, even 
though advantageous. But even if the entrepreneur finances himself out of former 
profits, or if he contributes the means of production belonging to his . . . business, 
the risk falls on him as capitalist or as possessor of goods, not as entrepreneur. 
Risk-taking is in no case an element of the entrepreneurial function. Even though 
he may risk his reputation, the direct economic responsibility of failure never falls 
on him.11 
Although financial risk bearing can thus be conceptually separated from 
entrepreneurship, it is clear why risk is correlated with this function. First, entrepreneurs
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do often invest their own capital and, indeed, may be required to, in order to give other 
investors confidence in their commitment. (This situation does not, however, exist in the 
government and nonprofit sectors or in the context of entrepreneurship by large 
corporations, where entrepreneurs need not assume fiscal liabilities.) Also, as 
acknowledged by Schumpeter, risk may be other than financial. The outcomes of 
entrepreneurial activity are inherently less predictable than other forms of employment, 
yet entrepreneurs often put their reputations and careers on the line, in public view, with 
such ventures. Entrepreneuring may be safer than race-car driving, but it is more risky 
than the typical white-collar job. Furthermore, the inclination to take personal risks 
helps determine the boldness and innovativeness of ventures undertaken, for there 
seems an inevitable association between the degree of proposed change and the 
probability of failure. 
Perhaps of the greatest interest here is the apparent connection of 
entrepreneurship to profit making. Cole, for example, defines entrepreneurship as "The 
purposeful activity . . . of an individual or group of associated individuals, undertaken to 
initiate, maintain, or aggrandize a profit-oriented business unit for the production or 
distribution of economic goods and services."12 Despite the specific reference to the 
profit-making sector in this and other definitions and the specifically market-oriented 
context in which Schumpeter's discussion is posed, entrepreneurship is described basi-
cally as an organizing and promoting activity, which may be paid for by wages or other 
means, and which can, indeed must, takes place in all economic sectors—profit oriented 
or not. Schumpeter's concept of implementing new combinations seems entirely 
applicable to the production of government, or nonprofit-sector services, although the 
motives and the specific forms and procedures for undertaking new ventures may differ. 
Schumpeter's five types of entrepreneurial venture are based on an industry as the 
unit of analysis and involve changes in an industry's product, input, consumers, 
technology, or organizational structure. Entrepreneurs, however, operate not at the 
industry level, but at the level of the firm—the two levels being synonymous only in the 
case of a monopoly. From the viewpoint of the entrepreneur, then, it is desirable to 
classify ventures differently. Although they may be aware of this potential, 
entrepreneurs do not necessarily seek to change an industry; rather, they aim to 
implement a successful, firm-level enterprise, if only because the factors under their 
control, except in the case of a monopoly, operate at the level of the firm. 
Collins and Moore describe a basic dichotomy in the form of entrepreneurial 
ventures—the distinction between setting up new organizations and developing 
ventures within the context of existing organizations.13 These authors indicate that the 
motives of entrepreneurs and the implications of either choice may be quite different. 
This point will be elaborated later. For the present discussion the relevant consideration  
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is whether the establishment of a new organization or a new program within an existing 
organization necessarily constitutes an instance of entrepreneurship. The answer 
depends on whether something new is being done and whether the firm-level action has 
industry-wide implications of the kind outlined by Schumpeter. 
In the case of a new firm or organization, entrepreneurship almost always seems 
to be involved. New organizations are formed either to fill some empty niche in the 
industrial landscape—to offer a new product or serve a different set of consumers—or to 
substitute an improvement in the current regime—for example, use of a new 
technology, more economical input factors, or change of product quality. Furthermore, 
the introduction of new organizations inevitably alters the structure of the industry 
(Schumpeter's fifth criterion), if only slightly. Even where a new organization simply 
imitates the methods and services of another, some degree of innovation is likely to be 
involved, except perhaps in establishing franchise outlets, such as fast-food restaurants 
and automobile dealers. 
The class of ventures that take place in the context of existing organizations 
requires closer inspection. In particular, what constitutes a new enterprise or program 
within a given corporate structure? Certainly a shift of personnel or the rearrangement or 
relabeling of boxes on an organization chart should not qualify as an entrepreneurial 
venture unless it signals a more fundamental change. Various types of changes do 
qualify, however, in the sense of leading to potentially substantive changes in the 
industry. Certain of these programmatic changes are obvious. If an organization adopts 
a new technology, provides a new service, or seeks a new consumer group, it is 
implementing a new combination and hence entrepreneuring. If an organization 
undertakes a major expansion (through internal growth or mergers) or diversification of 
its goods and services, even if these products are conventional, implications may 
abound for other firms and for the structure of the industry as a whole (for example, a 
shift from many small to a few large firms). Hence the venture would qualify as 
entrepreneurial. 
Suppose that an organization radically shifts its services from one type to 
another. If the new service is novel in some sense, then the venture is clearly 
entrepreneurial, but even if the shift is from one conventional service to another, the 
venture may be indicative of change in the sense of an industry-wide shift from one 
source of demand, which is drying up (such as the demand for slide rules), to another, 
which is growing (for example, electronic calculators). 
Another form of programmatic change that takes place in the context of existing 
organizations and that often indicates entrepreneurial activity is the revival of a failing 
organization. Organizations begin to fail for a variety of internal and environmental 
reasons. According to Hirschman's analysis of the processes of "exit and voice" a certain  
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level of oscillation of organizational deterioration and recuperation is to be expected.14 
Correction of routine problems or reduction of slack through enforcement of existing 
methods and procedures or the shifting of personnel does not constitute 
entrepreneurship. Often, however, organizational failures are endemic to an industry. As 
noted above, the demand for certain products or services may decline because of 
changes in tastes or technological developments; changes in government policies may 
affect industrial fortunes (witness the role of public-university systems in the decline of 
some private universities or the effect on railroads of government spending on 
highways); or industries may age, and their technologies, capital facilities, and 
personnel capabilities may become obsolete (for example, the domestic steel industry in 
the older industrial cities of the Northeast). In such cases, entrepreneurial initiatives may 
succeed in turning organizations around through technological renovations, product 
reorientation, or structural changes in corporate financing and decision making, and 
these turnarounds may signal basic changes at the industry level. 
In short, several types of developments at the organization (firm) level are strong 
manifestations of entrepreneurial activity. The establishment of new organizations 
constitutes one class. The development of new programs in the context of existing 
organizations is another. Both types of development can include the introduction of new 
goods or services, service to new consumer groups, introduction of new technical 
methods or inputs, or innovations in corporate structure and financing. New programs 
within established organizations may also encompass major growth and expansion or 
product diversification or simplification. Finally, the turnaround of failing organizations 
may be indicative of changes in products, clientele, methods, inputs, or financial and 
organizational strategies, all indicative of entrepreneurship. 
In all these cases, of course, entrepreneurship is a matter of degree. New 
organizations and major programmatic changes in existing organizations (including 
organizational turnarounds) together provide many interesting cases. In some instances, 
ventures will be observed at the leading edge of industry-wide change. In other cases, 
imitative or following behavior may be an equally accurate characterization. In all cases, 
there will be some originality and some imitation, some industry-wide implications and 
some implications peculiar to the individual firm. It becomes a matter of judgment as to 
what constitutes a legitimate case of entrepreneurship and what does not. Nonetheless, 
the qualitative character of entrepreneurship is clear, as is the notion that new 
organizations and internal programmatic developments of the kinds just discussed are 
relevant manifestations. 
The inclusion of new organizations and internal programmatic developments 
helps make obvious the omnipresence of entrepreneurship across the various sectors of 
the economy. Although the incidence and distribution of these events differ
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among the public, nonprofit, and profit-making sectors, both new organizations and new 
program developments occur continually in all sectors. New governments occasionally 
form to replace old ones or to fill in new niches (metropolitan governments in some 
urban areas, new special districts or municipal incorporations, and so on). New 
government bureaus are formed with greater frequency, and program and policy 
changes are even more common. Failing governments also manage to extricate 
themselves from difficulty through major structural and programmatic shifts. Hundreds 
of nonprofit agencies are newly incorporated annually, and many new programs are 
established by the thousands of existing nonprofit organizations, associations, and 
federations. And struggling nonprofit universities, social-service agencies, fine-arts, and 
performing-arts organizations, and the like often save themselves from financial failure 
through entrepreneurial initiative. 
Such a litany is, of course, familiar for the profit-making sector, in which many 
new businesses start each year, new products and technologies are developed, major 
corporations undertake multiple initiatives internally, and many firms come back from 
the edge of bankruptcy. 
Because this book is fundamentally concerned with the nonprofit sector, 
particular illustrations from that part of the economy are useful to provide a specific 
sense of the nature and variety of nonprofit entrepreneurship and to indicate that 
nonprofit entrepreneurship is indeed a real, significant, and widespread phenomenon. 
This aim is most easily accomplished by reviewing a few fields of endeavor in which 
nonprofit activity is common. 
The author's field studies in the broad field of child welfare focus on various 
manifestations of entrepreneurial venture. Several cases illustrate the founding of new 
nonprofits from scratch, and other cases describe new agencies that are spin-offs of 
parent organizations. One study reviews the formation of a new agency through the 
merger of two parent agencies. Another documents the experience of a social agency 
that radically changed its services (to juveniles) from one type (detention) to another 
(diagnostic). Still other cases illustrate the creation of new services by established 
agencies. A final set of studies describe dramatic turnarounds and growth of previously 
failing organizations. 
Additional documentation of nonprofit entrepreneurial ventures in social 
services exists in the literature. For example, a collection of vignettes of over one 
hundred successful self-help projects in economically disadvantaged communities 
across the United States is presented in Uplift, under the auspices of the U.S. Jaycees 
Foundation.15 The projects cover a number of functional areas, including local 
economic development, education, employment opportunity, housing, social services, 
health services, offender rehabilitation, and community organization. The vignettes 
report the efforts of local people – housewives, working people, clergy, handicapped 
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people, social workers, minority-group leaders, ex-offenders, reformed alcoholics—to 
organize new programs and establish nonprofit organizations dedicated to solving or 
servicing some of the problems in their local communities. 
Other literature is more confined and focused on particular cases. In a study of 
foster-care agencies by Young and Finch, several cases of entrepreneurial activity are 
cited, including an agency that was converted from proprietary to nonprofit form, 
agencies that changed or grew rapidly over short periods of time, agencies that 
developed innovative programs for delinquent children, and newly established 
agencies.16 
Other children's service ventures have received more notoriety. Reverend Bruce 
Ritter has often been cited for his path-breaking developments at Covenant House, a 
nonprofit child-care agency—notably for its Under 21 program, which services 
teenagers in the Times Square area of New York City who have run away from home 
and become involved in prostitution and pornography.17 Other examples include Hope 
for Youth, a group home for abandoned or abused boys, established on Long Island in 
1969 by Elizabeth Golding, a retired family court judge;18 the Human Resources Center, 
an education and training institution for the physically handicapped, founded in 1953 by 
Henry Viscardi, himself crippled from birth;19 and a home for boys in Guatemala, 
established in 1977 by John Wetterer, an American Vietnam veteran, with the support of 
the American Friends of Children, which he also founded.20 Finally, a case of 
youth-oriented social-service entrepreneurship is described in detail by Goldenberg in 
Build Me a Mountain, which documents the formation and early operation of the 
Residential Youth Center in New Haven, Connecticut.21 The venture, which entails 
entrepreneurship by Goldenberg and a few of his associates, was funded by the U.S. 
Department of Labor through New Haven's community action agency and administered 
in conjunction with the Psycho-Educational Clinic of Yale University. 
Another interesting case, provided by Moore and Ziering, describes several 
entrepreneurial efforts to address the heroin-addiction problem in New York City in the 
mid-1960s.22 Moore cites new programs organized within the city's Addiction Services 
Administration and Health and Hospitals Corporation as well as a venture based at the 
nonprofit Beth Israel Hospital. The latter was led by Vincent Dole, who developed the 
technique of methadone maintenance and organized and expanded a program within 
Beth Israel with public-sector (city) support. 
The particular area of services to the elderly has witnessed a burgeoning of 
entrepreneurial activity over the last two decades. In the context of residential care, most 
of the action has been proprietary, but nonprofit activity also abounds.23 Recent case 
studies of newly established nursing homes by Grennon and Barsky provide detailed 
examples of two nonprofit nursing-home ventures.24 Other examples are referenced by 
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Vladeck.25 Nonresidential services to the elderly are dominated more heavily by non-
profits. Fueled in part by provisions of the Older Americans Act, initiatives in this field 
have skyrocketed. Activities include congregate meeting facilities, food and 
homemaker programs, transportation, health, and a variety of other services designed to 
enable the elderly to live in the community rather than in nursing homes. An outstanding 
example of nonprofit entrepreneurial activity in this area is the Minneapolis Age and 
Opportunity Center, Inc. (MAO), organized by Daphne Krause in 1969.26 The MAO is 
considered a pioneering venture, developed from scratch by a highly energetic and 
determined layperson, to provide a range of health, home-support, economic, and other 
assistance to elderly in need in the Minneapolis region. 
The growth of emergency-relief organizations and other major charities is a 
prime manifestation of nonprofit entrepreneurship and is often in the public eye. Some 
international efforts, such as Oxfam, established in England almost forty years ago to 
provide relief from famine,27 or the now-legendary work of Nobel laureate Mother 
Theresa of India,28 which has included the establishment of some 158 branch houses in 
thirty-one countries, are examples. In the United States, organizations like the Red 
Cross and the Salvation Army have long histories of organizing emergency-relief 
programs of various kinds. 
The fund-raising activity of emergency-relief and other types of char-
ities—specialized, like the American Cancer Society, or generalized, such as the United 
Way—constitute a rather visible aspect of nonprofit entrepreneurship. Fund raising for 
charitable causes has come to represent a business in many minds, raising suspicions 
about the wisdom and efficiency, if not propriety, with which such funds are disbursed. 
Certainly, as noted by Rose-Ackerman and others, the behavior of United Funds in 
establishing payroll-deduction plans and consolidating the fund-raising functions of 
multiple charitable causes through unified fund drives represents entrepreneurship—a 
developing of new combinations for production, in Schumpeter's terms.29 (It has also 
engendered some resistance and indignation, as many such ventures do.)30 
United Way and other large charities are nonsectarian, but similar 
entrepreneurial behavior is found in the church-oriented charities as well. Merging of 
the fund-raising efforts of such organizations as the United Jewish Appeal and the 
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies in New York is one example. Fund raising is not the 
only direct aspect of entrepreneurship manifested by church-sponsored and other 
charities, however. Aside from funding various established non-profit operating 
agencies, such charities become involved in setting up new corporations and 
administering direct-service programs in a variety of fields. For example, Catholic 
Charities of New York has been active in promoting local parishes to establish 
senior-citizen centers and in establishing certain innovative programs, such as hospices 
for the terminally ill. 
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Another interesting entrepreneurial tack taken by some charities, especially those 
which have funded causes addressed to problems that have ultimately been remedied or 
ameliorated, is diversification into new fields. The branching of the March of Dimes 
from polio research into the problem of birth defects and of charities for the blind into 
services for the multiply handicapped provide familiar examples. Still, new charities 
continue to be formed, often reflecting the personal concerns of founders. An example is 
the Committee to Combat Huntington's Disease, established by the widow of Woody 
Guthrie, the folksinger who died of that illness.31 
Another entrepreneurial direction taken by some charities and churches is 
providing services through commercial-type ventures. For example, the Agency for the 
Blind as well as a number of churches have been directly involved in housing 
construction for the elderly and handicapped.32 Fund raising through commercial-type 
activities—cake sales, benefit performances, raffles, auctions—has become an 
established practice for churches and other charities and is not confined to this part of 
the nonprofit sector. Many nonprofit organizations in a variety of fields have come to 
rely on commercial activities peripheral to their main purpose, such as sale of pub-
lications, property rental, gift shops, and insurance and travel programs, to generate 
revenues in support of service programs. Where such activity competes with private 
business, such nonprofit entrepreneurship has generated resentment and required 
scrutiny by the IRS. 
Philanthropic foundations—large ones, such as Rockefeller, Mellon, Ford, and 
Carnegie, established through amassed family fortunes; those such as Johnson, Exxon, 
and Lilly, founded by large corporations; and many smaller ones—are an integral part of 
the world of nonprofit entrepreneurship. Foundations differ from charities—they have 
to give away money rather than collect it. In terms of entrepreneurial activity, however, 
there are similarities. For example, there are efforts, such as the New York Community 
Trust, to consolidate small, individual foundation resources to permit the funding of 
larger and more meaningful projects and to allocate resources in a more systematic way. 
More important, in providing services foundations have been active in the design and 
support of new ventures over a wide spectrum of social causes and often become 
involved in individual projects and programs. Areas such as research, higher education, 
social and economic development, and health are replete with illustrations of integral 
foundation involvement. The 1972 study by Nielsen reviews a variety of such 
examples;33 in his subsequent book, Neilsen cites Andrew Carnegie and John D. 
Rockefeller as the developers of the modern foundation as a vehicle of social change 
and credits the Ford Foundation with stimulating modern-day support for the arts.34 
The field of higher education has produced several examples of nonprofit 
entrepreneurship since World War II. Academic Transformation, edited by Riesman and 
Stadtman, focuses on the crises of the 1960s and discusses such examples as the
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innovations of Antioch, changes in programs at the University of Pennsylvania and 
Princeton, and the growth of Stanford.35 The latter is by now a legendary success story, 
documented recently in the alumni paper, encompassing the transformation of a 
scholastically limited and financially insecure university into one of the economically 
and educationally strongest in the country.36 President Wallace Sterling, Provost 
Frederick Terman, and others are credited with such major coups as the development of 
the Stanford Industrial Park and Stanford Medical Center, which exploited the riches of 
the university's real estate and emerging new technologies to push Stanford to the 
forefront of technical and academic excellence. 
More recently, the resurgence of New York University (NYU) parallels the 
Stanford experience somewhat in its revival aspects. Under the leadership of John 
Sawhill, and with a boost from sales of (and reinvestment of revenues from) certain key 
assets, NYU expanded and began new construction at a time (the 1970s) when higher 
education was generally perceived to be in difficult straits.37 Latent assets (Stanford's 
land, NYU's ownership of the C.F. Mueller spaghetti company) help explain these 
successes, but such assets by no means ensured active engagement in entrepreneurship. 
An interesting case to watch will be Emory University, recently the recipient of $100 
million from Robert W. Woodruff of Coca-Cola.38 
A rather offbeat example of entrepreneurship in higher education is provided by 
Nova University in Florida, which has pioneered in such areas as computer-assisted 
instruction and off-campus programs.39 Nova was saved from bankruptcy in 1970 by the 
New York Institute of Technology, whose president, Alexander Schure, became 
chancellor of Nova. The expansionism of the New York Institute of Technology and the 
maverick nature of Nova's programs have stirred some local resentment in Florida, 
particularly since Nova became the prospective recipient of certain charitable bequests. 
Schure, however, appears to have a keen idea of what his own entrepreneurship is all 
about, arguing that institutions need to identify and exploit marketing trends to survive. 
As chapter 4 will show, entrepreneurship commonly arises from institutional 
adversity. Stanford, NYU, and Nova bear witness to this. Other cases include the 
absorption of the troubled Peabody College by Vanderbilt40 and the takeover of Simon's 
Rock College by Bard College.41 Another manifestation is the burgeoning of extension 
programs and the opening of out-of-state branches by many universities, in a "frantic 
search for students"42 Even in the era of fiscal stringency and projected enrollment 
declines, adversity is not the only springboard for entrepreneurship in higher education. 
Tufts, for example, has opened a major veterinary school in anticipation of synergistic 
growth with other health-science units on the campus.43 Professional education has 
witnessed a great deal of recent nonprofit entrepreneurship, not only in the expansion of 
schools in such growing disciplines as law, medicine, and business, but also in the
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birth of a whole generation of interdisciplinary schools since the late 1960s, for 
example, the School of Organization and Management at Yale, the Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard, and the School of Urban and Public Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon 
University. In a related development, universities and their faculties have seized on the 
opportunities for funded research by establishing a myriad of nonprofit research 
institutes, such as Stanford Research Institute, Yale's Institution for Social and Policy 
Studies, Columbia's Center for Policy Research, and Michigan's Institute for Social 
Research.44 
Research institutes outside the university context are another prime 
manifestation of recent nonprofit entrepreneurship. Such organizations as the Urban 
Institute (under the leadership of William Gorham), the Vera Institute of Justice, and the 
Research Triangle Institute have emerged as major providers of research and policy 
studies in the 1960s and 1970s, while older institutes such as the Brookings Institution 
and RAND Corporation have grown and diversified significantly in this area.45 
As reviewed by Nielsen, health care is another field in which nonprofit 
entrepreneurship has flourished in various forms.46 Recently, organizational units 
centered on medical innovations—open-heart-surgery units, organ-transplant programs, 
and burn-treatment centers—have been started in nonprofit medical centers. An 
especially interesting development is the hospice conceived by Dame Cicely Saunders 
in England and recently implemented in a number of U.S. nonprofit settings, including 
the Good Samaritan Hospital in West Islip, New York and Mercy Hospital in Rockville 
Center, New York.47 These hospices are designed to provide a comfortable, hospitable 
environment for the terminally ill. 
The rising costs, increasing governmental support, and growing sophistication 
and specialization of health care have spurred a number of different types of nonprofit 
organizational ventures. Somers and Somers identified the trends toward more 
comprehensive medical institutions and systems of care.48 The advent of Medicare and 
Medicaid have led public hospitals, such as those administered by New York City's 
Health and Hospitals Corporation to contract and local voluntary (nonprofit) hospitals to 
absorb the case loads and in some cases the administration of formerly public facilities. 
More commonly, successful nonprofit hospitals, such as Long Island 
Jewish—Hillside Medical Center in New York, have expanded through merger, that is, 
by acquiring nearby proprietary facilities or other nonprofits with administrative 
problems.49, 50 One motivation for such merger activity is the fact that expansion-minded 
hospitals have faced resistance to new building programs from cost-conscious 
government officials who believe that there are already too many beds available.51 
Buying up existing capacities circumvents this resistance. 
Cost considerations are also a prime factor in the development of prepaid
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medical care provided by health-maintenance organizations (HMOs). Pioneered by the 
Kaiser Hospitals in California (see Lehman)52, HMOs have begun to develop more 
rapidly with the advent of federal-assistance grants. The new Community Health Plan of 
Suffolk, the expansion into hospital care by the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New 
York (HIP), and the Blue Cross HMO in New Hyde Park are recent examples of HMO 
activity.53 
The area of law services and legal advocacy provides additional examples of 
recent nonprofit entrepreneurship, for example, by Ralph Nader in the public-interest 
law movement. This includes the formation of research institutes, such as the Center for 
the Study of Responsive Law, and the founding of public interest law firms, gathering 
momentum around 1970 with support of the Ford Foundation.54 
The performing arts constitute another broad area of activity where nonprofit 
entrepreneurship has lately been much in evidence. As reviewed by Nielsen, the number 
of major opera companies, symphony orchestras, dance companies, and legitimate 
theaters more than doubled in the 1968-1978 period.55 Netzer cites the establishment of 
regional and touring companies, such as the Baltimore Opera Company and Trinity 
Square Repertory in Providence as significant developments.56 
Many other examples are cited in the press. The Performing Arts Foundation 
(PAF) Playhouse in Huntington, New York is one illustration in the field of dramatic 
performance.57'58'59 Founded in 1966 by a high-school teacher with a large grant from 
the U. S. Office of Education, the theater was intended as a medium for arts education 
and as a community theater for presentation of revivals. By 1974, however, the theater 
was seriously in debt and threatened with closing. Under the leadership of its board 
president— folksinger Harry Chapin—and newly appointed director Jay Broad and with 
substantial help from private foundations, government, and major corporations, PAF 
was transformed from a local repertory theater into a regional, professional theater 
which presents primarily original works. Over the period 1975-1978, the budget tripled, 
subscriptions rose from 2,000 to 14,000, and a new half-million-dollar theater was 
constructed. Unfortunately, the theater experienced renewed difficulties and folded a 
few years later, following Mr. Chapin's untimely death. 
Other recent examples of nonprofit enterprise in drama include the Arena Stage 
in Washington, D.C. and the New York Shakespeare Festival in Manhattan. The Oregon 
Shakespeare Festival reflects nonprofit entrepreneurship on a smaller but 
no-less-interesting scale.60 Founded by Angus Bowmer in 1935, it began as a 
community celebration of the Fourth of July, in Ashland, Oregon, with performances by 
students and faculty of Southern Oregon State College. The festival now runs a dozen 
plays per season in three theaters and draws a quarter of a million people. 
On Long Island, orchestral music provided an active entrepreneurial context
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in the late 1970s. Originally two orchestras consisting largely of part-time 
musicians—The Suffolk Symphony and the Long Island Symphony—served the two 
counties of Nassau and Suffolk. With impetus from Harry Chapin, a full-time 
professional orchestra—the Long Island Philharmonic—was formed to replace these 
two orchestras. The Long Island Symphony, composed of resident musicians, refused to 
go out of business, however. Disbanded by its board of directors, this orchestra has 
reorganized as a musicians' cooperative.61 
Ventures like The Kennedy Center in Washington or the Lincoln Center in New 
York represent major milestones of interdisciplinary performing-arts enterprise. The 
Lincoln Center, begun in 1959 under the leadership of John D. Rockefeller, was 
conceived as an urban redevelopment project that would bring under one roof a 
"community of the arts."62 The center has indeed been an ambitious undertaking, now 
housing The New York Philharmonic Orchestra, the Metropolitan Opera, The New 
York City Ballet, the Juilliard School of Music, a repertory company, a chamber-music 
hall, and a library-museum. The Kennedy Center in Washington was envisioned as a 
national center for the performing arts during the Eisenhower years, but was 
reconceived as a memorial to John F. Kennedy after 1963. It opened in 1971 and has 
been developed under the dynamic joint leadership of Roger L. Stevens, board 
president, and Martin Feinstein, its first executive director.63, 64 Stevens, a lifelong 
theater entrepreneur, and Feinstein, a trained musician and impresario, are generally 
recognized to have helped put Washington on the cultural map with top-flight dramatic 
theater, ballet, music extravaganzas, summer opera, and visiting world-renown opera 
companies. 
Art museums have been one of the most dynamic areas of nonprofit activity in 
recent years. As Meyer notes: 
Since 1950 the United States has committed at least a half billion dollars to the 
construction of 10.2 million square feet of art museums and visual art centers, the 
equivalent footage of 13.6 Louvres.65 
New museums continued to be founded, often to display art forms not previously 
provided special recognition. The International Center of Photography in New York 
City is a recent example, as was the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in an earlier era 
(1929).66 The recent activity of a group in Los Angeles to found a modern-art facility is 
an additional illustration.67 
New museums are often set up to display the private collections of rich men who 
donate their treasure to the public. The Hirschhorn Museum in Washington, D.C. and 
the Kimbell Art Museum in Fort Worth (under the leadership of Richard Brown) are 
important recent examples.68 Meyer describes additional examples, including
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the Norton Simon Museum in Pasadena and the Brundage wing of the De Young 
Museum in San Francisco.69 The Parrish Museum in Southampton, New York is an 
older and smaller illustration of the same phenomenon.70 
Other museums are founded by historically minded entrepreneurs to preserve 
local treasure. The new art museum (1978) of the Museums at Stony Brook (New York) 
is devoted to works of the local, renowned nineteenth-century artist William S. Mount. 
Other museums, like Gallery North in Setauket, New York, which recently converted 
from proprietary to nonprofit status, are established to display the works of local, living 
artists. 
Within the realm of long-established museums, entrepreneurial activity seems to 
have taken at least three different directions—the development of new functional 
subdivisions, the undertaking of commercial ventures to generate financial support, and 
the creation of popular new exhibitions. An example in the first category is the plan of 
the Los Angeles County Museum to construct a modern-art wing.71 
The engagement in commercial sales in support of organizational purposes is a 
relatively common phenomenon among nonprofits, but some recent initiatives by 
museums have drawn particular notoriety. In real estate, for example, the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York has undertaken construction of a forty-four story 
condominium over a six-story museum building in an effort to generate revenues to 
offset its increasing operational expenses.72, 73 
The project caused substantial protest, with critics charging that a profit and loss 
orientation would force the museum to alter its artistic priorities. Other objections 
included loss of tax revenues to the city and architectural considerations. In a similar 
vein, museums have enormously increased their activity in the domain of retail 
sales—for example, memberships that include magazine subscriptions, gift shops, and 
sale of art reproductions. The larger museums, at least, appear to have learned the lesson 
taught by Olson, that public goods can be better provided if they are tied in with 
selective private goods.74 Hence the receipt of fine magazines (unavailable on news-
stands) like The Smithsonian or Natural History or discounts on reproductions of 
museum pieces increases general-membership support. The Metropolitan Museum of 
Art reportedly grossed over $16 million in 1978 in commercial revenues (not including 
memberships and admissions). Smithsonian gift shops drew $7 million, and many other 
examples can be cited.75 
The growth in commercial-sales revenue is closely tied to the most spectacular 
recent museum innovation—the grand exhibition, or super-show, best exemplified by 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art during the dynamic tenure of Thomas Hoving, with its 
King Tut (Tutankhamen) tour of 1978.76 This exhibit was followed at the Metropolitan 
by other blockbusters, including Pompeii 79, Alexander the Great, and Treasures of the 
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Kremlin, and by such grand exhibitions as the Cezanne and Picasso shows at the 
Museum of Modern Art.77 These large and spectacular shows, often based on 
foreign-loan collections, have generated considerable revenues for the museums, 
largely through sales of reproductions and boosted interest in memberships, but they 
have also generated considerable tension and controversy in the museum world. Seen as 
a lifeline to rescue museums from the ravages of inflation, the shows are also said to 
threaten some of the nonprofit museum's basic purposes, such as the discernment of new 
directions in the art world, art education and research, and other artistic concerns not 
subject to popular appeal. 
As for entrepreneurs in the world of nonprofit museums, the recently deceased 
Richard Brown and the dynamic Thomas Hoving provide captivating, if very different, 
examples. Brown was a scholar, teacher, and connoisseur whose desire, according to a 
colleague, was to "realize an institution that was concerned with excellence, that would 
provide the finest of visual experiences for the viewer."78 Hoving, on the other hand, is 
generally acknowledged to be the most dynamic executive to enter the museum world in 
many years. A flamboyant entrepreneur, Hoving was characterized by one observer as 
"A P.T. Barnum."79 At the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Hoving is credited with 
securing large, expensive, new collections and controversial art objects, with initiating a 
major building program that cost more than $70 million and with planning spectacular 
exhibits like Tutankhamen. Meyer cites several other fascinating entrepreneurial 
characters in the museum world, including S. Dillon Ripley of the Smithsonian, Francis 
Henry Taylor of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in the 1940s and 1950s, and Sarah 
Newmeyer of the Museum of Modern Art, each of whom was responsible for major 
innovations in museum operations.80 
In most of the fields reviewed, parallel instances of entrepreneurship can be cited 
for the profit-making and governmental sectors as well. Proprietary hospitals and 
nursing homes, government social-service programs, public-education and research 
initiatives, public museums, and proprietary theater are all rich with contemporary 
examples. Thus, precisely what factors influence the selection of sector for 
entrepreneurial activity is not simply a superficial matter of associating a given service 
with a given economic sector. This question will be explored later in much greater 
depth. 
Nonprofit entrepreneurship is not restricted to the several areas discussed above. 
Other fields, such as publishing or recreation, provide further illustrations. Some of the 
most often-cited recent examples of nonprofit entrepreneurship are not easily 
distinguished from market-oriented commercial ventures. For instance, the new YMCA 
facility in Washington, D.C. has a sauna, whirlpool, steam room, large pool, and so on 
and caters to the upper-middle class, with membership fees to match.81 The Educational  
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Testing Service (ETS) is another nonprofit enmeshed in controversy for its recent 
market-making behavior.82 Having grown into an $80 million business, ETS is offering 
a more diversified set of aptitude and job-placement services, some say at the expense of 
profit-oriented business competitors. Finally, a venture like Erhard Seminars Training 
(EST), founded in 1971 by Werner Erhard and boasting a $15 million operation by 
1978, has grown on the unique chemistry of evangelism, salesmanship, and a keen eye 
on what the market will bear for people who can pay to improve themselves.83 
Nonprofit entrepreneurship is thus a diverse and widespread phenomenon. Yet it 
has been argued that the nonprofit sector suffers from a lack of entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial talent.84 In relative terms, this may be true, but there are no adequate 
measures. What is clear, however, is that entrepreneurship in the nonprofit sector, as 
elsewhere, represents the cutting edge of the sector's activity, and, as such, its study 
helps to reveal the driving forces and underlying character of its member organizations. 
Of course, entrepreneurship is just one important phase of activity that takes 
place in an economic sector, and entrepreneurs are just one set of actors who help 
determine the general patterns of behavior. Certainly, as observed in chapter 9, the 
motivations, intentions, and circumstances that characterize entrepreneurship may be 
dissipated over time, as entrepreneurs leave their ventures to successors or as they 
themselves change or face new exigencies. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 4, 
organizations are not only established or grow or change for the better, as normally 
reflected in entrepreneurship, but they also pass through stages of relative equilibrium 
and sometimes stagnate or die. These latter aspects of organizational life are also 
important in establishing overall sector patterns and trends, although it seems plausible 
that the incidence of entrepreneurship, or lack of it, during periods of organizational 
uncertainty or stagnation may help account for ultimate survival or demise. 
Entrepreneurial leadership, or lack of it, can never fully explain why organizations 
prosper or decline or behave in particular ways. Labor-market trends that affect the cost 
and availability of particular types of personnel, such as volunteers and 
paraprofessionals, the cost of other inputs, the nature of societal demands for particular 
types of goods and services, the alteration of public policies, the demands of labor 
unions, and the availability of capital may all be beyond entrepreneurial control yet may 
largely account for global shifts among fields of activity and sectoral shifts within a 
given field. Still, it may be argued that the manner in which entrepreneurial talent 
responds or fails to respond to such general changes in context will be highly 
informative of the vitality and behavior peculiar to particular sectors. 
Entrepreneurship is viewed here as an especially useful focal point for attempting 
to characterize a number of crucial aspects of organizational and sectoral behavior—for 
example, the extent to which growth, innovation, self-aggrandizing, quality-
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emphasizing, cost-inflating, socially responsive, market-dominating, or zealously 
missionary activity are exhibited, or not exhibited, by nonprofit organizations. The 
reasons for this view are twofold. 
First, entrepreneurs are often founding fathers of their organizations, and leaders 
in their industries. As such, their values and personal motivations for venture will tend 
to shape in a significant way the organizations that they are establishing or changing. 
Second, enterprise is the means through which many forms of organizational behavior 
are exhibited. If an organization is growth oriented, it will grow through enterprising. If 
it is innovative, it will innovate through new ventures. If it is self-aggrandizing or 
aspires to market dominance, these goals will be sought largely through the implemen-
tation of new enterprise. If such characteristics are lacking, there will be a dearth of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Still, as noted previously, describing entrepreneurial motives or the nature of 
enterprising projects alone is insufficient for generalizing to overall patterns of 
organization behavior. The role of entrepreneurs and the incidence of venture must be 
placed into a wider perspective in order to discern where entrepreneurship is likely to 
take place, how it will vary from one context to another, and how it will be shaped and 
modified by environmental circumstances. 
The next chapter begins to address these questions by considering various 
scenarios by which entrepreneurial activity typically takes place. 
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4   Circumstances for Venture 
 
Entrepreneurship is a universal process, pervading all sectors and industries of the 
economy. Despite the variety of contexts in which entrepreneurship occurs, the nature 
of this process is remarkably similar from one area of experience to another. This 
chapter describes the generic tasks that entrepreneurial activity entails, the few basic 
scenarios that ventures tend to follow, and the general conditions of sector development 
that these scenarios appear to reflect. To use an analogy from chemistry, these latter 
conditions represent the ambience—the temperature, pressure, and so on—in which 
entrepreneurial catalysts can be expected to create enterprise from the resources 
available to them in a given industry and sector. 
 
 
The Entrepreneurship Process 
 
The similar experiences with organizational and program initiatives and innovation 
across sectors of the economy reflect a generic process of entrepreneurship. In this 
process there is generally at least one central figure (the entrepreneur) who catalyzes the 
venture and ensures its implementation. In Frank Knight's view, the entrepreneur is one 
who acts on a clear vision in murky circumstances. According to Marris and Mueller, 
Knight's concept of the entrepreneurial role "is to make decisions under uncertainty and 
assume responsibility for the consequences of these decisions. To make good decisions 
in the face of uncertainty requires good information, and so the entrepreneurial role 
becomes one of gathering, evaluating, and utilizing information."1 Moreover, the 
process involves a number of crucial stages or tasks that must be accomplished for 
venture implementation. 
A perusal of the author's case studies reveals these tasks to be quite general, if not 
uniform in sequence or emphasis from case to case. 
 
Idea Generation. The concept of a particular change or innovation must be articulated. 
An entrepreneur need not be the originator of the idea—it may even come in the form of 
a solicitation from an outside agency, for example, a charity or foundation wishing to 
stimulate a certain type of program—but the entrepreneur must see its relevance to his 
own situation and he must see to it that the idea is translated from abstraction to 
application. 
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Proposal Development. An idea must be clarified and elaborated, a design for 
implementation must be developed, and resource needs and other implications for the 
host organization and other participants must be spelled out. A need, or market, for the 
proposed activity must also be demonstrated. The proposal may be formally written for 
presentation to outside sources of funds or it may consist of internal communications if 
the venture is to be supported wholly from within. The entrepreneur may not necessarily 
be the author of the proposal, for example, he may commission it to be written by a staff 
member or a consultant, but he will usually initiate this exercise and control its content. 
 
Resource Development. Once a proposal is in circulation it must be sold to those whose 
resources are needed to support the venture. In the case of a profit-making business, 
investors or lenders must be found. For nonprofit agencies applications may be made to 
foundations or to grant-giving government agencies. In government, efforts must be 
made to secure budget lines or to pass relevant legislation. Some ventures may not 
require extra resources, or such resources may be available from a budget directly acces-
sible to the entrepreneur. In most cases, however, others have to be convinced of the 
sensibility of using existing or additional resources to support the venture. Resource 
development is a key function of the entrepreneur. In some cases, the entrepreneur will 
rely on influential colleagues to develop resources (for example, an agency director may 
depend on members of his board of directors for fund raising), but he must always 
remain abreast of resource possibilities. 
 
Path Clearing. In addition to garnering resources, other institutional barriers often must 
be overcome to implement a venture. For example, corporate charters, licenses, or other 
official approvals may have to be secured to operate a particular type of service, 
manufacture a certain good, or become eligible for a particular source of government 
funds. Again, much of this work can be delegated, but the overall orchestration, 
worrying, and crisis handling must be done by the entrepreneur. 
 
Organizing Venture Leadership. Once economic and institutional impediments have 
been overcome, it is necessary to ensure that the venture be self-sustaining. It must have 
adequate leadership or management, especially in its early life. Often the entrepreneur 
will assume this management role for some period of time. Sometimes the entrepreneur 
will explicity shun the management role. Nonetheless, he must ensure that capable 
leadership is put in place in order to successfully carry out operations. 
 
Program Development. Even with plans laid, leadership in place, resources available,
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and necessary permissions obtained, ventures must be organized from within. Staff must 
be hired, facilities secured and occupied, and equipment purchased. There may be some 
period of time during which the venture officially exists but is not yet open for business. 
During this period, which may overlap with the path-clearing and resource-development 
stages, venture leadership often operates as a small, core staff attempting to put the final 
pieces in place. In doing so, this group may find that the initial plans (proposal) are 
vague or require modifications. This is a crucial phase for the venture and requires the 
entrepreneur's nursing, even if that entrepreneur does not assume management 
responsibilities. 
Overall, there are a number of salient points to be noted about the entrepreneurial 
process and the specific role of the entrepreneur. 
1. The work of implementing a new venture will entail some division of labor 
among collaborators, staff, consultants, and other colleagues of the entrepreneur. The 
exact division of labor will vary from case to case, with the entrepreneur assuming direct 
responsibility for some tasks and sharing or delegating other tasks. 
2. Certain core groups may be involved in the process. At the initial stages of 
proposal and resource development there may be a committee of colleagues or a 
coalition of interested parties who share in the work. In the later stages, a formal core 
staff may carry the ball. 
3. The entrepreneur may work in a number of different ways—in some cases 
taking on most of the direct work, in other cases operating behind the scenes to ensure 
that the work gets done. What distinguishes the entrepreneur from others involved in an 
entrepreneurial venture is his assumption of the responsibility to make things happen. 
As Schumpeter indicates, the entrepreneur behaves as a "driving power" and 
"promoter," doing what is necessary to move a venture from idea to operation.2 
It would be improper to conclude that the simple presence of an entrepreneur is 
sufficient to precipitate an entrepreneurial venture. As Shapero states "The 
(entrepreneurial) event becomes the dependent variable while the individual or group 
that generates the event become the independent variables, as do the social, economic, 
political, cultural, and other situational variables."3 One way to begin to understand this 
equation is to consider the kinds of events and circumstances that appear to precipitate 
venture activity. 
 
 
Stylized Scenarios 
 
Ventures tend to follow a few fairly universal patterns, regardless of the contexts in 
which they occur. In particular, almost any venture can be described by one of a small 
set of generic scenarios. These scenarios are shaped by both the
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personal circumstances of the entrepreneur and the particular social, professional, and 
organizational context in which he is imbedded. These scenarios also tend to mirror the 
general economic and social conditions of the sectors and industries in which they take 
place. 
The three basic categories of entrepreneurship scenarios are the initiative, 
evolutionary, and problem-response modes. The initiative venture mode is the closest in 
character to the conventional (folklore) image of how entrepreneurs work and follows in 
linear fashion the steps outlined above for venture implementation. In this mode, an 
entrepreneur who can bring his own ideas to bear or an entrepreneur who can 
opportunistically discern and develop a concept that has emerged at the forefront of 
technology or current professional or political debate may shape and develop that idea 
into an operating project or program or organizational unit. In cases observed by the 
author, for example, such ideas include the application of computers to the management 
of social agencies, the comprehensive diagnosis of children prior to foster-care 
placement, the control of social agencies by their constituent communities, and the 
caring for unwed mothers and their babies in a common shelter. In these cases, the 
entrepreneurs became convinced of the value and feasibility of the new concepts, 
carefully worked out operational plans, proceeded systematically to convince the 
relevant authorities, and eventually developed the required resources for 
implementation. 
In a second variation of the initiative mode, the entrepreneur may exploit a 
unique opportunity to implement an idea that may have been gestating in the back of his 
mind for some time. When the proper circumstances fall into place, he is thus ready to 
spring into action. In one observed case, for example, the proposal to merge and 
integrate two agencies, long talked about and considered, was implemented by seizing 
on the opportunity created by the retirement of one of the chief executives. More 
generally, unique grant opportunities often serve as special chances to pursue pending 
ideas. 
The evolutionary mode is an entrepreneurial scenario in which the venture 
represents more culmination, continuation, or incremental extension of ongoing 
developments than striking out in a new direction. This mode requires an entrepreneur 
who operates over the long term by creating a receptive environment and nurturing 
developments within his purview. Such an entrepreneur may develop his agency like a 
workshop, greenhouse, or laboratory for ongoing projects. In one variation of the 
evolutionary mode, the venture arises as the formalization of ongoing internal program 
developments. In one observed case, for example, the venture consisted of the formal 
organizing of an already operating volunteer effort to house runaway youths. In another 
case, it was the structuring and solidifying of existing efforts to provide consultation to a 
set of child-care agencies by a university group. 
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In a second type of evolutionary scenario, the venture represents a more 
discontinuous, yet still incremental, extension of current programmatic developments in 
response to some unusual opportunity. An illustrative case is that of a children's hospital 
that took a quantum jump toward emphasis on outpatient care—a direction in which it 
was already developing—in response to a special grant opportunity. This type of 
evolutionary scenario bears a strong resemblance to the second initiative mode 
variation, except that the latter builds on a new idea rather than on a program already in 
place. 
The problem-response mode of entrepreneurship is perhaps the most common 
type of entrepreneurial scenario, although it probably fits the popular conception of 
entrepreneurship least well. There are two distinct problem-response mode 
variations—the personal type and the organizational type. 
The personal type of problem-response venture is built on an individual's crisis or 
frustration and represents striking out in a new direction. In this mode the entrepreneur 
may find his present situation (for example, employment) intolerable, although he may 
be unsure of what action to take, or he may feel thwarted and frustrated by his superiors 
and resolve to set out on his own, free from the direct authority of others. In these cases, 
the personal problem-response mode of venture is inspired by a long-simmering 
uneasiness that can be triggered by a single event or incident. The individual may be laid 
off or fired, thereby moving latent entrepreneurial energies to a state of conscious 
resolve. In other cases, the transition is more gradual, but at some point it gathers a 
momentum that precludes turning back. Shapero provides a number of private-sector 
and international examples of the personal problem-response scenario, which he refers 
to as negative displacement.4 
The second variation of problem-response mode, the organizational type, 
involves a venture designed to resolve an organizational crisis. As described in the last 
chapter, this is the classic turnaround situation. Most commonly, the crisis is financial in 
nature but is likely to encompass managerial problems, program uncertainties, social 
pressures, and personnel difficulties as well. 
The organizational crisis spells opportunity for entrepreneurs both within the 
failing agency and outside. From the inside, the crisis may attract those who fear for 
their organization and are prompted to take action that will save it. The organizational 
crisis may also be a hunting ground for those internal members who view it as a chance 
to move up, gain control, seek promotion, or increase their incomes. 
Organizational crises are also likely to attract entrepreneurial interest from the 
outside, especially if the crisis has reached major proportions unresolvable by internal 
talent. Again, outsiders may view these circumstances as opportunities for gain. One 
variant here is the merger, whereby a failing organization is absorbed by
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another agency headed by an entrepreneuring executive. In such cases, the crisis of the 
failing agency may be resolved, while the resultant expansion of the entrepreneuring 
agency provides its executive with rewards concomitant with his enlarged responsi-
bilities. 
Another possibility is the recruitment of fresh talent to the suffering organization. 
This situation is most likely to occur when the organization has good prospects for 
recovery. For example, the agency may have a large but eroding endowment, substantial 
latent capital resources, or other hidden potential, which, if properly used or converted, 
might turn the agency around. In such circumstances, an entrepreneur from outside 
might agree to join the failing agency if provided with assurances that he will be able to 
make the changes he thinks are required, will be adequately rewarded for succeeding, 
and will have a free hand in reshaping the agency and running it thereafter. 
 
 
Sector Conditions 
 
The three modes of venture scenario reflect, in an approximate way, different 
underlying conditions in the industrial environment as a whole. The initiative mode, for 
example, presupposes a degree of ferment in the economic, professional, or social 
context, perhaps stimulated by demographic, technological, and economic shifts and 
trends, generating ideas and opportunities for change. Thus at any one time some 
industries are more likely than others to experience the initiative mode of 
entrepreneurship. Those industries would be characterized by a high level of 
questioning of conventional methods and practices. For example, treatment methods 
such as institutional care in the social- and health-service areas may be challenged by 
research and professional debate that casts doubt on the effectiveness of that care and 
indicates that preventive or community-based strategies might be more viable, thus 
creating ideas for entrepreneurs to develop and pursue. 
The evolutionary mode of entrepreneurship nominally requires relatively stable 
and prosperous environmental conditions in which ideas and projects are gradually 
encouraged and nurtured. These ideas and projects arise from adaptive solutions to 
long-term problems (such as treatment of diseases) or from the maturing of professional 
ideas, not from social, economic, or intellectual tumult. Evolutionary ventures grow in a 
tolerant and protective environment, within relatively mature and stable progressive 
organizations led by innovative (entrepreneurial) managers or managers who delegate 
considerable discretion to innovative senior staff. Thus evolutionary ventures will be 
found most commonly in fields of endeavor that feature a professional ethic of cautious 
progress and in sectors within those industries populated by mature, professionally
Circumstances for Venture       49 
 
oriented organizations with the resources and managerial patience to nurture projects 
over time. 
The problem-response mode of entrepreneurship occurs in sectors and industries 
that exhibit high levels of obsolescence, perhaps because of their age or because they 
have been outpaced by external events. For example, ventures based on response to 
personal problems are often rooted in the failure of some organizations to respond to the 
yearnings of young, latent entrepreneurs. If such stultifying circumstances are peculiar 
to a particular organization, the prospective entrepreneur may find satisfaction by 
moving to another agency in the same sector and industry. If most agencies in that 
category are similarly problematic, the prospective entrepreneur may try to form a new 
agency, or he may switch sectors or industries, for example from government to the 
nonprofit sector or from education to camping for handicapped children. Thus ventures 
of the personal problem-response variety may begin in sectors and industries that are 
relatively stagnant and move into sectors with more flexible and forward-looking 
conditions. 
Ventures of the organizational problem-response type are even more germane to 
industries that have large numbers of troubled agencies. In contrast to the personal 
problem-response mode, the organizational variety of problem-response venture is 
inspired and usually resolved within that same sector. (An interesting but relatively 
small set of exceptions includes organizations that change sectors, such as profit-making 
firms that become nonprofit in order to resolve their financial difficulties. See 
Hutchins.)5 Furthermore, the organizational problems that lead to venture activity are 
likely to be much more severe and immediate in the organizational problem-response 
case. Not only may the organizations at issue experience stagnation, but they may be 
well on their way to bankruptcy and dismemberment. Industries where economic or 
social events have outstripped organizations' abilities to adapt or keep pace are good 
places to look for ventures of an organizational problem-response type. Older sectors 
with stagnant personnel structures or tenure systems within such industries are likely 
possibilities. Sectors that feature organizations with financial cushions, such as historic 
endowments in the nonprofit case, access to entrenched tax levies in government, or 
capital reserves of large corporations, constitute another target area. In the former case, 
the lack of new blood allows organizations to fall behind and eventually lose vigor and 
control. In the latter case, the financial cushion allows organizations to postpone facing 
the facts of changing economic environments (inflation, changes in demand and cost 
structures) until it is too late. These are classic cases of organizations that have built up 
inordinate margins of slack, which, in Albert Hirchman's analysis, causes them to 
become unresponsive to their environments until they are in serious trouble.6 Many 
universities, social agencies, and other nonprofits have been caught in this bind. The 
cases of Lockheed, Chrysler, New York City, and Cleveland attest to the fact that
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the condition is not unique to the nonprofit sector, however. 
 
 
Sector Maturity 
 
In a rough sense, the initiative, evolutionary, and problematic scenarios of venture 
reflect different states of development or evolution of an economic sector. The initiative 
mode is easily associated with a vibrant, expanding new industry or with the renewal of 
an older but still vigorous industry facing new conditions. The evolutionary mode 
correlates with a more mature and stable, but prosperous, sector in which an equilibrium 
or steady growth pattern has been achieved. The problematic mode is more easily 
associated with a troubled, decaying or contracting sector, where the demand for 
traditional services has declined or cost pressures or quality problems have made 
services difficult to deliver. 
The correlation between enterprise scenarios and sector conditions is highly 
imperfect. Organizational failures do take place in dynamic and prospering sectors, and 
organizational successes are maintained in the worst of conditions. Nevertheless, 
ambient sector conditions may serve as a crude indicator of the relative occurrences of 
the three types of enterprise scenarios, and the growth and decline of sectors may be 
signaled by the natural history of its member organizations. As noted by various 
scholars, including Hirschman,7 Downs,8 and Mueller,9 individual organizations tend to 
pass through similar sequences of development, albeit with different cyclical periods 
and different ultimate outcomes. Organizations are born, and they struggle to survive. If 
they surmount the problems of birth, they often enter a dynamic growth phase, which at 
some point tends to level off and settle into a relatively stable equilibrium. Ultimately, 
an internal loss of vigor or a failure to adapt to new environmental circumstances may 
occur, resulting in deterioration. This process, according to Hirschman, is the result of a 
natural buildup of entropy, or slack. If circumstances are right, the organization may 
recover from its decline and enter a new period of stability or growth. If decline is not 
suitably addressed, the organization will wither and may eventually become defunct. 
Nielsen gives an example of such evolution for social-action movements, which 
sometimes develop into formal corporate entrepreneurial ventures. 
Some [movements] are born out of circumstances of mass excitement or unrest, 
carry on their efforts for a period, and subsequently disappear, having achieved 
their mission or having lost their motivation and following. Some begin as ardent 
reformers, evolve into more formal structures, and eventually become sedate 
operating entities, fulfilling their cause in the performance of a conventional 
function.10 
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Given the generic tendencies of organizations to follow such historical patterns 
of maturation, the age of a given sector, obviously correlated with the age of its member 
agencies, will be suggestive of the types of opportunities for venture that it contains. 
(See Mueller.)11 Newer sectors, featuring organizations struggling to survive and 
establish themselves on the basis of new concepts or services, will more likely reflect 
opportunities in the initiative mode. Established sectors, featuring prospering 
organizations, will feature the evolutionary mode. Aging sectors will more likely reflect 
the problematic scenarios. 
An interesting and important question is why different sectors within the same 
industry tend to develop at different times and why, at any given point in time, alternate 
sectors present different opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures. James Douglas 
reviews this phenomenon in a recent paper.12 He argues (in contrast to the government 
and market-failure theories of Weisbrod and Hansmann, respectively) that "Historically, 
most activities . . . have originally been in what we are calling the Third (nonprofit) 
Sector, and the activities still remaining there are those in which neither the market 
sector nor the government sector have enjoyed a sufficient advantage to draw them out 
of the Third Sector." 
In the broad scan of development in certain fields such as charity and social 
service or education, this account seems accurate. Voluntary nonprofit institutions 
developed early as self-contained, cooperative efforts of communities to accommodate 
their own needs. Where profit opportunities arose in that context and were permitted to 
develop, that sector later grew. Where the larger public viewed private activity (both 
voluntary and profit) as insufficient, government initiatives were taken. The sequence is 
not fixed, however. Hospitals have shown a zigzag pattern of public, profit, and 
nonprofit initiatives; for medical schools, nonprofits have replaced earlier proprietary 
forms.13 In nursing homes, a surge of profit making has followed on a mixed proprietary 
and nonprofit base.14 Public programs were built after earlier nonprofit efforts in foster 
care,15 similar to the pattern for universities.16 More recently, in fields such as 
mental-health care and criminal corrections, there has been a resurgence of interest in 
private, nonprofit alternatives, following a long period of governmental dominance.17 
Thus there is no single sequence of sector development across fields, but it does seem 
apparent that sectors in any industry tend not to develop simultaneously. The result is a 
differential pattern of venture opportunity across sectors, in any field at any point in 
time. Furthermore, the zigzag pattern tends to suggest a closure between differential 
sector development and the natural history of organizations. In particular, in an aging 
industry dominated by one relatively ossified sector, a new development, such as an 
innovative technology, change in service demand, or social problem, may stimulate 
(initiative mode) entrepreneurship outside the dominant sector as much as it may inspire 
(problem-solving mode) entrepreneurship inside that sector. 
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Summary 
 
The ambient, historically derived conditions of an economic sector roughly mirror the 
patterns of enterprise that transpire within it. 
New industries, or still-vibrant sectors inspired by fundamental changes in social 
conditions or technology, will tend to feature initiative-mode scenarios, with 
entrepreneurs who can quickly capitalize on emergent ideas and convert them into 
operating ventures. 
Established and prospering sectors will tend to feature evolutionary-mode 
scenarios, with entrepreneurs who can cultivate organizational environments in which 
programmatic developments may be continually nurtured over time. 
Aging, rigidifying sectors that have become seriously out of tune with social and 
economic conditions may give rise to both problematic and initiative modes of venture 
scenario. In particular, aging sectors in changing environments may inspire 
initiative-mode developments in adjacent sectors by failing to internally accommodate 
entrepreneurial energies and by ultimately encouraging entrepreneurs to exploit 
opportunities elsewhere. Just as commonly, however, declining sectors will feature 
struggling organizations that become the focal point both of inside entrepreneurs, who 
attempt to rescue their agencies, and of outsiders, who see opportunities for resurrection 
and gain amid the decay. 
The discussion in this chapter strongly implies that the various venture scenarios 
tend to engage entrepreneurs with a number of different reasons and motives for 
undertaking enterprising activity. The next chapter describes the essential nature of 
these entrepreneurial drives. 
The discussion also suggests that current economic and social conditions in a 
sector affect the kinds of entrepreneurial motivations attracted to those opportunities as 
well as the frequency with which venture opportunities manifest themselves. Theory 
must necessarily deal with these phenomena in simplified and indirect ways. Potential 
entrepreneurs of different persuasions will be seen to distribute themselves among 
sectors of the economy at early points in their careers according to what they perceive to 
be the current and likely future attributes of those sectors. Assessment of some of these 
attributes will obviously be influenced by ambient sector conditions and states of 
development. For example, career decisions will be seen to hinge on the public 
importance attached to alternative industries and to the relative employment 
opportunities available in particular sectors of an industry, characteristics clearly tied to 
the current status and history of development of these parts of the economy. 
Furthermore, the theory will recognize that activation of the energies of entrepreneurs 
previously channeled into a particular sector will depend on current conditions in that 
sector. In particular, entrepreneurs will be seen to operate within a set of opportunities
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and constraints that implicitly depend on the sector's state of development. Beyond these 
general parameters, the theory must ignore the complexities of chronological 
development and changes in the ambient conditions of sectors and industries, in the 
hope that the resulting simplification will pay off in terms of clarity, without sacrificing 
too much realism. 
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Whereas the tasks and scenarios around which new ventures develop are quite general, 
the particular skills, personality traits, styles, and motivations of entrepreneurs can vary 
substantially. Schumpeter offers one view in his description of the entrepreneur in the 
profit-making sector: 
the personality of the capitalistic entrepreneur need not, and generally does not, 
answer to the idea most of us have of what a "leader" looks like, so much so that 
there is some difficulty in realizing that he comes within the sociological category 
of leader at all. He "leads" the means of production into new channels. But this he 
does, not by convincing people of the desirability of carrying out his plan or by 
creating confidence in his leading in the manner of a political leader—the only man 
he has to convince or impress is the banker who is to finance him—but by buying 
them or their services, and then using them as he sees fit.1 
It is doubtful that this is a wholly adequate description even of the modern 
profit-making entrepreneur, especially in the context of the large, modern corporation. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between market-oriented and people-oriented 
entrepreneuring is useful. The political skills of leadership may be much more important 
in the public and nonprofit sectors than they are in the profit sector. In the former 
sectors, it is often not possible and certainly not sufficient to demonstrate to one's banker 
that a new concept will sell. Furthermore, the trust that the nonprofit or public 
entrepreneur can engender in his sponsors is often important because the promised 
results of the new service, methods, and so on will be much harder for sponsors to judge 
without a market test. Thus sponsors presumably must be confident of the entrepreneur's 
intentions. 
The differences in entrepreneurial skills required in different sectors and 
industries may correspond to psychological characteristics identified in entrepreneurs 
by David McClelland.2 Specifically, McClelland describes achievement-oriented, 
power-oriented, and affiliation-oriented individuals. Private-sector entrepreneurs are 
found to be achievement oriented, judging themselves by concrete indicators of 
accomplishment rather than recognition by, or control of, others: 
the need to achieve . . .  was one of the keys to economic growth, because men who 
are concerned with doing things better have become active entrepreneurs and have 
created the growing business firms which are the foundation stones of a developing 
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economy. . . . Some of these heroic entrepreneurs might be regarded as leaders in 
the restricted sense that their activities established the economic base for the rise of 
a new type of civilization, but they were seldom leaders of men. 
Entrepreneurs in the nonprofit and public sectors are also achievers, but, often 
not to the exclusion of interests in power and affiliation, because the latter interests are 
closely associated with enjoying and working effectively with people. Indeed, 
McClelland recognizes that "studying the power motive may help us understand 
managerial, societal, or even political leadership better," particularly the need for 
"socialized power," which "is characterized by a concern for group goals, for finding 
those goals that will move men, for helping the group formulate them, for taking some 
initiative in providing members of the group with the means of achieving such goals." 
It seems clear that entrepreneurs in any context are achievers in some sense and 
that they possess certain rare talents of promoting ideas and organizing people and 
resources. What is less clear are the underlying personal objectives of such achievement, 
energy, and application of skills. Why do entrepreneurs choose to do what they do? Few 
scholars have really probed this question, although it seems relevant to the character that 
entrepreneurs impart to the organizations and projects that they nurture. Because the 
literature on entrepreneurs is thin, this discussion draws on studies of other classes of 
organizational participants as well as on some studies of entrepreneurs. 
Chapter 2 noted Weisbrod's study of lawyers of equal credentials who chose to 
work for nonprofit rather than profit firms and Hansmann's theory of entrepreneurial 
screening between the profit and nonprofit sectors. Weisbrod implies two kinds of 
motivations—income enhancement and public spiritedness, as manifested in legal work 
directed to social causes. Hansmann also implies dual motivations—income and 
professional pride, as reflected in the quality of the institution one manages. 
Cornuelle cites the desire to serve as helping differentiate the nonprofit sector: 
In the commercial sector, the motivation is the desire for profit. In the government 
sector, the motivation is the desire for power. . . .  But in the independent sector, 
the motivation in its purest form, is the desire to serve others. . . . 
Whether the desire to serve arises from self-denial or egomania, it is a 
compelling drive.3 
Vroom, in his study of work and motivation, also notes both the economic and 
noneconomic motivations of organizational participants, including entrepreneurs: 
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The evidence concerning noneconomic incentives to work is not restricted to 
people's reports of their motivations. The existence of "dollar a year men," who 
work with only token economic rewards and entrepreneurs who continue to work 
after having amassed tremendous fortunes, is well known.4 
Vroom also cites Miller and Form, who observe: 
The motives for working cannot be assigned only to economic needs—for men 
may continue to work even though they have no need for material goods. Even 
when their security and that of their children is assured, they continue to labor. 
Obviously, this is so because the rewards they get from work are social, such as 
respect and admiration from their fellow man. 
In his study of voluntary organizations in the political area (that is, in 
Hansmann's terminology, mutual-donative nonprofits such as lobby groups), Wilson 
also cites a variety of economic and noneconomic incentives for participation by 
members.5 These encompass material compensation, including monetary benefits of 
various kinds, specific intangible rewards such as honors, offices, and personal 
deference, social satisfactions such as the camaraderie, conviviality and general prestige 
associated with membership, and purposive satisfaction associated with achievement of 
the organization's formal social or political goals. Presumably such motives pertain to 
entrepreneurs as well as to general members of such organizations, although just what 
distinguishes the entrepreneur is somewhat unclear. Wilson suggests that entrepreneurs 
may have an exaggerated sense of their likely efficacy, that is, the probability that they 
can lead the organization to fulfill its formal goals, or they may have an exceptional 
commitment to such purpose. 
The commitment to purpose and to change is what Winter seems to have in mind 
in describing at least one brand of achievement-oriented innovators: 
A careful study of the Puritan impulse towards reform . . . suggests that . . . radical 
innovators, who are possessed of a transcendental concern for change and 
excellence (i.e. achievement needs), have always been bitterly attacked by their 
contemporaries as a small minority of dissident disrupters. . . . 
Because of their fundamental needs for achievement, rather than power, 
these new radicals can be understood as Puritans. They call for a quasi-religious 
enthusiasm for animation of the individual person, who is then a directed agent of 
radical social change.6 
Economic, social, and substantive policy and service motivations (beliefs) all fall 
within the spectrum of forces that drive entrepreneurial behavior. As Winter notes, 
however, another consideration is what is commonly referred to as power. McClelland 
and Watson have studied the power drive, which they distinguish from achievement 
motivation: 
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Recent studies . . . support the conclusion that the incentive for a power-oriented 
person is to "have impact," to "stand out" in some way, or to be considered 
important. He may pursue this incentive in a variety of ways— by trying to win 
arguments . . .  by collecting prestige possessions . . .  by nurturing others, by 
being aggressive, or even by drinking to increase fantasies of personal power . . . 
[by] doing well at a task, the achievement incentive, but only in a public situation 
where others will notice the superior performance and probably only where the 
person can stand out relative to others—that is, can be judged superior to others.7 
In some contrast to the foregoing highly directed and purposive types of 
motivations, some scholars have identified other, less delineated or more groping 
varieties of personal motives for ventures. Shapero, for example, observes the valued 
autonomy and independence of the street hawker, and the search for these goals by 
employees frustrated by their organizations.8 In a related observation Shapero also notes 
that there are both one-time and chronic entrepreneurs. Having achieved independence 
or resolved a personal search, a given individual may venture no longer. For others, 
however, the seeking of power, material reward, or other objectives may be ongoing. 
The panoply of motivations that may enter the organization member's (and 
entrepreneur's) calculus, has been conceptualized by some authors into sets of 
stereotypical managerial and entrepreneurial actors. A recent effort of this kind is 
Maccoby's study of corporate leaders in the profit-making sector, The Gamesman.9 In 
this work, based on several hundred psychological interviews of managers in 
growth-oriented technology-based corporations, the author identifies four types of 
managers, two of which normally exhibit entrepreneurial behavior. These are as 
follows. 
The craftsman is motivated by the "pleasure in building something better" and 
derives his satisfaction directly from the quality of the product that he is responsible for 
producing. Maccoby includes some corporate scientists in the category of craftsman, but 
he puts other scientists in a different category, which he discusses only briefly because 
of their sparcity in the ranks of management. According to Maccoby, "What most distin-
guishes (these) 'scientists' from the craftsman is their narcissism, their idolatry of their 
own knowledge . . . and their hunger for admiration: They are the corporate 
intellectuals." 
The jungle fighter lusts for power, derives pleasure from crushing opponents, 
fears defeat, and wants only to be number one. Maccoby identifies two subtypes of 
jungle fighter. "The lions are the conquerors who . . . may build an empire; the foxes 
make their nests in the corporate hierarchy and move ahead by stealth and politicking." 
The company man also fears failure, desires approval by authority, and finds his 
sense of identity by being part of the "powerful, protective company.” The company
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man is thus committed to maintaining the organization's integrity. 
The gamesman derives satisfaction from the process of competition. He 
"responds to work and life as a game . . . enjoys new ideas, new techniques, fresh 
approaches and short cuts." As with the jungle fighter, but for different psychological 
reasons, "his main goal in life is to be a winner." 
In Maccoby's view, the jungle fighter represents the old-style entrepreneur, the 
post-Civil War robber barons, such as Andrew Carnegie. The gamesman represents the 
more civilized, slick, and in many ways more sophisticated modern-day equivalent, the 
source of dynamism for the large corporation in the complex, governmentally regulated 
world of the 1960s and 1970s. The craftsman and the company man are more 
conservative types, lacking the interest or daring for major entrepreneurial ventures. As 
discussed below, however, some traits of the craftsman and the company man, and even 
Maccoby's denigrated scientist, are relevant to entrepreneuring in the nonprofit world 
and in the proprietary and public sectors in industries where nonprofits participate. The 
craftsman, for example, represents pride and accomplishment in the quality of programs 
or organizational design. Aspects of the scientist may be seen in some entrepreneuring 
individuals who seek recognition for their leadership in professional disciplines. Finally, 
the company man may represent loyalty to cherished traditions that can underlie 
entrepreneuring behavior designed to rescue failing institutions (in the 
problem-response mode). 
The stereotype approach is also used by Downs to describe styles and 
motivations of officials who populate the ranks of public bureaucracies.10 Again, a 
subset of these seem more inclined toward entrepreneurial behavior, yet each type might 
be so motivated in the appropriate circumstances. Downs's characters are divided into 
purely self-interested and mixed motive categories. The self-interested types are 
climbers, who "consider power, income, and prestige as nearly all-important in their 
value structures," and conservers, who consider convenience and security as nearly 
all-important. 
The mixed-motive types are zealots, who are "loyal to relatively narrow policies 
or concepts" and who "seek power both for its own sake and to effect the policies to 
which they are loyal"; advocates, who are "loyal to a broader set of functions or to a 
broader organization. . . . They. . . seek power because they want to have a significant 
influence upon policies and actions concerning those functions or organizations . . . "; 
and statesmen, who are "loyal to society as a whole and . . . desire to obtain the power 
necessary to have a significant influence upon national policies and actions. They are 
altruistic to an important degree because their loyalty is to the 'general welfare' as they 
see it." 
Downs's climbers resemble Maccoby's jungle fighters and gamesmen; his 
conservers and, perhaps, advocates are breeds of company men. The mixed-motive
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types are especially interesting. They acknowledge that, although some people may be 
exclusively self-interested, others are something of a mix. More important, this category 
provides recognition that beliefs and loyalties to purposes larger than one's self are a 
genuine source of motivation to participants in organizations. Downs's analysis is 
directed to the public sector, but such motivations are often strong in the nonprofit sector 
as well. 
To proceed analytically with the present investigation of entrepreneurial 
behavior, there are essentially three options. One is to recognize that man is a complex, 
adaptive, and dynamic creature whose motivations are mixed and changing. Thus an 
entrepreneur may be characterized as having some combination of motives that may 
vary as he grows older, gains experience, and meets new circumstances. Furthermore, 
the motivation mix varies from individual to individual. This assumption clearly 
conforms closely to reality, but is cumbersome for developing analytical models capable 
of producing incisive and unambiguous hypotheses and insights. 
A second approach, popular among economists, is to assume that all men are 
basically the same and may be characterized by some specific static set of objectives 
that enter a common utility function. Better yet is to assume that a single motive, such as 
income maximization, prevails. An intermediate approach is to identify instrumental or 
proxy variables that capture various entrepreneurial goals in a single index. For 
example, Niskanen's notion of budget maximizing is intended to represent a package of 
status, power, and income seeking by bureaucrats.11 Another example is found in the 
theory of managerial discretion presented by Williamson and others.12 According to this 
theory the corporate manager in the private sector is assumed to maximize his own 
utility. The arguments of the postulated utility function include a few key variables, such 
as organizational staff and emoluments, that proxy the status, income, and power 
objectives. 
The single-objective or proxy-utility approach allow analytical (mathematical) 
elegance and simplicity but are rejected here as strategies for characterizing the behavior 
of nonprofit entrepreneurial activity. For one thing, these models are exclusively 
focused on managers, yet entrepreneurs need not always become managers of their 
enterprises. Indeed, entrepreneurs sometimes develop their ventures with the specific 
intent of turning them over for others to administer. In addition, empirical observation 
suggests that entrepreneurial motivations are quite varied and not easily captured by one 
or two proxy indices such as staff, emoluments, or surplus revenues. The monolithic 
utility approach puts the entire burden of explaining differences in economic behavior 
on environmental parameters and incentives structures such as laws and prices by 
assuming no variations among men. Although this approach may simplify the study of 
alternative institutional arrangements, it is incapable of recognizing some potentially
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important implications for social behavior that are based on differential response to 
environmental factors or policy variables. For example, a model that focuses solely on 
monetary incentives is valid only if it can be shown that individuals not singularly 
devoted to profit have been weeded out, (that is, that the relevant world consists only of 
those actors of a given motive). Otherwise, such a model will fail to account for the 
behavior of individuals motivated by other factors and relatively indifferent to monetary 
gain. In the nonprofit and public sectors, it is unreasonable to assume that a single, or 
even uniform, mix of motives is manifest, hence a monolithic utility model seems 
inappropriate. Even in the profit sector, as noted in chapter 2, more traditional economic 
scholars such as Williamson 13 and behaviorists such as Simon 14 and Cyert and March 15 
have recognized the significance of the multipart, diverse nature of corporate 
management. 
Many economists do argue that in the competitive, profit-making sector any 
variety of entrepreneurial or managerial motives is unimportant because those who 
choose not to emphasize profits will be driven out of business. This argument is hedged 
in the case of a less than perfectly competitive profit sector by those of the 
managerial-discretion school, who offer the notion that, whereas profitseeking remains 
of paramount importance, profit levels above some acceptable minimum may be traded 
by management for items of personal utility. This idea has even been extended to the 
public sector by Roger Parks and Elinor Ostrom, who model the public-sector official as 
exchanging a certain level of net public benefits (called a benefits residuum) for 
personal utility as proxied by staff levels.16 
In the nonprofit sector, there is certainly a large margin of entrepreneurial 
discretion, and nothing closely resembles a profit criterion or a benefits residuum to 
which entrepreneurs are strongly held by market, political, or other external forces. (See 
chapter 8.) This is not to say that nonprofit entrepreneurs face no constraints or that they 
are completely unaccountable for their actions; rather, the sources of accountability and 
constraint on ventures are so variable, diverse, and diffuse as to allow for a wide 
spectrum of possible motivations and resulting behaviors. 
It may be argued that much of what is called entrepreneurship constitutes 
attempts to change, rather than play by the existing rules and environmental constraints. 
For example, in the commercial sector, firms try to take control of, rather than respond 
to, prevailing price structures, perhaps so that they may comfortably indulge in pursuits 
other than pure profit making. In the public and nonprofit sectors, the desire for new 
legislation or new sources of funds also reflects the desires of entrepreneurs to change 
the environmental parameters that confine their abilities to pursue a variety of 
motivations. Simply assuming that entrepreneurs with some fixed set of objectives will 
maximize these objectives subject to accepted constraints often misses the point, that is, 
it ignores the dynamic element involved in achieving the social or economic change
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desired by entrepreneurs. Hence, a theory based on entrepreneurship inherently conflicts 
with the constrained-optimization approach of neoclassical economics and requires 
more of a behavioral framework in which innovation and rule- and process-changing 
activity is explicitly recognized.17 
A third approach to the investigation of entrepreneurial behavior is to recognize 
the diversity of motivations by postulating alternative stereotypes, in the manner of 
Maccoby and Downs. This approach is qualitatively different from specifying a single 
utility function, even one that incorporates a variety of competing objectives, because it 
recognizes that given motivations and styles may be distributed differently among 
individuals in the relevant entrepreneurial population and may be pursued in different 
ways. It thus allows for alternative types of entrepreneurs pursuing different goals and 
following different organizational paths in their ventures, thereby providing a fuller and 
more meaningful interpretation of the screening process as well as the behavior that 
results once different types are sorted into different environments. 
The stereotype approach falls short of complete realism also, especially if one 
tries to associate particular characterizations with actual people. People do change 
motivations over time, and they do adapt to environmental circumstances in a manner 
that may even fundamentally alter their values. Sociologists argue that people are 
malleable and have a tendency to fulfill expectations associated with the (work-related) 
roles they happen to occupy at any given time. Although this observation clearly 
contains some truth, it does not answer some questions posed here. For example, why do 
potential entrepreneurs select particular fields and employment opportunities in the first 
place, and why do they subsequently act to change the parameters and circumstances of 
their employment over time? The answers to these questions require explanation based 
on relatively stable personality traits. Ascribing too much adaptive dynamism to the 
stereotype models would hopelessly complicate them and make them ineffectual for 
analytical purposes. 
The theory that follows begins with a set of entrepreneurial personality types that 
are defined independently of environment, although particular manifestations of 
behavior of these personality types may be strongly environment related. Thus a 
mission-oriented entrepreneurial type may not find his cause until he has gained the 
benefit of work experience in a particular field, yet he may still be a generic believer, 
who is drawn to a given industry or sector because of its ability to accommodate zealous 
personalities and causes. Alternatively, certain potential entrepreneurs may choose 
fields of employment for reasons other than personality but may subsequently behave 
according to the motives inherent in their personal makeup. Although this theory leans 
to the former process, it also explores the implications of such imperfections in
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the sorting-by-personality process. I will proceed by postulating stereotype models that 
seem to capture the alternative driving motivations and styles of entrepreneurs across a 
wide spectrum of economic activity and that ultimately appear relevant to the 
association of these entrepreneurs with particular industries, sectors, and venture types. 
These models derive from observations from the author's field studies and from the 
literature cited above. Later I will analyze how these entrepreneurial types are screened 
at the industry and sector levels and derive implications from this process for 
organization and sector behavior. 
It is important to emphasize that the following models are pure types in the sense 
that each personifies a particular variety of internal motives and drive. Again, actual 
people are probably more easily thought of in terms of combinations of the postulated 
models; the models are simply analytical devices to help derive more aggregate 
behavioral implications for sectors and industries. This approach is possible because the 
observable aggregate effects of large differentiated populations of pure versus mixed 
types should be essentially similar, that is, viewed as a whole, it is hard to distinguish 
populations that contain a wide variety of mixed types from those that contain an 
equivalent variety of pure types. Thus analysis can proceed as if the world were 
populated with distributions of pure stereotypical entrepreneurs, although the screening 
effects considered in chapters 6 and 7 are likely to lead to more homogeneous groupings 
of entrepreneurial sub-populations for pure types and hence to more exaggerated 
differences in predicted behavior among sectors and industries. Hence this theory will 
predict behavior patterns that may actually be harder to detect and isolate empirically 
than they are to distinguish in the world of conceptual models. The postulated 
entrepreneurial stereotype models are listed below. 
The artist is an entrepreneur who derives his satisfaction directly from the 
creative act and from pride in his own organizational and programmatic constructions. 
There are basically two types of artists. 
The architect, a close relation of Maccoby's craftsman, is a builder and tinkerer 
who likes to play with organizational "blocks." He may view his organization as a 
workshop for building better structures, both physical and organizational. In one 
observed case, for example, the entrepreneur took special pride in having reconstructed 
and nurtured a small, faltering agency into a multi-campus, computerized operation with 
a unique umbrella-like organizational structure. 
The poet is a less structured and less meticulous, more cerebral and emotional 
artistic entrepreneur whose creations consist of implemented ideas. Poets may view 
their agendas as blank canvases or unwritten books to be filled with paintings or stories 
of their own philosophic conceptions. 
Both types of artist like to create, to nurture, and to see things grow. Some, like 
Angus Bowmer, who founded the Oregon Shakespeare Festival, apparently
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combine the workmanship concerns of the architect with the emotive feelings of the 
poet, indulging both a love of acting and a dedication to artistic excellence.18 Both types 
seek artistic expression and require the freedom to pursue their work in a relatively 
unharnessed setting, without restrictive monitoring. 
The professional, a distant cousin of Maccoby's scientist, is formally trained in a 
discipline, and is highly attuned to the controversies and debates that characterize his 
professional domain. He is committed to the standards and methodological approaches 
of his profession, which may vary in style from the highly scientific character of 
medicine to the more subjective, theory-oriented, and discursive intellectual modes of 
social work or education. The professional pursues ventures at the leading edge of 
current professional thinking in his discipline, and looks to his peers in that discipline as 
the source of reinforcement, recognition, and acclaim. Elements of this kind of 
motivation are strongly illustrated in the observed cases where, for example, 
profession-oriented entrepreneurs have experimented in a careful, calculated manner 
with such leading-edge concepts as outpatient clinical services for autistic children and 
common-shelter care for unmarried mothers and babies. Nielsen19 and Vladeck2" both 
cite hospitals and medical care as a domain in which scientifically-oriented 
manifestations of professional-type motivations are particularly strong. 
The believer, a relation of Downs's zealot, is an entrepreneur who is unshakably 
devoted to a cause and consistently formulates his ventures and focuses his energies in 
pursuit of that cause over a long period of time. He has what Cornuelle calls the service 
motive, which "is at least as powerful as the desire for profit or power. We see some 
people in whom it is paramount and overwhelming."21 The believer's cause may be 
defined as help for a particular (needy) constituency, it may be a civil-libertarian or 
social-justice concept, or it may be a particular strategy of social reform, or the believer 
may simply have a deep, general religious resolve to be of service. Examples abound. 
Thomas Kielty Scherman founded the Little Orchestra Society and subsidized it from 
his own personal fortune in order to present what he considered to be important revivals, 
rare works, new music, and unheralded masterpieces.22 Ralph Nader is perhaps the 
quintessential believer, combining a missionary zeal with an ethic of personal sacrifice 
in his consumer and public-interest law activities.23 
The searcher is restless and frustrated, out to prove himself and to find his niche 
in the world. He may be a relatively young person, with some job experience, perhaps 
even moderately successful in what he is doing, but unhappy and critical in his present 
employment and anxious to resolve the tensions between his aspirations and uncertain 
self-confidence. Searchers often shun security to find opportunities that will better 
satisfy their yearnings for career satisfaction. In some cases, however, the searcher may 
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be trying to resolve a mid-life crisis and attach to an institutional structure that provides 
a new source of identity or security. (See Shapero, for example.)24 Having found such a 
solution through some entrepreneurial venture, the searcher may cease to engage in 
ventures thereafter. A few searchers, however, may be chronic, constantly becoming 
disillusioned with one venture experience and trying another. In some observed cases, 
the entrepreneurs left unsatisfying jobs and endured long periods of unemployment, 
eventually finding opportunities to develop their own agencies. 
The independent seeks autonomy and wants to avoid shared authority and 
decision making. His independence may derive from strong-mindedness about how 
things should be done or frustration from working under the control of others. The 
independent basically seeks to establish an organizational unit in which he is his own 
boss, free of direct internal interference or overwhelming external monitoring. 
Various observed cases illustrate this orientation. For example, the headmaster of 
a private school left because of a conflict with his proprietor and established his own 
school. In another case, entrepreneurs left their posts in a state mental hospital to form 
their own children's agency. As noted earlier, Shapero also identifies the independent as 
an important entrepreneurial type.25 Even more than the searchers, the independent is 
likely to moderate or restrict his entrepreneurial tendencies once he has achieved his 
goals of autonomy. 
The conserver, a cousin of Downs's advocate and conserver and Maccoby's 
company man, is an organizational loyalist who carries out entrepreneurial activity (in 
the problem-response mode) only under circumstances (a crisis period) in which it is 
necessary to preserve the character and viability of his agency. The loyalty of the 
conserver derives from some combination of personal economic interest and cherished 
ideas, both of which have become embodied in, or associated with, the organization 
itself, through long-term affiliation and possibly even involvement with the founding of 
the institution. Like the independent and the searcher, the conserver is an occasional, 
sporadic entrepreneur when compared with the other, more chronically enterprising 
types. In one observed case, for example, a long-time employee who rose through the 
ranks of a large child-care agency helped to initiate a new program late in his career to 
alleviate public pressures and criticisms of his agency. 
Power seekers derive satisfaction from climbing to the top, gaining recognition, 
and exerting influence over large groups of people and organizations. There are two 
kinds of power seekers—players and controllers. 
Players like the chance their organization gives them to wield power and gain 
respect and acclaim within their organizations and in the world at large. Similar to 
Maccoby's gamesmen and jungle fighters and Downs's climbers, players are more 
willing to delegate authority than are controllers and hence they prefer larger
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organizations. In two observed cases, entrepreneurs expanded two of the largest social 
agencies and used this base to become prominent personalities in New York public 
affairs. As described by Meyer, Thomas Hoving would appear to be a preeminent 
player, combining political cunning with the skills and instincts of a showman.26 
Controllers receive satisfaction directly from having authority over others and 
having the security of knowing what is going on under them. Such power seekers like to 
run tightly centrally controlled organizations and seek to expand those organizations so 
long as they can maintain the feeling of control. Some of the motivation of controllers 
may be understood by the observed tendency of many organizations to grow too large. 
As noted by Mueller: 
The case study literature of corporations is replete with situations in which the chief 
executives of a large diversified firm find themselves one day in a "crisis of 
control.". . . Frequently, these crises have been brewing for some time, but, owing 
to the lack of information about the division or individuals involved, the leaders of 
the firm are not aware that any problem exists until calamity strikes. What is more, 
these losses of control are not endemic solely to business corporations. The crises 
that have befallen large universities, branches of the government, the church and 
other large bureaucratic organizations in recent years are typically attributed to the 
lack of adequate information by those at the top of the difficulties being encoun-
tered by people further down the hierarchy.27 
Controllers strongly wish to avoid such circumstances. 
Income seekers are those entrepreneurs primarily driven by the motive of 
material self-aggrandizement in the form of income, future capital gain, and perquisites 
of office that substitute for personal expenditure. Various examples in the nursing-home 
industry are provided by Mendelson,28 Vladeck,29 and Grennon and Barsky.30 Vladeck 
cites instances of wasteful spending, cheating, and corruption associated with Medicare 
and Medicaid financing, mostly in the proprietary sector. Mendelson also reviews in-
stances in the nonprofit arena. Field studies reveal other cases with important elements 
of income seeking as an underlying drive. In extreme (maximizing) form, income 
seekers constitute the basic stereotype model of owners and managers implicit in the 
conventional theory of the firm in microeconomics. 
The list of entrepreneurial characters is somewhat long, and there is some 
correlation and gradation of objectives from one type to another. The controller, for 
example, might be thought of as a hybrid of the independent and player types, the latter 
representing the power-seeking element and the former typifying the desire to retain 
control. Believers, poets, and professionals are similar to one another in their pursuit of 
concepts and ideas, albeit for different reasons and through different styles. Despite 
these similarities, however, the distinctions among the ten types and subtypes are
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useful for the development of the theory in the remainder of the book. The various kinds 
of entrepreneurs are summarized in table 5-1. 
 
 
Entrepreneur Types and Venture Scenarios 
 
There are certain correlations between the entrepreneurial stereotypes presented here 
and the venture scenarios described in chapter 4. Conservers, for example, would 
overwhelmingly associate themselves with the organizational problem-response mode 
of venture; searchers would tend to be active in the personal problem-response mode. 
Believers and poets lend themselves most readily to the intellectual or social flux of the 
initiative mode. 
Other types of entrepreneurs are compatible with a wider range of scenarios. 
Professionals might prosper in the stability of the evolutionary situation or in the 
intellectual dynamism of the initiative mode. Architects would clearly engage their 
creative energies in the evolutionary mode, but might begin their venture agendas in the 
more open environment of the initiative mode or with the opportunities created by an 
organizational problem-response situation. Independents would also seize opportunities 
in the initiative or organizational problem-response circumstances. 
Power seekers and income seekers are the most adaptable entrepreneurial types, 
willing to exploit ideas generated in the initiative-mode environment, create 
organizational environments for nurturing long-term projects in the evolutionary mode, 
or step into the adversity of a problem-response situation in order to create a turnaround 
that promises future power or wealth. 
 
Table 5-1 
Entrepreneurial Stereotype Models 
             
 Type      Principle Source of Satisfaction   
 Artist 
Architect    Pride in building and workmanship 
Poet     Creativity and implementation of ideas 
 Professional    Acclaim of disciplinary peers 
 Believer    Pursuit of a cause or mission 
 Searcher    Self-identity 
 Independent    Autonomy 
 Conserver    Preservation of a cherished organization 
 Power seeker 
Controller    Stimulation and security of feeling in control 
         of people 
Player    Acclaim, notoriety, and excitement of having 
         power 
 Income Seeker    Wealth       
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Because there is a rough correlation between the incidence of particular venture 
scenarios and the ambient conditions of an economic sector, the association of the 
various entrepreneurial types with specific scenarios means that those types will be 
differentially sensitive to their sectoral environments. Thus these environments will 
affect the degree to which entrepreneurs screened into a sector at one point in time later 
become active as agents of venture activity. The theory here will not make much of this 
point because the association between scenarios and ambient conditions is so rough and 
because it would unduly complicate matters. Nevertheless, the consideration of ambient 
conditions should be kept in mind as a qualifying element to the entrepreneur-based 
explanations of behaviors in specific contexts. 
 
 
Risk 
 
The entrepreneurial models are designed to capture the underlying drives that motivate 
the variety of individuals who are likely to become involved in significant 
entrepreneurial activity in industries that contain nonprofit agencies. The models also 
imply how much each of these types may be willing to take chances to achieve their 
basic goals. Therefore, a discussion of risk-taking behavior will help fill out the 
descriptions of these entrepreneurial characters. 
Although financial and other risks of venture may be carried or shared by others, 
entrepreneurs are action-oriented people, often prone to putting themselves in 
precarious situations. All entrepreneurial activity, because it involves change, involves 
some risk, although often the risks associated with forbearing such activity may be just 
as severe. (In various observed cases ventures were required to avoid organizational 
collapse.) Risk-taking behavior varies by entrepreneurial type because there are 
different kinds of risk, each of which may be more or less important to each of the 
various types of entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs may incur risks along several dimensions in choosing to 
undertake, or not to undertake, ventures. The most common conception of risk is 
potential financial loss. Although this is a factor in many ventures, Williams and others 
argue that such risk is usually minimal in nonprofit activities.31 As noted in chapter 3, 
financial risk is not necessarily overwhelming, even in the profit-oriented sector, nor is 
it necessarily the dominant mode of entrepreneurial risk taking. Vladeck for example 
argues that proprietary-nursing-home entrepreneurs have faced little financial risk, 
given a virtually assured flow of Medicaid patients and the failure of regulators to 
prevent them from diverting revenues from service quality to pay bills as they come 
due.32 
Although entrepreneurs may not necessarily risk their own capital in ventures,
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some may risk job security or future income. Some observed ventures, for instance, 
were undertaken by newly installed executive directors who viewed the efficacy, if not 
the tenure, of their positions as dependent on their outcomes. In other cases, 
entrepreneurs sacrificed substantial levels of secure income in their efforts to establish 
ventures of highly uncertain prospect. Even a well-entrenched entrepreneuring 
executive may wonder if his job is at stake if a venture severely upsets the stability of his 
agency. 
Perhaps an equally important personal dimension of risk is the legal jeopardy that 
entrepreneurs are sometimes willing to incur on behalf of their ventures. Entrepreneurs 
may take risks, sometimes defiantly, by opening programs before certifications or funds 
have been officially committed, circumventing regulations, or exposing themselves to 
other liabilities because of program exigencies. 
Damage to professional reputation is another important source of entrepreneurial 
risk. Innovative ventures that run counter to professional thinking or that stir 
controversy can hurt the innovators if they fail. A variant of professional risk occurs 
when an entrepreneur who is a member of a corporate hierarchy (such as the Catholic 
church in several observed case studies) takes a legal or ideological position that 
conflicts with that of the establishment. Such a position risks rebuke by superiors and 
tarnishing of the entrepreneur's reputation. Professional reputation is also jeopardized 
when ventures threaten to upset the internal stability of an agency and hence bring the 
competence of the entrepreneur into question. Such risks are inherent, for example, in 
cases where human-service entrepreneurs bring program units for violent children onto 
their campuses or where an innovation such as an outpatient program in a residential 
institution upsets the organization's established structure, routine, or priorities. 
Loss of managerial control is in itself a source of risk, making the entrepreneur's 
job more difficult and consuming. Such loss, in addition to its possible effects on job 
security and reputation, can lead to an overburden of personal responsibility as the 
entrepreneur attempts to deal with crises of instability and to reestablish an equilibrium. 
Perhaps more than economic losses or external judgments of program ineffectiveness, 
such loss of internal control may lead to a more direct sense of personal failure by the 
entrepreneur. 
Personal overburden can be a serious source of risk to entrepreneurs, especially if 
ventures are expansive in nature or add significantly to the existing responsibilities of 
the entrepreneur. The same may be said of the personal sense of failure that some 
entrepreneurs seem to fear. Entrepreneurs who set high expectations for themselves and 
tend to feel personally responsible for their ventures find it difficult to live with negative 
outcomes. The egos of many entrepreneurs are tied up with their ventures. 
To discern the risk-related behavior of the various entrepreneurial types,
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it is useful to distinguish between two concepts: risk consciousness and risk proneness. 
An entrepreneur is risk conscious if he seriously weighs particular elements of risk in his 
decision-making calculus. An entrepreneur is risk prone if he tends to take chances 
along particular dimensions of risk, consciously or not. 
The artist is keenly risk conscious only with respect to the managerial 
environment of his agency. He is not especially sensitive to personal financial, 
job-security, legal, or professional risks and may therefore appear to be inadvertently 
risk prone in these areas. Whereas his ego is tied up with the success of his creations, he 
is willing to innovate and experiment with new forms without constraining himself to 
conservative strategies that might enable him to avoid failure. The artist is sensitive to 
his organizational environment, however, and makes decisions to prevent having that 
environment restrict his free hand. He will wish to avoid any new venture that threatens 
to tie him to administrative responsibilities and will seek to incorporate the delegation of 
responsibility into the design of new ventures. The artist may seize opportunities to 
increase his flexibility or the creative resources at his command, and this will sometimes 
involve calculated risk taking, balancing the potential administrative burdens against the 
potential new opportunities. The latter dilemma is most serious for the poet-type artist. 
The architectural type may view administrative tinkering as part of his own creative 
realm, deriving direct satisfaction from toying with and perfecting new (perhaps larger 
and more complex) administrative mechanisms. 
The professional will be most conscious of risks in the legal, managerial, and 
professional-reputation dimensions. He may also be conscious of risks to job security 
and of financial (income) loss to the extent that professional standing may be influenced 
by economic status or rank. In general, the professional tends to be conservative on 
ventures that involve potential organizational instability, legal jeopardy, or job security, 
fearing that incidents could hurt his reputation. On the other hand, professionals may be 
inadvertently risk prone with respect to overburdens of personal responsibility, perhaps 
taking on more than they can easily handle, because of the potential professional 
accolades. The most interesting risk-related problem of the professional is to weigh the 
undertaking of controversial ventures whose success can substantially enhance 
professional standing but whose failure can seriously damage that standing. In such 
cases, the professional will take a calculated risk, weighing the potential losses to 
reputation from managerial and legal problems, loss of job security, or ridicule of an 
idea turned sour against the potential recognition gained from championing a new 
concept. 
The believer is the most risk prone of all entrepreneurial types, putting the 
implementation of his cherished ideas, or progress in his cause, above all else.
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Minimizing personal ramifications, he tends to be risk prone with respect to financial 
security, legal jeopardy, professional reputation, and administrative overburden. He 
may even put a positive value on creating instability (managerial or otherwise) in the 
belief that this is the most effective road to reform. Such a rationale appears to have 
characterized James Dixon, former president and innovator of Antioch College: "Dixon 
clings to a perverse form of courage, believing that only thin ice is worth skating on…"33 
Dixon is quoted as saying that "(Antioch) has no obligation to pursue its own survival as 
an end," clearly an unusual, risk-oriented stance for an administrator, but one apparently 
deriving from a strong sense of social mission. 
Believers may be forced to take calculated risks if the efficacy of the cause or the 
potential of the entrepreneur in working toward that cause are uncertain. Thus a venture 
that might substantially advance the cause if it worked but that might damage the 
movement or the entrepreneur's role in it if it failed would cause some hesitation. Ralph 
Nader would have to think carefully about a project designed to expose the hazards of 
coal power, for example. Such a project might result in a considerable boost for the use 
of nonpolluting, renewable energy sources, but it might also strengthen the hand of 
nuclear-power interests, and thus damage the position of clean-power advocates. 
The searcher is by definition a potential entrepreneur without a well-established 
organizational or professional base, although he may have some disciplinary training 
and a current job that provides income. Risks to managerial stability and personal 
administrative overburden are thus irrelevant to him. On the other hand, the searcher 
appears to be risk prone with respect to financial loss, job security, and professional 
reputation because he is willing to range far and wide for a long period of time and with 
great sacrifice to find his niche in the professional or business world. He is willing to 
leave his present employment and pass up substantial income to consider a wide variety 
of venture (and other employment) opportunities, even those outside his disciplinary 
training or realm of work experience, before settling on a course of action. The most 
serious problem for the searcher is to choose a venture that will suit his personal 
needs—one that will give him a renewed sense of purpose and self-worth but that will 
not overwhelm his capabilities and bring about further frustration or uneasiness. 
The independent is an entrepreneur who knows what he wants to do 
(managerially and professionally) and wants to be free to do it without the constraints of 
sharing authority with others. He may or may not have secure employment prior to his 
venture, but if he does he may risk it to break free. At that stage, therefore, the 
independent is risk prone with respect to financial loss, job security, personal 
overburden, legal liability, and even professional reputation, although his personal 
professional ideas and desire for managerial discretion may be the very source
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of his quest for autonomy. Having succeeded in setting up his own organization, 
however, the independent is likely to become risk averse. His main goal will be to 
preserve his autonomy and run his business as he likes. He may cease to become an 
entrepreneur at all, in the sense of sponsoring future ventures. If he does continue, he is 
most likely to resemble the conserver. 
As his name implies, the conserver is a basically risk-averse personality who is 
seriously concerned with job security and avoiding activities that threaten legal 
jeopardy, internal instability, or loss of reputation for the organization. The conserver 
does not become an entrepreneur until the organization, or his position in it, is troubled 
and a venture promises to rescue it. He will then move into action, taking calculated 
risks of the legal, professional, and managerial varieties against the potential for 
successful resurrection. 
Power seekers are the most flamboyant risk takers of all entrepreneurs, although 
their risk taking is usually calculated. They will gamble with their own financial 
well-being, job security, and professional reputation and will risk legal problems and 
organizational instabilities, but only if there is reasonable hope for a substantial payoff 
in terms of increased personal power or if implementation of the venture is in itself an 
exercise in power playing. Controller-type power seekers will be substantially more 
conservative than players with respect to potential managerial instability because they 
derive their satisfaction not only from manipulating but from feeling they are in control. 
In contrast, players will present a bolder front to the outside world to suit their larger ego 
needs. However, their risk taking is held in check by those same ego needs, namely the 
desire to avoid personal failure. Both controller and player varieties of power seekers 
are prone to personal administrative overburden—the controller because he constantly 
seeks to increase surveillance of his operation, and the player because he tends to 
increase his organizational domain over time. 
The income seeker is perhaps the most calculating of risk takers, weighing the financial 
implications (benefits and costs) of each venture decision carefully. He will also be 
mindful of legal and managerial risks insofar as they might put his organization's 
economic position in jeopardy. The income seeker may be indifferent to professional 
reputation and inadvertently risk prone in this area, although regulatory mechanisms 
may force him to translate professional standards and norms into dollars and cents. As 
Vladeck observes for nursing homes, even the greediest operator has to show some 
minimal concern for image, the safety of his investment, and personal legal liability.34 A 
young income seeker is also prone to a risk of personal overburden, hustling to find 
financial backers and accumulate working capital or to establish a foothold on the rungs 
of a corporate ladder. Older income seekers may have accumulated enough capital to 
live their lives with more moderation. 
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6    Screening by Industry 
 
Discussion so far has focused on certain universal qualities of entrepreneurship in the 
economy, that is, on motivations and circumstances of enterprising found in virtually 
every formally organized field of social and economic activity. This chapter will begin 
to distinguish among qualities of entrepreneurship found in different parts of the 
economy by differentiating entrepreneurship according to industry or field of activity, 
for example, health care, child care, education, the arts, and so on. Chapter 7 will further 
distinguish enterprising behavior by economic sector—profit making, nonprofit, and 
public—within industries. 
To differentiate entrepreneurship by industry it is necessary to delineate 
structural characteristics of fields that differentially attract (or repel) the various types of 
entrepreneurs and then to determine how these characteristics tend to screen potential 
entrepreneurial populations into different parts of the economy, thereby affecting the 
distribution of entrepreneurial motivations within any given industry. The emphasis on 
the term potential is important. I shall argue that entrepreneurs ultimately active in a 
given field may not become immediately mobilized, either because they may take time 
to mature and gain the requisite knowledge or because sectoral conditions (as delineated 
in chapter 4) are not immediately appropriate or attractive for venture. Nonetheless, the 
screening process creates pools of latent entrepreneurial talent that differ by industry in 
their motivational content and hence in their ultimate behavior. 
I shall argue that the relevant structural characteristics of industries that screen 
the populations of potential entrepreneurs include the following. 
1. The intrinsic character of the service itself, in particular, whether it is basically 
a social or a technical service, whether it involves an altruistic objective, and whether it 
stresses creativity. In brief, this theory will state that entrepreneurs tend to be drawn 
from academic disciplines associated with particular industries and that those 
disciplines will tend to attract personnel with motivations appropriate to the service at 
issue. Hence, to a strong degree, screening by discipline also serves as screening by 
industry for entrepreneurship. 
2. The degree to which the field is dominated or controlled by one or more of the 
organized professions. This factor will be seen to influence the degree to which entre- 
preneurship can come from outside the ranks of dominant disciplines or from the ranks 
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of alternative (coexisting) disciplines. 
3. The degree of concentration of the field, that is, the degree of dominance by a 
few organizations and the ease of entry by new firms or agencies. This factor will be 
seen to especially influence the career choices of latent entrepreneurs who are concerned 
with power, independence, and opportunities to pursue individual ideas and beliefs. 
4. The social significance or priority attached by society to a given field. This 
again will be seen to influence the career choices of certain latent entrepreneurs whose 
interests focus on power and material gain. 
The mechanics of entrepreneurial selection among industries may involve three 
alternative (complementary) processes or trajectories by which individuals enter the 
latent entrepreneurial pool. 
1. Individuals make early choices of disciplinary training and career tracks that 
logically channel into particular industries. Such individuals pursue their careers in 
these industries and at some point become mobilized as entrepreneurs. For example, 
trained social workers enter social-service career ladders in agencies, and some 
eventually become entrepreneurs. Thus, disciplines attached to fields become a common 
source of entrepreneurial talent. This is perhaps the most common entrepreneurial 
trajectory in service industries, but is more heavily followed by professionals, 
conservers, and believers than other types of entrepreneurs. 
2. Individuals make career changes later in life, after having gained various work 
and educational experiences. Such career shifts are inhibited by intrafield requirements 
for disciplinary training, but in industries in which these requirements are flexible, such 
as therapeutic-camping or services to violent or severely handicapped children, the pool 
of latent entrepreneurial talent will include membership from a variety of loosely related 
disciplines (education, social work, and psychology). This route tends to be 
characteristic of the searcher, but is not unusual for other flexible or wide-ranging types, 
such as artists, power seekers, and income seekers. 
3. Individuals make purposeful, managerially oriented choices of generalist 
disciplines, such as business administration or law, that can provide them with 
continued flexibility in choice of industry. Alternatively, individuals with other types of 
disciplinary training or even without much formal training pursue managerial 
experiences early in their careers in organizations in a variety of industries. Often such 
trajectories only delay field specialization and a long-term choice of industry. Indeed 
Thurow observes, for the profit sector, that most entrepreneurial and managerial 
personnel do tend to become specialized in a given industry: 
If we ask why managers with large internal savings do not start subsidiaries in high 
profit industries rather than reinvesting in their own low profit industries,
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we come face to face with the entire structure of restricted competition in the U.S. 
economy. Barriers to entry are often high, and managers often do not have the 
specialized knowledge necessary to make profits in another industry. The existence 
of high profits in the cosmetics industry, for example, does not mean that iron and 
steel executives could earn high profits there.1 
In some cases, however, the (latent) entrepreneur does manage to maintain his 
flexibility as a long-term career pattern. Hence in industries such as the nursing-home 
industry that permit easy entry and reward administrative skill or financial management 
as important specialties, the pool of potential entrepreneurial talent is expanded to 
include this group of entrepreneurial generalists (see Vladeck).2 This route tends to be 
more characteristic of power seekers, income seekers, and some architects than of other 
entrepreneur types. 
Given these various career-sorting processes, the character of the resulting pool of 
potential entrepreneurs available to a given industry will depend on the particular 
structural characteristics of that industry. These characteristics are discussed below. 
 
Nature of the Service. Services can be characterized as having various degrees of social 
involvement, technical sophistication, and requirements for creativity. The social 
services, for example, rank high on the first of these dimensions, as they strongly 
involve activities directly addressed to helping the less fortunate and improving social 
conditions. Higher education would score somewhat lower on direct social involvement 
but higher on technical sophistication, that is, demands for technical excellence, than 
social service. Health services would rank high on technical sophistication because they 
require intensive training, scientific discipline, and meticulous operational skills, and 
they would rank lower than social or educational services in the social-involvement 
dimension. Scientific research would be generally more demanding of technical 
sophistication, moderately demanding of creativity, and low in direct social 
involvement. The arts would obviously stress creativity as well as technical 
sophistication. 
These dimensions of service character affect the screening of latent entrepreneurs 
primarily through processes 1 and 2 described above by differentially appealing to the 
principal motivations represented by each of the postulated entrepreneurial stereotypes. 
For example, latent believers will be drawn to fields involving high levels of social 
involvement, where causes are clear and easy to articulate and where crusading is an 
accepted form of behavior. Searchers, who may actively be engaged in process 2 during 
their entrepreneurial phase, may also find fields of social involvement appealing 
because they might find relevance and meaning for themselves in the work being done 
for society or in the direct human relationships entailed by these fields.
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Conservers will also be disproportionately drawn to such fields because organizations 
with cherished traditions of service are more likely to develop in such contexts. 
Institutions like the settlement house provide examples of this phenomenon. 
Fields characterized by high levels of technical sophistication are generally the 
domain of the professional (although not all fields with high levels of professionalism 
are technical). These fields favor rational discourse, methodological standards, and 
scientific patience and scrutiny. Believers may operate in technical fields, espousing 
strongly held theories and methods, but they need to cloak these beliefs in the form of 
rationally derived proposals. Many ventures in the medical and psychological service 
areas illustrate the professional entrepreneurial character in technical disciplines. 
Technically sophisticated fields may also be attractive to potential entrepreneurs 
of the architectural variety. Sophisticated technologies—in engineering, research, or the 
health fields, for example—can provide participants with the means to create new 
structures, products, and services. In hospitals, for example, generous reimbursement 
formulas have financed the development of sophisticated laboratories and treatment 
units founded on the latest scientific technologies.3 Thus new medical advances or 
computer-research technologies may become the basis for building up and reorganizing 
entire organizational structures, for example, specialized-care units in hospitals, 
management-information systems, and research centers in universities. 
Finally, fields that emphasize creativity are more likely to attract the latent artist, 
especially the poet. Traditionally, artistically trained individuals have been the primary 
management and entrepreneurial source for museums, theaters, and musical and dance 
enterprises (consistent with process 1). In museums, for instance, directors are heavily 
drawn from those with graduate degrees in fine arts.4 Only recently has there developed 
a tendency to consider the need for managerial skills. (For example, see McQuade.)5 
The same creative, expressionistic urges that underlie performance and achievement in 
artistic fields are thus likely to motivate and underwrite entrepreneurial enterprise via 
projects that strike out in original directions and bear messages of philosophic meaning 
or emotional content. 
 
Professional Control. The degree to which organized professions control employment 
and maintain fundamental authority and power within a given industry affects the pool 
of entrepreneurial talent available to that field in three ways. First, disciplinary control 
tends to institutionalize the nature of the service as described above and to protect it 
from corruption by extra-disciplinary influences (such as the influences of 
commercialism or the perspectives of other disciplines). Thus the professions
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reemphasize the labeling of services as technical, helping, or creative undertakings. In 
part, therefore, social work is a helping profession, with its implications for 
self-sacrifice and public service, by definition of the profession as well as the inherent 
character of the work. Hence those who would enter without this perspective (via 
process 1) are discouraged from doing so. Similarly, medicine or law are defined as 
technical professions, thereby limiting entry of those with other, less rigorous points of 
view. Nielson observes, for example, that "the AMA battled unrelentingly against the 
licensing of osteopaths, chiropractors, and optometrists."6 Finally, the arts require a 
creative, expressionistic viewpoint in a vein parallel to the alternative orientations taken 
by helping and technical professions. Overall, therefore, the result of professional 
control is to screen even more strongly—believers and conservers into the helping 
fields, professionals into the technical fields, and artists into the creative fields. 
The second effect of professional control of an industry is to limit the processes 
through which the pool of entrepreneurial talent is formed. Disciplines require unique 
modes of training that must normally be undertaken at the beginning of a career. Thus 
process 1 is the most viable mode of entry; career-switch (2) and generalist (3) modes 
become more unlikely as disciplinary control becomes tighter. The education, legal, and 
medical fields all provide relatively stringent examples. One result is to substantially 
reduce the chance that searchers will be part of the entrepreneurial pool or that 
generalists of any type (that is, those who would enter through scenario 3) can infiltrate 
a specialized industry. 
A third important way in which professional control influences the formation of 
the latent entrepreneurial pool is through the inculcation of ethical values. The 
aforementioned altruism of the helping professions, the emphasis on intellectual 
honesty and technical competence of the technical disciplines, and the elevation of 
artistic expression by the creative professions, constitute only part of this value 
structure. Professions also have different values with respect to money-making, 
achievement of power, and autonomy (solo practice versus teamwork). The helping 
professions, because of their self-sacrifice ethic, tend to deemphasize wealth and, to a 
lesser degree, power accumulation, thus discouraging income seekers and power 
seekers. Technical professions tend to encourage income augmentation as a virtue, 
signifying societal recognition of their importance, competence, and special skills and 
investments in advanced training and education, although they will also express disdain 
for irresponsible money seekers. The creative fields are relatively neutral in these 
domains, neither recognizing money and power as symbols of status, nor disdaining 
them as sins, except to discourage power seeking or income seeking at the sacrifice of 
originality or artistic achievement. Often, however, the emphasis on the intrinsic value 
of the work leads to a relative deemphasis of material reward.  For example, McQuade7 
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and Meyer8 both allude to the low pay and economic insecurity of museum directors. 
According to Meyer: 
There are few professions in the United States that offer more modest economic 
rewards to those holding graduate degrees than does the museum calling. Because 
museum work is thought to be pleasant, prestigious, and even glamorous, museum 
professionals are expected to settle for working for relatively low wages. 
Similar observations apply to other areas of artistic endeavor. 
In practice, of course, industries are controlled by discipline-oriented professions 
in varying degrees. Although professions do tend to seek exclusive control over 
particular industries, the degrees of dominance achieved vary considerably from field to 
field. This variation reflects, in part, the maturity of an industry and its degree of 
evolution from a wide-open, turbulent field of activity to a more stable industrial regime 
(see chapter 4). 
There are three qualitatively different cases of professional dominance. 
1. In some industries, such as health care, certain arts, or higher education, 
disciplinary control tends to be essentially complete. Significant participation at the staff 
level and ultimate managerial control in these areas is virtually precluded to those 
without a medical degree, artistic credentials, or advanced graduate training in an 
academic discipline. 
2. In other fields, such as residential care of children, fragmentation occurs, with 
different disciplines claiming similar domains of service under different labels. Thus 
social workers, psychologists, and educators may all be involved in sheltering 
emotionally disturbed children, with similar services provided under the names of 
residential school, foster-care agency, and residential-treatment center. 
3. In still other fields, such as nursing-home care for the elderly or day care for 
children, participation and managerial control are much less restricted by discipline and 
hence are open to people with a wide variety of backgrounds, including those without 
special training for providing the services of interest.9 
Clearly, fields of the first variety will confine the entrepreneurial pool heavily to 
those trained in the discipline (via scenario 1) and hence to those entrepreneurial types 
encouraged or selected by that discipline. Industries of the second variety will add 
diversity to the pool by mixing the flows from alternative disciplines. Industries of the 
third kind will draw on an even wider entrepreneurial pool, with participation from a 
variety of disciplines, including generalists and field switchers who enter through 
processes 2 and 3. 
In no case does the disciplinary filter work perfectly. First, no industry can be 
described as a completely closed professional shop. In medicine, mavericks
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(osteopaths, chiropractors, optometrists) do manage to operate outside the medical 
establishment. Within the established boundaries of industries tightly controlled by a 
single discipline and heavily imbued with a particular work and moral ethic, individuals 
with motivations that deviate from that ethic will slip through, either because their 
values can change after they have become educated in the discipline and gained some 
experience or because they see through the disciplinary screen to a set of opportunities 
for pursuing alternative motivations. Still, an important sorting of motivations occurs by 
industry, not only because of inherent service character but also because of the degree of 
organized disciplinary control. 
 
Industry Structure. Industries vary in the degree to which they are dominated by a few 
large organizations. In the commercial and industrial sectors, monopolization has long 
been a key concern of public policy and the focus of antitrust legislation. In industries in 
which the nonprofit and public sectors participate (perhaps alongside proprietary 
activity), the concentration of activity also varies significantly, although the issues of 
competition and collusion are often considered less important, if not irrelevant (see 
below). Some fields, such as day care, nursing-home care, or residential child care, are 
characterized by the presence of many relatively small producing organizations, none of 
which represents a significant proportion of the total activity of the industry within a 
given community. In other areas, teaching hospitals or opera companies, for example, 
providers are relatively few, and activity is more concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of organizations. In general, the presence of scale economies in production 
helps account for monopolistic or oligopolistic organization in the goods-producing 
sectors of the economy. In the service sector, where nonprofits are concentrated, such 
economies tend to be less important. Still, there may be significant variation among 
service industries in this characteristic, which may help account for some of the 
variation in the concentration of activity across fields. Moreover, concentration may 
also reflect the age of an industry, if economic pressures or other considerations have led 
small, young agencies to merge or consolidate over time. Industry structure thus proxies 
some of the evolutionary factors that underlie venture activity, discussed in chapter 4. 
Related to the question of concentration is the ease of entry into a given industry 
by new agencies or organizations. Activity concentrated in a few organizations may 
reflect relatively large capital requirements for operation, which represents a barrier to 
new entry. Furthermore, concentration is likely to be accompanied by governmental 
planning controls that attempt to ensure that facilities are efficiently utilized and meet 
suitable standards. Thus government may restrict the entry of new hospitals, nursing 
homes, day-care centers, or foster-care agencies to those which meet prespecified
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quality, safety, architectural, financial, and administrative standards and can 
demonstrate need for their services and ensure that they will not simply dilute the 
enrollments of existing agencies. Comprehensive planning and regulation date back to 
the mid 1960s in the hospital field and, have recently come into their own in the 
nursing-home industry. (See Lehman,10 Vladeck,11 and Dunlop12 for review of 
developments in these areas.) Vladeck, for example, documents the relationship 
between entry regulation and industry concentration. Newer and smaller firms are 
denied entry (or driven out) by the costs of administrative procedures and capital 
requirements imposed by regulatory agencies. 
A rough correlation between industry structure and the distribution of industrial 
activity among profit-making, nonprofit, and public sectors is observed here. Within the 
service fields in which nonprofits participate, economic activity tends to become more 
concentrated within fewer, larger organizations as one moves from the profit-making, to 
nonprofit, to governmental form. For example, in 1976, for-profit hospitals averaged 
98.3 beds, compared with 195 for nonprofit, 119 for local-government, and 611 for 
state-government hospitals.13 For nursing homes in 1973, Dunlop documents average 
sizes of 69, 85, and 110 beds for proprietary, nonprofit, and governmental institutions 
respectively.14 For elementary schools in 1976, enrollment figures were 422 public 
versus 218 nonpublic; for secondary schools, 573 public versus 324 nonpublic; and for 
higher education, 6,317 public versus 1,423 nonpublic.15 
For museums, size measurement is complicated by difficulties in reconciling 
estimates of full-time, part-time, and volunteer staff with institutional definitions. In 
terms of operating budgets for 1971-1972, private nonprofits slightly outnumbered 
public museums in the category under $100,000, whereas the reverse was true for the 
$100,000-$250,000 category. Equal representation was found in the category over 
$250,000. In the special category of museums attached to educational institutions, a 
sharp differential existed between larger public and smaller private museums.16 In day 
care of young children in 1976-1977, the Abt study found that among day-care centers 
not enrolling publicly subsidized children, the profit centers averaged an enrollment of 
43 children, compared with 55 for nonprofit (including governmental).17 For centers 
enrolling publicly subsidized children, the figures were 49 versus 51. 
Governments tend to locate most of their activity related to a particular function 
(such as child welfare or health) within a single hierarchical structure or in large 
divisions of such a structure, for example, in departments of health and major public 
clinics. In contrast, proprietary services are generally not the focus of a large corporation 
but are more the domain of the small, independent operator—the doctor, the educator, or 
the consultant who is in business for himself or with a partner or small company. 
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Nonprofits, because they often entail community-wide sponsorship, are frequently 
required by government or other sponsors to meet various standards of administration 
and service output and, perhaps because they are subject to less stringent antitrust 
controls than are profit makers,18 they tend to represent a middle ground—larger and 
more bureaucratic than proprietaries, but smaller and more fragmented than 
governmental units. The distinctions among sectors will be elaborated further in the next 
chapter. At this point, it will suffice to note that industry concentration is correlated with 
the distribution of industry activity across sectors, increasing as emphasis moves from 
proprietary, to nonprofit, to government provision. Thus screening of entrepreneurs by 
industry, because of concentration effects, will tend to occur in tandem with some of the 
sectoral-screening effects considered in chapter 7. 
The effect of industry concentration is simply to make particular industries more 
or less attractive to particular entrepreneurial characters. Thus when potential 
entrepreneurs make career choices they are assumed to have some appreciation of the 
current (and likely future) structure of the industries that they select or reject. Several 
types of potential entrepreneurs will be influenced by industry concentration and ease of 
entry. 
Independents will prefer industries that are relatively unconcentrated, in which 
small organizations are common and new entry is relatively easy. The ultimate objective 
of such an entrepreneur will be to try to establish his own new organization or to gain the 
helm of an existing agency within a reasonably short period of time. 
Searchers may begin their careers in concentrated fields in which they may 
become overwhelmed or frustrated by large organizations that impose fixed career 
ladders and burdensome controls on employees. Ultimately, however, they move to 
industries in which new entry is possible or in which many different agencies exist that 
may be explored for their career potentials. 
Power seekers will prefer concentrated fields that feature large organizations, 
where opportunities abound for assuming responsibility over large groups of people. 
Player-type power seekers will prefer larger organizations (and hence more 
concentrated fields) than controller-type power seekers, because the latter fear loss of 
effective control as the organization grows. Players, on the other hand, benefit from the 
grander platforms and greater notoriety provided by bigger organizations. 
Conservers will prefer fields of modest concentration that feature organizations 
large, stable, and mature enough to have established traditions and provide a sense of 
economic security but that are not so large as to have become impersonal and 
institutional or mechanical in character. 
Professionals will tend to select industries that are moderately to highly 
concentrated and provide adequate resource bases for pursuit of their disciplinary
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endeavors. Professionals may seek to avoid highly concentrated industries, however, if 
they perceive the large organizations within those fields to be inimical to the flexibility 
required for professional development. Professionals will also avoid industries that are 
so fragmented as to offer little promise of resource aggregation sufficient to support 
state-of-the-art activity and methodological advances. 
Artists will select industries that exhibit a moderate to low concentration of 
activity. The architectural variety of artist will seek organizations large enough to 
provide a resource base sufficient to support his penchant for building and program 
development, yet small enough so that new enterprises are both noticeable and 
identifiable as one's own product. Artists of the poet variety generally desire less 
concentration than architectural types; they prefer to remain unencumbered by 
administrative responsibilities and constraints and free to explore a variety of ideas. The 
poet may thus have stronger feelings about ease of entry than the architect, because he 
may feel less bound to remain with particular organizations for long periods of time (see 
chapter 9). Both types of artist enjoy nurturing projects from scratch, but the architect 
prefers a sector that will ultimately support programs of significant size, whereas the 
poet is generally more comfortable with smallness and flexibility. 
The Income Seeker has no strict preferences regarding the concentration of 
activity, size of organizations, or entry possibilities in a given field. Unconcentrated 
fields can present income opportunities through investment in the formation or building 
up of small enterprises, whereas concentrated fields may present opportunities for 
internal advancement in large agencies, matched by salary and benefit increases. As 
Vladeck observes, however, the former scenario often seems more compelling, because 
money can be made quickly in rapidly growing fields not yet dominated by a few large 
firms.19 Having entered a weakly concentrated field, the income seeker will work 
toward its concentration as a long-term strategy to increase income, or he will leave 
once his fortune is made and opportunities have diminished. 
 
Social Priority. Through the expression of economic demands and the allocation of 
resources as well as the more elusive concept of prestige, society tends to attach greater 
importance and social status to some fields than to others. For example, among 
industries in which nonprofits typically participate, health and scientific research tend to 
be elevated (in the United States, at least) and education and social service hold more 
precarious positions in the public's mind and in the economy. Social priorities will, of 
course, vary over time, reflecting demographic trends, technological change, cycles of 
economic prosperity, and other factors that contribute to the ambient conditions
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for an industry's development. For theoretical purposes, however, it is assumed that 
potential entrepreneurs are able to make reasoned, fixed judgments on what these 
priorities are likely to be for the future. 
Accordingly, the relative status of industries is assumed to influence career 
choices and hence the pools of latent entrepreneurial talent that become available to 
particular industries. (Sometimes the effect of social priorities on career choice is made 
quite explicit through public policy, as when the government invests in the training of 
scientists and engineers as the United States did in the late 1950s and early 1960s, or in 
physicians, as in the 1960s.) 
Differences in social priority among industries will have the strongest effects on 
two entrepreneurial types—the income seeker and the power seeker. Income seekers 
will look toward rich or expanding fields as presenting the strongest opportunities for 
material reward. Power seekers, especially those of the player variety, will see such 
industries as the locus of where the action is. There they will seek the most notable 
platforms for achieving fame and influence over the largest and most important sets of 
people and resources. 
Other entrepreneurial types may also be influenced in their career choices by the 
social status of alternative industries, albeit to lesser degrees. Professionals and artists 
may see the more prestigious fields as providing stronger resource bases on which to 
pursue the kinds of intellectual or creative stimulation they value. Alternatively, 
searchers may see fields of emerging social interest as new, uncrowded, vistas to 
explore in their efforts to find satisfying careers. 
Independents and believers will be relatively indifferent to the social priority 
attached to alternative industries. The independent essentially seeks autonomy and may 
even tend to avoid fields that are in the spotlight, preferring environments in which he is 
more likely to be left alone. The believer is somewhat similar in this respect. Although 
industries of greater social priority may provide a wide set of opportunities for taking up 
social causes or sponsoring particular policies, the believer is more likely to attach 
himself to causes or fields that he feels are underserved and require new attention by 
society. 
 
Perspective. The discussion in this chapter is based on the idea that pools of latent 
entrepreneurial talent available for enterprise within particular industries are determined 
by people's choices of disciplines and careers, usually made early in their working lives. 
Furthermore, this chapter postulates that such career choices are influenced by aspirants' 
perceptions of the character of industries associated with their disciplinary training and 
career paths. Finally, some consistency is assumed between the motivations
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of people at the stage of career choice and the motivations that they exhibit when they 
become entrepreneurs. 
These assumptions require some further explanation and elaboration. First, there 
is usually a significant delay between time of career choice and time of entrepreneurial 
activity. Thus potential entrepreneurs are assumed to exhibit a certain amount of 
foresight as to the future character of industries. In particular, except for fields in which 
the entrepreneurial talent pool is formed significantly through field-switching (2) or 
generalist (3) modes, the latent entrepreneur is assumed to make reasonable guesses as 
to the future character of industries, manifested by disciplinary choices. 
Second, this chapter has focused on motivations as a prime selection variable for 
sorting latent entrepreneurial types into alternative careers and industries. Chance and 
inherent individual talents are also involved in this process. Random deviations are 
assumed to obtain across industries but not bias the postulated selection processes in any 
particular direction. 
Talent raises more troubling questions. Certainly the screening process that 
tracks individuals into disciplines hinges heavily on skills (talent) as a prime 
discriminating factor. Tone-deaf people will not be channeled into musical careers nor 
will those with limited mathematical abilities be channeled into computer programming. 
Perhaps more to the point, industries that require certain relatively rare talents will 
strongly attract those with the requisite potential. 
On this basis one might even argue that individuals with high potential for 
entrepreneurial skills—organizing, salesmanship, leadership and charisma, and a good 
business sense—would be strongly attracted to commercial areas that positively and 
explicitly reward and encourage such skills. Williams suggests this situation,20 and 
Cornuelle observes that: 
competitive pressure has developed in the commercial sector a breed of gifted 
promoters and organizers of commercial action. We need to create such a breed in 
the independent [nonprofit] sector. They are our scarcest resource.21 
In relative terms, such claims of entrepreneurial steering toward the commercial 
sector may be correct. Nonetheless, as illustrated in chapter 3, entrepreneurial talent is 
found in noticeable quantities in many industries in which entrepreneurship is not a 
particularly enshrined concept. 
Thus substantive individual interests and motivations, perhaps more than innate 
skills, heavily influence career tracks. Furthermore, there is an obvious, inseparable 
correlation between what one enjoys and what one is able to do well. Skills and 
motivations are thus likely to go hand in hand. 
This chapter has taken the perspective that the composition of the pool of 
potential entrepreneurial talent is influenced by processes of career and discipline 
choice.
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It argues further that choice of discipline and career orientation is itself influenced not 
only by chance and talent, but more by a positive, if not self-conscious, matching of 
latent entrepreneurial motives to the character of industries to which given types of 
disciplinary training or early work experience ultimately apply. Four relevant industry 
characteristics were identified: the nature of the service, that is, its social, technical, or 
creative orientation; the pattern of professional or disciplinary control over the industry; 
the size of organizations, degree of industry concentration, and ease of entry; and the 
social priority attached to the industry as a whole. These characteristics act as indicators 
or signals used by the various distinct entrepreneurial types to sort themselves among 
industries. 
It is important to recognize that particular industries, for example, hospitals or 
higher education, must be described as clusters, or packages, of characteristics along 
these four dimensions. The four unidimensional analyses of sorting by entrepreneurial 
type must be combined to arrive at specific conclusions about the motivational 
distribution of entrepreneurship for any particular industry. Furthermore, these clusters 
exhibit substantial intra-industry variation, arising in good measure from sectoral 
divisions within industries. Screening by sector is the subject of the next chapter. 
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The industry-choice process is one of two, basic, intertwined processes of selection 
through which the pool of entrepreneurial talent available for enterprise in a given part 
of the economy is formed. The second process is sector choice, through which 
individuals select specific organizational contexts in which to work within a given 
industry. As for the industry-choice decision, there is more than one scenario through 
which the sector-choice decision may take place. 
1. A potential entrepreneur may become initially employed and gain the bulk of 
his experience in a given sector and remain in that sector throughout his entrepreneurial 
phase. 
2. A potential entrepreneur may gain initial experience and even undertake 
enterprise in one sector but eventually move on to focus the bulk of his entrepreneurial 
energies in another sector. 
Strong inertial tendencies govern the movement of personnel who favor scenario 
1 as the dominant mode. Entrepreneurs of the income-seeker, power-seeker, and 
searcher varieties exhibit greater inclinations toward scenario 2 than do other types. The 
discussion that follows treats these latter cases as if such entrepreneurs initially chose to 
work in the sector in which they ultimately undertake the bulk of their entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Sectoral considerations may influence selection by industry. In particular, the 
predominance of a given sector within some industry is likely to affect certain structural 
characteristics (for example, the concentration of economic activity) on which industry 
selection is based. In general, however, the industry decision—which reflects a basic 
career choice—comes first, and sector selection is secondary, although significant. 
Having selected an industry, the potential entrepreneur will often have some choice of 
sector because most service fields are not totally dominated by a single sector. 
 
 
Screening Factors 
 
Some empirical evidence suggests systematic differences among employees in 
alternative economic sectors. Guyot, for example, observes that public employees are 
more likely to be female, come from minority group, low socioeconomic backgrounds, 
and to have more formal education than their private sector counterparts.1 It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that the motivations of employees—latent entrepreneurs,
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in particular—may also differ systematically by sector. 
I will proceed, as in chapter 6, by postulating a certain amount of good intuition, 
rational thought, and foresight on the part of potential entrepreneurs in their early 
choices of employment in organizations. In particular, I assert that there is a strong 
correlation between the motives that the entrepreneur will ultimately exhibit (when he 
begins to venture) and the character of organizations in which he chooses to become 
employed and gain experience. Thus reference to the various types of 
entrepreneurs—believers, power seekers, and so on—will apply to latent motivations 
that may not yet have become manifest but are presumably part of the individual's 
consciousness at the stage of choosing an organization for which to work. 
The factors on which sector screening of potential entrepreneurs takes place include the 
following. 
 
Opportunity. Within any given industry, some sectors tend to be larger and more vital 
than others at a given point in time. The relative abundance of employment 
opportunities will vary accordingly. For example, until the mid-twentieth century when 
public universities began to develop, opportunities in higher education were 
concentrated almost totally in the nonprofit sector. The pattern in child care is similar. 
For nursing homes, however, the proprietary sector has been the main locus of 
opportunity. 
A few statistics illustrate the variety of sectoral splits among industries. 
According to the American Hospital Association, general hospitals were distributed 
across sectors in 1976 as follows: 35 percent government; 52 percent nonprofit; 13 
percent proprietary. For psychiatric hospitals the figures are 59 percent, 17 percent, and 
23 percent. For nursing homes the distribution was 8 percent, 19 percent, and 73 
percent. In education, according to 1976 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) statistics, elementary schools were 82 percent public and 18 percent 
nonpublic, whereas secondary schools were 87 percent public and 13 percent private 
(See Miller).2 
In higher education, according to Nielsen, the distribution in enrollments 
between public and private, nonprofit institutions has gone from 50 percent each in 1950 
to 78 percent versus 22 percent in favor of public institutions in 1977.3 For medical 
schools in 1977, the division was 57 percent and 43 percent, in favor of public 
institutions. 
In the day-care-center industry, according to a study by Abt Associates, 
approximately 41 percent of centers were profit making, compared with 59 percent 
nonprofit or governmental, in 1976-1977.4 Of the 59 percent labeled nonprofit, 7 
percent were governmental, 4 percent Headstart; and 3.2 percent, school affiliated. 
According to Netzer, 85 percent of the arts sector (broadly defined) in
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terms of annual expenditure is commercial.5 For 1971-1972, about 56 percent of 
museums were private nonprofit, compared with 34 percent government, 5 percent 
attached to public educational institutions, and 5 percent attached to private educational 
institutions.6 (Proprietary galleries or exhibitions are excluded from the count.) 
In the research and development industry, Dickson indicates roughly a 70 
percent-30 percent division between profit-making and nonprofit or public agencies in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s.7 Of the six hundred or so agencies that he considers think 
tanks, about half are profit making, one-third are nonprofit, and one-sixth are 
governmental. 
In broadcasting, according to figures presented by Schutzer, public and nonprofit 
educational FM radio stations constituted slightly less than one-eighth of all radio 
stations in 1979, whereas educational television stations (VHF and UHF) represented 
about 25 percent of all television stations in that year.8 
Government funding or licensing policies often underlie these patterns of 
sectoral distribution (see chapter 10). For example, some states refuse to certify 
proprietary foster-care agencies. In contrast, programs such as FHA mortgage 
guarantees helped underwrite the growth of proprietary nursing-home enterprise, and 
other legislation, for example, state higher-education programs, sponsored the specific 
development of public systems (universities).9 
Although latent entrepreneurs of various types may have strong leanings by 
sector, they may also be limited in their ability to exercise those preferences, that is, 
sector choice may be constrained by existing sectoral opportunity structures within 
industries. If opportunities are restricted by sector, that is, if there is a mismatch between 
available opportunities by sector and the sector preferences of entering personnel, then 
some latent entrepreneurs who have selected a given field will be forced to become 
employed in less preferred sectors. The less preferred sectors will then include 
entrepreneurial types that they would not otherwise attract. Given a more open 
opportunity structure, latent entrepreneurs would be sorted into more homogeneous 
motivational sets by sector. The implications of this important phenomenon will be 
developed in chapter 10. 
What determines if a sector is more or less preferred by a latent entrepreneur? 
Aside from opportunity constraints, other factors will tend to sort out the entrepreneurial 
types. Most of these factors, including income potential, internal bureaucratic structure, 
and service ethic, vary in a fairly unambiguous way from sector to sector for a wide 
range of industries. 
 
Income Potential. The nonprofit sector is by definition restrained by the so-called 
nondistribution constraint, which formally precludes appropriation of differences 
between revenues and expenditures as profits by managers or trustees.
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As Hansmann and others argue, the existence of this constraint discourages income 
augmentation in the nonprofit sector by signaling what is meant by appropriate behavior 
and by raising the threat of legal penalties for violation of this norm. Income-increasing 
behavior in the nonprofit sector is not impossible or even terribly unusual, however. De-
vices such as the inflation of salaries and perquisites or kickback and sweetheart 
schemes for the purchase of other inputs are possible and observed. (See Mendelson, for 
example.)10 Thus in industries whose resources are concentrated in the nonprofit sector 
(perhaps reflecting explicit policy or relative states of sector development), the 
nonprofit sector may be seriously viewed as a source of wealth enlargement. 
Nonetheless, income potential is nominally more restricted and blunted in the 
nonprofit sector than it is in the profit sector. In the proprietary sector, 
income-maximizing behavior is the prescribed norm and may be legally implemented 
directly through profits, ownership, and appreciation of capital as well as through 
increases in salary and perquisites and control over input factors. Of course, the relative 
potentials for increasing income in the profit and nonprofit sectors will also depend on 
market factors, including the demand for particular services and the level of 
competition, and on tax and other revenue considerations. Nonprofits in some fields can 
conceivably combine tax concessions and access to philanthropy to generate income 
potentials in excess of proprietary capabilities. The appropriation of surpluses as 
personal income can, within wide limits, be held in check by accountability to the 
groups (government, donors, consumers) responsible for enforcing the conditions under 
which such special advantages are granted (see chapter 8). 
Income potentials and expectations in the public sector are quite variable: 
corruption, opportunities for advancement, and remuneration levels of public 
employees tend to differ considerably over time and place. Significantly, in some parts 
of the public sector, for example, within the federal government and some state and 
large local governments, civil-service and political-appointee pay scales and other 
benefits can be sufficiently attractive to warrant the attention of those whose career 
objectives may center heavily on income augmentation. Alternatively, the public sector 
may be viewed by some as a training ground or springboard from which income-seeking 
careers may be launched into the private sector. Much depends on the particular political 
conditions associated with given parts of the public sector, including the wealth and 
level of demand for public goods by the relevant constituencies, the strength of 
public-sector unions, and the tolerance levels for corruption and conflicts of interest. 
In the upper managerial ranks at least, such as assistant-commissioner or 
deputy-assistant-secretary levels, the public sector is often viewed as a broad vertical 
continuum. Hence those with long-term income-increasing goals may conceive
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of career ladders that begin at the local level and proceed upward through state and 
federal echelons, featuring increased benefits along the way. Since lateral mobility 
across local or state jurisdictions is fairly uncommon, however, the latent entrepreneur's 
view of the income potential of the public sector will be highly conditioned by his local 
origins. On balance, the public sector would appear to constitute a middle ground 
between the clear income potentials of the profit sector and the restrained income 
orientation of the nonprofit sector. 
 
Bureaucratic Structure. Within a given industry, the profit-making, nonprofit, and 
public sectors differ in their degrees of dependence on hierarchy and political 
accountability and hence in the flexibility, independence, and authority that staff 
members and officials can maintain. For example, chapter 6 briefly noted the tendency 
of economic activity in service fields to become more concentrated and more 
hierarchical as one moves from proprietary to nonprofit to government sectors. 
Concentration and hierarchy were observed to affect the selection of potential 
entrepreneurs by industry because of implications for power seeking, autonomy, and 
other motives. Within industries, a similar selection process will take place by sector. 
There are several implications of hierarchy. Although large hierarchical 
structures may provide more opportunity for power-seeking behavior, they also tend to 
entail more cumbersome and restrictive internal systems of control and accountability. 
Those who value personal flexibility and freedom from rigid systems of rules, reporting, 
and authorizations, would thus prefer working in less hierarchically structured sectors. 
This inclination is further strengthened by the tendency of staffs of large, hierarchical 
organizations to develop an inertial character of their own that restricts the freedom of 
action of those who would promote new initiatives. As Smith explains, such problems 
have inspired the formation of government corporations and nonprofit agencies separate 
from government itself: 
[These] types of organization arose in part out of a need to have a public function 
performed in a more flexible administrative framework than was easily available 
within one of the traditional executive departments. . . . [They] initially enjoyed 
considerable autonomy in regard to personnel and staffing practices; the normal 
civil service pay scales did not apply and, consequently, employment opportunities 
tended to be more attractive than civil service.11 
It is not simply the dependence on hierarchy, however, that differentiates the 
bureaucratic structure of the three sectors. The degree of interaction with and restraint 
from overseeing bodies and political entities also varies systematically by sector, with 
important implications for latent entrepreneurs who value autonomy and may
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disdain the requirement to share decision-making authority. Agencies in each sector are 
normally associated with a board or council of trustees in one form or another. In the 
public sector, a government bureau is accountable to a legislature or a sublegislative 
committee and often to a community-advisory board as well. Nonprofit agencies are 
required to have boards of directors or trustees composed of responsible community 
members to whom the ultimate well-being of the corporation is entrusted. These boards 
normally have the power to appoint the agency's executive director and to approve basic 
fiscal and program policy. In the proprietary sector, corporate responsibility resides in a 
board of directors composed of shareholders, often including the executive director. In 
some cases, proprietary and nonprofit agencies have additional advisory committees 
attached to specific program activities, often to satisfy requirements of 
government-funding programs in which they may be involved. 
Within each sector, the authority asserted by these overseeing bodies varies 
considerably, perhaps most widely in the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit-agency boards of 
directors are known to range from those whose officers insist on major day-to-day 
influence on policymaking to those which are virtually rubberstamps for the executive 
director. The public and proprietary sectors show less variance. Legislative committees 
usually assume a reasonable level of control over an agency's budget and executives are 
normally well advised to pay homage to their legislative benefactors. In the proprietary 
sector, the executive usually has strong, often dictatorial control, commensurate with his 
financial interest and ability to keep the enterprise solvent and prosperous. Clarkson 
explains that nonprofit (and, by extension, public-sector) trustee control over the 
executive function tends to be more inhibiting than it is in the proprietary sector because 
output is more difficult to measure and managerial rewards are only loosely related to 
changes in organizational wealth.12 Trustees of nonproprietary organizations must 
therefore compensate by imposing stricter rules and procedures. 
Because such issues seem to amplify as one moves from commercial to 
private-nonprofit to governmental realms, it may be said that the requirement of 
executives to share authority and to be constrained by overseeing bodies increases 
systematically from proprietary to nonprofit to public sectors. 
A similar spectrum obtains with respect to entanglement of a more general 
political nature. The proprietary-agency director must be careful to cultivate certain 
relationships to secure zoning, licensing, or other approvals that he may need for 
operation. He may have to be careful not to arouse community opposition to his 
operation if he is dealing with sensitive areas, such as services to the retarded, 
delinquent, or mentally ill. He may also be required to follow particular rules and 
reporting protocol if he decides to accept government funding. The proprietary
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director, however, will be fundamentally less entangled and constrained by political 
considerations and government regulation than his nonprofit or public-sector 
counterparts. 
The nonprofit agency is based on the notion of a public purpose for some 
constituency, whether it be a particular neighborhood, ethnic or religious group, or those 
interested or needing a particular type of service. Its board of directors, staff, and 
volunteers are more likely to have roots in this constituency and to bring a strong 
element of political responsiveness and responsibility to the agency itself. Even those 
nonprofit agencies which might be incorporated without such community ties will 
normally be required by government to constitute a board of trustees representative of 
the public purpose for which nonprofit status is granted. Thus there will be at least a 
nominal sensitivity to political pressures and constituencies by the nonprofit. 
Furthermore, when the nonprofit receives public funds or is designated as a vehicle for 
public-service delivery, it will become enmeshed in the broader spectrum of political 
concerns and regulatory requirements. Meyer describes an example of both political 
accountability and trustee control in the case of the Metropolitan Museum of Art: 
As a result of . . . news stories, the attorney general of New York State ordered an 
official inquiry to determine whether the museum had deliberately ignored donor 
wishes. . . . Under pressure to make a full public accounting of past sales, the 
Metropolitan for the first time disclosed its transactions and agreed reluctantly to 
establish new procedures for deaccessioning. Satisfied, the attorney general 
absolved the museum of intent to violate the law. [Museum director] Hoving thus 
survived a scandal that would surely have toppled any other museum director; that 
he was able to do so was in good part attributable to his skill in managing the board 
and in retaining the support of its president, C. Douglas Dillon.13 
By far the most overwhelming set of political constraints is faced by directors of 
public bureaus whose decisions must often reflect partisan, geographic, ethnic, and 
other political sensitivities. New policies or program initiatives must be checked or 
modified for their effects on multiple groups before action can be taken. 
Overall, therefore, sectoral differences in organizational structure provide 
differential opportunities to those potential entrepreneurs whose ultimate motives 
concern power, autonomy, and flexibility. In general, the public sector is the most 
concentrated in terms of hierarchy and outside restraint on freedom of action; the 
proprietary sector tends to be least intense in these dimensions; and the nonprofit sector 
constitutes a broad middle ground. 
 
Service Ethic. Just as the different sectors vary in the norms that they encourage with 
respect to money-making, they also differ in the ideals and service
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orientations that they espouse. Whereas such normative codes may not in themselves be 
powerful influences on behavior, their importance as signaling devices for latent 
entrepreneurs at the stage of employment choice cannot be totally ignored. 
Each sector has its lofty traditions and positive self-images. As Nielsen says in 
his discussion of private versus public colleges, "Each of these subsectors has developed 
its separate (and sometimes self-glorifying) definition of itself."14 Government has the 
notion of public service—devotion to country and community through the competent 
provision of essential services. In earlier eras, public servants—policemen, firemen, 
soldiers, even postmen and teachers—were heroes in the public mind, and in the 
managerial and political ranks, statesmanship, patriotism, and leadership were 
important values. In recent years, this imagery has faded, but there remains a concept of 
public interest that underlies the value system for government work. Although this 
notion is vague, it connotes selfless attention to the needs of a society or community as a 
whole. As such, public sector employment may still attract idealists who identify with 
the public-service image. 
Traditionally, the profit-making sector has been the domain of the rugged 
individualist, the self-made man who works hard for his living and makes it on his own. 
It is the domain of commerce, subject to the harsh discipline of the marketplace, where 
activity is frankly viewed as business and only secondarily as service. It is where 
fortunes may be made, but where every cent must be earned, where free enterprise rules 
and government is viewed as an intrusive and corrupting influence. As Vladeck 
observes for nursing homes: "Proprietary nursing home owners are not averse to re-
minding legislators that they are independent, taxpaying entrepreneurs with payrolls to 
meet and bottom lines to be looked at."15 In the modern era of large, multinational 
corporations and complex entanglements between government and private industry, this 
individualist image too has worn thin, yet it maintains an essence of viability, especially 
in the arena of small business and many service industries. This image influences latent 
entrepreneurs who see themselves as individualists who want to make it on their own. 
The nonprofit sector has its roots in voluntarism, charity, community, and in 
large measure, organized religious denominations. It is a mode of organization based on 
the notion of voluntary mobilization of close-knit communities to assist those of its 
members in need or in trouble. Whether it is a social agency, hospital, or museum, the 
nonprofit agency is seen to be supported by voluntary contributions, manned by 
volunteers or those who work for some sacrifice in pay, controlled by community elders, 
and administered by those whose interests are benevolent and specifically attuned to 
local-community needs. As with the folklore of the other sectors, the nonprofit's 
idealized imagery has also been tarnished as the application of this organizational device 
has been modified, extended, and intertwined with other sectors over time.
Screening by Sector        97 
 
Still, the imagery continues to bear some semblance of fact and hence to serve as a 
signal to those potential employees (latent entrepreneurs) who find it appealing. 
 
 
Screening of Entrepreneurs 
 
The relatively systematic differences in income potential, bureaucratic structure, and 
service ethic serve to sort out latent entrepreneurs among sectors. 
Income seekers will be most strongly attracted to the proprietary sector, where 
the avenues for money-making are more numerous and open and where profit making is 
a socially approved and legal mode of behavior. (See Vladeck's account on nursing 
homes in the 1950s and 1960s.)16This tendency will be modified to the degree that the 
market or regulatory environment restricts financial gain in the profit sector or generous 
income streams and salary opportunities are channeled to the nonprofit or government 
sectors. (See chapters 8 and 10.) 
Independents will also tend to gravitate to the proprietary sector because of the 
less overbearing requirements in that sector for shared decision making and 
accountability to others, and because the lower concentration of activity in that sector 
provides greater opportunity for achieving positions of executive autonomy. This 
tendency will be modified to the extent that small nonprofits with rubber-stamp boards 
are able to insulate themselves from outside pressures and hence attract independents. In 
few cases, however, will independents be attracted to government, where hierarchical 
and political-accountability arrangements are omnipresent. 
Power seekers will generally gravitate to the public sector for the same reasons 
that independents reject this alternative. Government exhibits major hierarchical 
structures and arenas of public visibility in which power seekers may climb to greater 
heights of control and notoriety. As Schaffner observes, "management in government is 
indeed different from management in industry. . . . High and frequent turnover in top 
levels of government . . . political considerations, complicated bureaucratic procedures, 
and media limelight all contribute to the rarefied climate in the public sector."17 This 
atmosphere will be especially appealing to the bold and ambitious player-type power 
seeker. The controller-type power seeker is more complex, however. Whereas the 
opportunities for expanding control in the public sector appeal to him, at some level the 
public sector becomes overwhelming. Major departments become too large to control 
and accountability relationships too complex to manage. The latent controller type may 
therefore decide that organizations in the nonprofit sector present more comfortable 
alternatives. 
The believer is most likely to be attracted by the service ethic of the
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nonprofit or public sectors, but his uncompromising ideas for social reform and social 
change are more likely to be accommodated by the less overbearing accountability 
structure of the nonprofit arena. Thus, the nonprofit sector is likely to employ more than 
its share of believers. 
According to Nielsen, believerism is common across many nonprofit industrial 
sectors: 
In the world of the nonprofits, there is constantly present a great latent 
righteousness because most of the inhabitants feel they are serving some high 
moral purpose in behalf of the commonweal. As a result, educators, scientists, 
artists, and reformers can be readily aroused to assert the claims of their institutions 
in passionate and absolute terms. To educators, education is not only virtuous but 
the bedrock and precondition of democracy. . . . Scientists view the quest for 
knowledge . . .  as essential to human advancement and well-being. . . . Those 
devoted to cultural activities see them as the core and very definition of civilization. 
. . . Likewise doctors, religious leaders, and social activists all can express the value 
of the work to which they have committed their lives in the most ardent and 
uncompromising terms.18 
Conservers, too, are most likely to be employed in the nonprofit sector, for 
several reasons. First, they have a loyalty to traditions and sentimentalities more likely 
to be found in the nonprofit and public sectors than in the proprietary sector. (An 
exception here is the multi-generation family business, which may invoke 
conserver-type loyalties in the profit sector.) Second, conservers are more likely to be 
attracted by the smaller size and greater informality of organizations in the nonprofit 
sector, where traditions and personal relationships are more easily cultivated and 
maintained. 
Like the power seekers, the two varieties of artist are also somewhat different in 
their likely employment preferences. Neither the poet or architect varieties are likely to 
be heavily attracted to the public sector because of their desires to use activities as 
personal expressions of accomplishment. In the public sector, more people are involved 
with specific activities because of the greater hierarchy and complexity of 
accountability arrangements; consequently, there is less opportunity for personal 
identification with the product. (Men like Robert Moses, who have managed to put their 
personal signature on works, are more the exception than the rule. Incumbent politicians 
tend to receive credit for accomplishments within their domains, whether or not they 
were personally responsible.) Both artist types can be accommodated by the relatively 
less encumbered structure of the nonprofit sector, but the poet may be more confined to 
this sector than the architect. The architect is more concerned with the fact that he is 
building than with what he is building. Hence opportunities in the profit sector, where 
vistas for new projects may be wide, may be as appealing as those available in the 
nonprofit sector. For the poet, however, activity is more a matter of personal
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expression of ideas and values than of structure building or pride of technique. The poet 
is more likely to feel inhibited by the rigor and restraint of the profit criteria and to feel 
more comfortable in the nonprofit sector where the diversity of support sources is more 
apt to be indulgent of diverse ideas, irrespective of direct-market potential (or political 
content). 
Finally, professional- and searcher-type latent entrepreneurs will be inclined to 
find the nonprofit sector a comfortable middle ground, for reasons similar to those cited 
in the industry-selection process. For the professional, nonprofits are likely to be large 
enough to provide the necessary resource base and logistical support to underwrite the 
pursuit of disciplinary accomplishment, while less inhibiting than government in 
following such a chosen path. Similarly, the searcher may be attracted to the ideals of 
the public or nonprofit realm, but likely to become stifled by governmental hierarchy. 
Figure 7-1 summarizes the nominal sorting of entrepreneurial types by sector. 
This sorting provides a preliminary basis for modeling nonprofit-sector behavior. If 
nonprofit sectors follow the general patterns of income potential, bureaucratic structure, 
and service ethic described above and industries in which such sectors are imbedded do 
not seriously constrain the opportunities for entrepreneurial employment by sector or 
severely screen particular types of entrepreuners into or out of the industry as a whole, 
then it is possible to hypothesize that nonprofit sectors are characterized by the 
behavioral tendencies of the entrepreneurs listed in the second column of the figure. 
However, this view is naive and too abstract for two reasons. First, the relative structural 
characteristics of nonprofit sectors do vary considerably from one industry to another, 
hence the pattern in figure 7-1 is not universal. Second, the postscreening behavior of 
entrepreneurs is influenced not only by their internal motivations but also by the 
constraint and accountability conditions that exist at the time of venture. Still, the behav-
iors implied in the screening pattern displayed in Figure 7-1 may be taken as a 
description of central tendency in nonprofit sectors, from which variations will be 
considered. 
 
Profit      Nonprofit      Public      
Income seekers     Architects    Believers   Controllers   Players 
Independents    Conservers 
Poets 
Searchers 
Professionals 
 
Figure 7-1. Nominal First Preferences of Entrepreneurs by Sector 
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The Permanence of Industry and Sector Screening 
 
The early screening of potential entrepreneurs by motivation into industries and sectors 
of employment significantly influences the character of enterprise and behavior in a 
sector, because there is a notable degree of immobility of these latent entrepreneurs at 
later career stages when most venture activity tends to take place. Specifically, strong 
inertial tendencies restrict the crossing of industry and sector boundaries by potential 
entrepreneurs once these people have made their early career decisions. These 
tendencies may be stated in the form of two general propositions. 
1. Entrepreneurs whose early employment history is concentrated in a particular 
industry will tend to undertake future ventures in that same industry. Within industries, 
entrepreneurs whose employment history is concentrated in a given sector will tend to 
undertake future activity in that same sector. 
These statements apply to first-time entrepreneurs as well as to those who have 
already begun entrepreneurial phases of their careers. The effect will tend to be stronger 
for industries as a whole than for sectors within industries because adaptation to 
different sectoral cultures is usually easier than learning whole new technologies and 
economic markets. 
Nevertheless, inertia exists within sectors as well. Each sector tends to have its 
own culture to which individuals become accustomed. The profit sector preaches 
efficiency; the nonprofit sector stresses voluntarism and community involvement; and 
government uses public service and political awareness as its frame of reference. More 
significantly, each sector requires different modes of operation and management 
(financial, personnel, and so on), which individuals master by experience and which 
create psychological and practical barriers to lateral movement across sectors. Thus the 
public-sector official becomes experienced with political considerations and bu-
reaucratic procedure; the profit maker becomes experienced with marketing and capital 
financing; and the nonprofit official becomes experienced with philanthropic fund 
raising and dealing with community groups. As a result of these cultural and operational 
factors, individuals who are familiar with a given sector become oriented to maintaining 
their activities (and hence pursuing ventures) in that sector. This situation is least true of 
searchers, who have previously failed to establish a comfortable foothold in a given 
organizational context, and most true of conservers, whose loyalties are the most keenly 
developed of all entrepreneurial types. The careers of power seekers and income seekers 
constitute additional possible exceptions. Power seekers are likely to exhibit a climbing 
pattern, with each successive job representing a step upward in terms of status, position, 
and authority over people and resources. This ladder may involve some crossovers be-
tween sectors. For example, a power seeker may begin in a relatively small nonprofit
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agency, move to another, more important one, and ultimately move into government at a 
high level. The pattern may cross sectoral borders several times, depending on the 
timing of opportunities. Because significant managerial opportunities may open up 
earlier in one's career in the nonprofit sector, but more powerful positions may be 
available later at the top of the public sector, the careers of power seekers often begin in 
the nonprofit sector but gravitate toward government. For reasons cited earlier, this 
pattern more often holds for a player than for a controller. 
A similar argument may be made for income seekers, but with different 
directional patterns. This variety of latent entrepreneur may begin his career in a public 
or perhaps a nonprofit agency, where initial salaries may be better and where he can gain 
professional experience and learn about service provision. Later, having gained 
experience and accumulated some capital, he may decide to move into the proprietary 
domain. This in not an unusual career pattern for physicians, psychologists, and even 
academicians with highly marketable skills (engineers and economists, for example). In 
the research field, Smith19 and Dickson20 both cite a number of instances of individuals 
who left nonprofit think tanks to form their own private consulting outfits. 
Even for power seekers, income seekers, and searchers, however, venture itself is likely 
to be concentrated in a single sector, that is, sector of ultimate destination, following 
various sector transitions that such individuals may make earlier in their careers. 
A similar inertial tendency exists at the level of particular organizations. 
2. Entrepreneurs associated with a particular organization will tend to undertake 
future ventures within the context of that same organization. The reasoning behind this 
proposition is similar to that underlying the first proposition. Specifically, familiarity 
and identification with the value structure and operational procedures of a given agency 
will make it costly and disruptive for those contemplating new ventures to seek a less 
familiar context. Again, the stipulated tendency is strongest for the conserver and 
weakest for the searcher. In addition, proposition 2 holds only weakly for the 
independent, whose entrepreneurship will often be centered on the goal of founding a 
new agency under his own jurisdiction. The independent may, however, find his 
opportunity for entrepreneurship by assuming the helm of his current organization or by 
working from within to spin off an autonomous agency that he can direct. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The factors of relative opportunity, income potential, bureaucratic structure, and service 
ethic screen latent entrepreneurs who have selected a given industry into
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alternative sectors within that industry. Sector screening tends to be relatively 
permanent for individual latent entrepreneurs, although notable exceptions have been 
discussed. Even these exceptions may be analyzed as if sector choices are made by 
certain entrepreneurs a bit later in their careers—after early experience has been gained 
but before the major portion of entrepreneurial activity has been undertaken. Thus early 
industry and sector screening still form the basic mechanisms for determining the 
motivational mix for enterprise in a given sector. These motivations constitute a crucial 
element for determining the ultimate shape of organizational behavioral in a sector. The 
constraining influences on those motivations are considered next. 
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8  Constraints, Constituents, and the 
Shape of Venture Outcomes 
 
The set of motivations of potential entrepreneurs constitute the entrepreneurial engines 
potentially at work in the economy at large. The processes of screening—by sorting 
entrepreneurial objectives into relatively homogeneous groups—then provide a sense of 
the different directions in which the drivers of these engines would prefer to steer their 
associated ventures within different industries and sectors. 
What about the roadways that these entrepreneurial trips follow? That is, how 
much discretion does the entrepreneur enjoy in initiating, designing, and guiding his 
venture to suit his own objectives, particularly within the nonprofit segments of various 
industries? 
The roads in some sectors can be quite narrow because of the stringent nature of 
certain economic or social constraints. In a highly competitive profit-making sector, for 
example, economists argue that profit-maximizing (via the selection of certain best 
production and marketing strategies) is the only way to avoid being driven out of 
business by more efficient competitors. In the broad area of services produced by 
nonprofit organizations, however, the range of entrepreneurial discretion is usually 
much wider, and thus the diversity of entrepreneurial objectives is of concern. If 
constraints were so rigid that only one mode of behavior were tolerated, then such 
diversity would be irrelevant. According to the managerial-discretion theory of the firm 
pioneered by Williamson, a variety of entrepreneurial objectives can only be manifested 
if the economic environment is not so stringent that such indulgence threatens survival.1 
In general, however, external constraints and opportunity structures remain quite 
important in shaping the ultimate behavioral nature of enterprise. This chapter will 
consider how certain structural aspects of sectors define the bounds within which 
(screened) entrepreneurs may work, and how these factors shape the rationale and 
format, if not spirit and content, of venture possibilities. 
The principal sources of restraint on entrepreneurial action are the formal 
(statutory) requirements on entry of new programs into a given industry and the interests 
and preferences of various constituent groups that exert control over policy formulation 
and over economic resources required to finance potential ventures. Together these 
sources of restraint define what may essentially be thought of as a possibility set, which 
constitutes the range of discretion within which an entrepreneur may design and 
promote his ventures. 
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Restraints on Entry. Previous chapters considered the effects of governmental controls 
and other barriers to the establishment of new organizations and programs on the 
concentration of economic activity in a given industry or sector and hence the screening 
of entrepreneurs into those parts of the economy. This chapter deals with the effects of 
such barriers on the activity of entrepreneurs already screened into their respective 
sectors. 
There are two types of cases—entrepreneurs who have been screened into sectors 
consistent with their entry-related preferences, and entrepreneurs who have been 
screened into sectors whose entry policies conflict with their preferences. Entry 
restraints may be expected to favor rather than inhibit the kinds of venture activity 
preferred by the first group of entrepreneurs. Entry restraints may be expected to have 
two effects on the second group: to diminish the overall level of venture activity, and to 
stimulate entrepreneurial initiatives designed to circumvent the restraints. 
In general, the latent entrepreneurial population within a given sector is expected 
to consist largely of those whose preferences are compatible with the entry rules. 
Several reasons for exceptions exist, however. First, entry rules or requirements may 
change between the time an entrepreneur chooses a given sector and industry and the 
time he undertakes an enterprise. Second, entrepreneurs may undergo changes in 
personal goals and become immobile in terms of their sector affiliation. Third, the 
entrepreneurial screening process is necessarily imperfect. For instance, differential 
entry conditions among sectors (see chapter 10) tend to distort the opportunity structure 
over the long run by reducing activity and employment levels in one sector relative to 
another. Thus some latent entrepreneurs may simply not be allowed to enter their 
preferred sectors. In addition, in view of the several variables on which screening takes 
place, entry conditions may not be the primary determinant of selection for many 
entrepreneurs, who may therefore be screened into sectors with entry rules at odds with 
their preferences. For these reasons, it is important to consider not only the behavioral 
implications of entrepreneurs who have been screened into sectors consistent with their 
entry-related preferences but also the behavioral implications of those who have not. In 
particular, certain types of entrepreneurs who may fail to be screened into a sector with 
compatible entry conditions may attempt to subvert or circumvent these requirements in 
one way or another. Such entrepreneurs set in motion some of the more interesting, 
albeit secondary, modes of observed venture behavior, as follows. 
Independents are likely to have screened themselves away from sectors with 
imposing barriers to new entry, and those who have not been so screened will no doubt 
operate at a diminished activity level. In that context, however, independents may still 
attempt to create semiautonomous enclaves for themselves. They can do so in two ways. 
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If the sector is composed of relatively small organizations, the independent will attempt 
to move to the top and gain control of one of them. More likely, the restricted-entry 
sector will be composed of relatively large organizations; in this case the independent 
will try to form his own subdivision within which he can essentially be his own boss (see 
Young and Finch for one illustration).2 Thus independents will work to decentralize and 
fragment large organizations in which they become enmeshed. 
For different reasons, and at a substantially larger scale of organization, power 
seekers of the controller variety may act in concert with independents; that is, once 
organizations start to become extremely large, controllers may tolerate or even tacitly 
encourage spin-off behavior, divesting their organizations of semiautonomous units by 
setting them up as independent agencies. Such action may be feasible even in an 
environment of restricted entry because the controller can use the resources of the parent 
agency to assist in overcoming entry barriers. Alternatively, controllers who are work-
ing their way up in large organizations may behave quite similarly to independents, 
carving out pieces of the overall agency as semiautonomous units over which they can 
exert their own authority. 
Power seekers in general are likely to have screened themselves into sectors with 
restrictions on entry where such policy has encouraged the development of large 
agencies. However, a power seeker who has, for other reasons, been screened into an 
open-entry sector will work in a manner contrary to that system. In particular, he will 
attempt to build up his own organization and work toward restricting entry and gaining 
control of other organizations. Thus power seekers, particularly players, will promote 
mergers, found trade associations that promulgate minimum standards, and lobby for 
governmental restraints on entry. 
Income seekers will tend to screen themselves away from industries governed by 
an entry policy that confines allowable activity to the nonprofit (or public) sectors. 
Entrepreneurs of this type who fail to be so screened will severely test the 
nondistribution constraint through various mechanisms of income augmentation that 
substitute for owner claims on declared profits. These mechanisms may include the 
inflation of salaries and perquisites, kickbacks, sweetheart contracts, and other self 
dealing schemes associated with the purchase of inputs to production. (See Mendelson's 
description of certain nonprofit nursing-home entrepreneurs).3 Clarkson, describes one 
sophisticated device: renting real property to nonprofits by property-owning managers, 
who take advantage of quick depreciation schedules, capital gains, and setting rents to 
extract profits while maintaining nonprofit tax status.4 
 
Constituent Accountability. Various nonentrepreneurial groups associated with 
organizations effectively monitor and exert some control over the development
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of new enterprise in any given sector of the economy. These groups may be roughly 
divided into four, nonexclusive categories: internal, client, rival, and resource 
providing. The implied requirements of such constituent groups (for example, for shared 
decision-making participation and authority) will affect the screening process for some 
entrepreneurs. Such groups may also exert direct constraining effects on ventures and 
enterprising behavior. In particular, these constituent groups can become involved in 
conflicts with entrepreneurs of different persuasions and ultimately thwart certain types 
of venture initiative. Alternatively, the preferences of constituent groups may shape the 
nominal rationale but not the essential content of ventures that do go forward. 
Internal interest groups consist of staff and trustees associated with organizations 
in which ventures are contemplated. If the venture is intended to bring radical change to 
an established agency—often the case in a problem-response scenario, for 
example—these groups may become a strong source of resistance. Staff may fear for 
their jobs and trustees may be sentimental over departure from traditional values or 
ways of doing things. The strength of these effects will vary from sector to sector, 
however. Proprietary agencies will tend to be the most flexible and least affected by 
such inertial elements because their structure concentrates power at the executive level. 
Furthermore, proprietary board members are primarily investors whose sentiments 
focus on profits more than on service objectives; hence efficiency, solvency, and 
managerial prerogative are traditionally maintained as the most important criteria of 
organizational decisionmaking. As long as (entrepreneurial) management has a 
financially successful track record, it will have a relatively free hand in implementing 
change or maintaining support for new enterprise. 
Nonprofit agencies, on the other hand, may be substantially affected both by the 
sentimental loyalties of long-standing board members and by the conservative interests 
of staff who may have long been affiliated with the organization. As Anthony,5 
McQuade,6 Cornuelle,7 and others suggest, although trustees are not always especially 
competent, effective, or conscientious in their overseeing functions, the more pervasive 
shared decisionmaking culture of the nonprofit form often gives them substantial voice 
as potential restraining elements. As Meyer observes in the museum field: 
a factor that applies to nearly all the largest art museums in the United States—[is] 
their governance by private boards composed of the established rich who have been 
operating with limited accountability and who have on occasion demonstrated 
minimal sophistication about the arts. In enough cases to warrant generalization, 
the decapitation of the director has been a ritual sacrifice on the altar of his board's 
incompetence. . . . 
Changing times have greatly strained the traditional structure of museum 
management, but many—if not most—boards have been reluctant to move with
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the times. . . . Directors and staff often have to struggle with an archaic system in 
which a single powerful trustee operates like a feudal baron.8 
Clarkson provides a more sympathetic view, explaining that the intrinsic nature 
of the nonprofit and its services, for example, the lack of measurable output and a profit 
criterion, makes trustees' tasks more difficult.9 
In the public sector, political and bureaucratic impediments tend to prevail, with 
effects similar to those that obtain as a result of the sentimentalities, administrative 
difficulties, and self-serving interests, that restrain the nonprofit sector. Effects in the 
public sector may be considerably stronger, however, because civil-service tenure 
systems and employee unions, bureaucratic procedures, and political sacred cows 
protected by legislators may severely inhibit entrepreneurial discretion. 
A similar spectrum exists at the client level with respect to the rigidity of 
constraints across sectors. Proprietary agencies are freer, and indeed more obligated, to 
track the economic demand for services—as expressed by the willingness of private 
clients to pay or the stipulations of government fees for service programs—than are 
nonprofits, which receive grant funds and contributions, or government bureaus, which 
receive legislative appropriations. Thus proprietary agencies shift relatively quickly 
with the market, more easily ignoring product loyalties of current consumers. 
Nonprofits usually build a more permanent relationship with the communities 
that they serve. These bonds are developed through various mechanisms, including 
citizen participation on boards and committees, donations from community members, 
and expressions of broad community support on which the nonprofit may have been 
initially established. Ventures that would disengage a nonprofit from its historical client 
and community roots, or otherwise change its mission significantly, can therefore face 
strong resistance. In a similar manner, government bureaus and program divisions also 
have their particular constituencies and interest groups. Those groups may have 
advocated the agency's programs, cultivated working relationships with its staff, and 
supported its appropriations in legislative hearings. Disengagement or departure from 
interests of current clients could, therefore, be highly problematic for the public-sector 
entrepreneur. As Vladeck explains, private operators can simply shut their doors or file 
for bankruptcy, but government, once having assumed responsibility for a given 
program or clientele cannot easily absolve itself of that commitment.10 New public 
sector initiatives, even those involving reverses of direction, do often take place during 
changes of political administrations, however. If such political change reflects an 
underlying shift in demography, implying changes in public demands for services, it can 
be ignored only at the government official's peril. This situation differs from the often 
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more stable perspective of nonprofits, whose governors have a greater tendency to 
adhere to historical missions even in the face of societal change. 
Resource-providing constituents of a service-producing organization may 
include paying clients; private, third-party insurers; investors and bankers; 
philanthropists and small contributors; and governmental agencies that provide grants or 
administer fees for service programs. A proprietary agency appeals to a subset of these 
groups for economic support. Its clientele may include paying consumers, government 
agencies that finance (through fees for service) consumption by nonpaying (or 
part-paying) users, and third-party (insurance) agencies; its investors consist of private 
individuals who expect a financial return and banks that will lend funds based on the 
collateral of physical plant, personal finances of the entrepreneur and his backers, and 
the promise of future returns on investment. The demands of these various groups are 
unified by the overall mandate of the marketplace: subject to possible procedural and 
service-quality stipulations that derive from governmental regulation, the quality, cost, 
and distribution of services must be such as to turn a reasonable profit. Depending on the 
cogency and volatility of consumer versus investor support, this mandate may en-
courage alternative strategies of cost and quality variation. For example, if consumer 
demand is highly elastic with respect to quality, or if government exerts strong 
regulatory pressure associated with its fees for service contracts, then quality may be 
emphasized more than it would be otherwise. Under other circumstances, however, 
results differ; for example, in the nursing-home industry consumer well-being has 
sometimes been secondary to real-estate speculation.11 
In the nonprofit case, resource providers may be more diverse and their mandates 
substantially less clear than in other sectors. Sources of operating support for nonprofits 
may include user, third-party, or governmental fees for services, philanthropic 
donations, and government grants. Returns on endowment may be a source of flexible 
income for a manager-entrepreneur, providing some relief from constituent pressures, 
although even these funds may be restricted by original-donor stipulations. Because 
there is no individual ownership (that is, equity), capital funds must be generated though 
philanthropy, government grants, and borrowing. Given the nonmarket nature of much 
of the nonprofit's income and possible concentrations of funding control in the hands of 
a small group of contributors, trustees, or government agencies, entrepreneurs must at 
least pay lip service to the programmatic and personal goals of such agents. 
Philanthropists and trustees, for example, will want their own conceptions of the 
community interest served and may want some personal recognition as well. 
Government agencies will insist on adherence to legislative mandates, to specific 
standards and regulations, and to sensitivity to the needs of strong political constituen-
cies. Overall, the nonprofit entrepreneur will prefer to reduce dependency on any
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one source, for fear of the pressures created by such dependency. For example, Netzer12 
and Meyer13 cite the fear of donor pressures in the performing-arts and museum fields, 
respectively. Meyer cites the conflicts that arise when donors of art collections—as in 
the case of the Lehman Pavilion of the Metropolitan Museum of Art—impose demands 
on the recipient museums. Meyer notes that "Over the years the Metropolitan's board 
had evolved a policy of rejecting such binding donor requests, and it was justifiably 
feared that in acceding to the Lehman terms, the museum would encourage other 
wealthy collectors to be as demanding." 
Netzer reviews the experience of the Arena Stage Theater: 
Arena is wary about local private support. Zelda Fichandler considers community 
residents the most conservative of benefactors and those likely to be hostile to 
controversial and experimental theater: "I am not very strong on community giving, 
except perhaps when it represents only a small percentage of the total. I think we 
could well do without the hand that rocks the cradle, for the hand that rocks the 
cradle will also want to raise it in a vote and mix into the pie with it. . . .  So, then let 
the money be given at a distance, once removed, and let it be awarded by a jury of 
one's peers, let the audience be the only judge.” 
One important source of relief, and hence discretion, for nonprofit entrepreneurs 
is that few constituents will have direct knowledge of performance, much time for 
monitoring, or precise criteria for judgment. For example, Kanter observes: 
products or specific benefits do not tend to be available to donors . . .  and therefore 
performance criteria for resource allocation (service delivery) might be unrelated to 
criteria for resource attraction.14 
The same may be said of government funders or third-party agents. Furthermore, 
as Brinkerhoff15 and Kanter16 suggest, the multiplicity of resource providing and other 
constituencies of the nonprofit may lead to conflicts and internal bargaining. Such 
conflicts, combined with informational difficulties, may leave substantial opportunity 
for isolating these constituents from managerial and entrepreneurial decision making. 
Kanter argues: 
In nonprofit organizations where there is a wide gap between the incentives, 
personnel, and procedures for resource attraction and the personnel and procedures 
for resource allocation, or service delivery, we can expect either a high degree of 
conflict in the organization (reflected in arguments about performance measures) or 
attempts to insulate donors or funders from allocators or deliverers (reflected in 
statements about professionalism and the need for independence) which tends to 
reduce the willingness to have performance measured at all.17 
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Brinkerhoff, citing Shapiro's study of Boys Town, goes even further to suggest the 
possible consequences of such tendencies: 
This separation of resource acquisition and program operation also can result in 
situations where a nonprofit organization is effective in the resource attracting 
arena but not in the programmatic one, or vice versa.18 
Alternatively, some view the loose accountability structure of nonprofits as more 
a strength than a weakness. According to Douglas: 
The absence of strong measures of accountability, far from being a weakness of the 
Third Sector, becomes a strength enabling it to undertake experiments, the benefits 
of which are too uncertain and too long term to be undertaken by either the 
commercial or the governmental sector.19 
These complexities of nonprofits often provide substantial room for 
entrepreneurial maneuvering and discretionary management of ventures once they are 
under way, but these same elements of information ambiguity, conflict, and separation 
of revenues from allocation may inhibit entrepreneurs' abilities to gather constituent 
support to launch their ventures. 
Mandates for ventures of public-sector agencies tend to be most rigidly defined 
among those of the three sectors. Whereas the entrepreneur may have been instrumental 
in lobbying for and shaping the authorizing legislation and appropriations, little formal 
discretion may remain once the specific laws are in place. Even more than nonprofits, 
public-sector agencies experience a separation of resource acquisition from service 
delivery, and limited performance information flows to resource-providing constituents, 
including legislative committees and taxpayers. Furthermore, legislative committees 
tend to be preoccupied with diverse matters and topics of current political concern and 
hence are relatively lax in monitoring the specific administration of authorized 
programs. The result may be a substantial degree of inefficient operation or even fraud, 
but little in the way of new directions that require substantial shifts in the use of 
resources or the definition of policy. Exceptions to this rule occur where governmental 
managers are able to act like directors of nonprofit agencies, developing close 
relationships with legislators as if they were board members and seeking grant funds 
from outside as well as within the home-government structure. This situation is most 
likely to occur in small governments at the local level. 
Rival groups that may effectively oppose or limit new enterprise also vary by 
sector. In the proprietary sector, rivals principally take the form of economic 
competitors, that is, other agencies whose effects are felt through the impersonal 
workings of the marketplace and the price system. In regulated sectors new
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entry or expansion may be opposed by community groups through political lobbying 
with regulatory agencies on the basis of need-and-necessity arguments or in terms of 
other aspects of public interest. For example, (proprietary) homes for the mentally ill 
often incur opposition on the basis of disruption to the integrity or well-being of 
neighborhoods. 
In the nonprofit sector, the latter kinds of regulatory mechanisms are even more 
likely to be used, for two reasons. First, nonprofits depend more directly on their local 
communities for sustenance and support. Indeed, the legitimacy of a nonprofit agency 
itself depends on its maintaining a stance consistent with community interests. To the 
degree that trustees, contributors, and government-funding agencies reflect local 
political concerns, these will be expressed within the framework of intra-agency 
decision making. To the extent that such concerns are not represented directly by agency 
constituents, they may be reflected through the wider mechanisms of regulatory control 
and political accountability, on the basis of the nonprofit's implicit responsibilities to the 
public at large—especially if the nonprofit is a recipient of public funds, tax 
concessions, or community-wide charities, such as the United Fund. 
The second source of rivalry in nonprofit venture may come from implicit 
competitive pressures within the sector. Although nonprofit sectors tend to shun explicit 
competition in favor of interagency coordination20 and to organize themselves into 
basically cooperative milieus that feature relatively open exchange of information, 
cross-referrals of clients, networking arrangements of various kinds,21 community 
planning, and even joint ventures, some forms of new enterprise may be perceived as a 
threat to members of such a sector. For example, a venture of one agency that threatens 
to reduce the share of activity by other agencies will be viewed askance. 
Similarly, a new agency's entry on the limited turf of existing agencies is likely to 
be skeptically received by those agencies. Nonprofits disdain competition and rivalry as 
a rule, and as a group are willing to engage in cooperative efforts that promise to 
maintain the status of individual agencies and to serve some public purpose. They will 
tend also to join forces in opposition, using regulatory and political channels, when a 
new venture is posed by some individual agency in a threatening way. Such action can 
be extremely effective because the board members and other representatives of rival 
nonprofits are often influential members of the community and well connected both 
politically and economically. 
A final source of competitive resistance to nonprofit ventures may emanate from 
other sectors, especially if such ventures threaten to exploit the special advantages of 
nonprofit status and are thus viewed as unfair competitors. As reviewed by
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Smith, for example, this situation has occurred in the research field, particularly where 
government has actively funded and helped set up nonprofit research agencies. 
Another source of discontent centers in various industrial circles. A comment by 
Ralph H. Cordiner is typical: "However generous their motives, these nonprofit 
organizations are usurping a field traditionally served by private consulting firms 
and producer companies, and hence are little more than a blind for nationalized 
industry competing directly with private enterprise—on a subsidized, 
non-taxpaying basis.22 
Constituent groups affect entrepreneurial initiatives not only by imposing limits 
and restraints but also by helping to define the rationale under which new ventures are 
posed. That is, board members, clients, and resource providers may all have their own 
ideas and preferences with respect to the purposes of organizations and programs. For 
certain types of entrepreneurs, constituent preferences for having ventures serve a 
particular purpose or rationale pose few problems. (See figure 8-1.) Independents, 
architects, power seekers, and income seekers in particular are relatively value free, or 
indifferent, with respect to the intrinsic nature of services or the intended clientele of 
proposed ventures. These entrepreneurial types will therefore design and advertise their 
ventures to the nominal tune of constituents, so long as their underlying objectives for 
income, power, autonomy, or building and creating can be met. Difficulties will occur, 
however, where expansive tendencies begin to impinge on the interests of rival agencies 
(as noted above) or where the service requirements of constituent groups are, in practice, 
simply used by the entrepreneur as a facade for the pursuit of self-serving ends and are 
so grossly neglected as to become obvious even to the poorly informed. Thus, within 
limited constituent abilities to monitor and hold ventures accountable: 
Independents may set up enterprises to maximize their own autonomy and 
insularity and resist desirable expansion or provision of new services that  
 
       Value free        Concept bound           
Income seekers   Searchers    Believers 
Power seekers   Conservers    Professionals 
Independents       Poets    
Architects 
 
 
Figure 8-1. Rigidity of Entrepreneur Positions with Respect to Content of Ventures 
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would entangle them in more complex organizational relationships. 
Architects may propose and build programs beyond the legitimate needs of 
client groups. 
Income seekers may sacrifice program quality, engage in fraudulent 
practices, or avoid loss-making activities that would reduce their net 
revenues (and hence personal-income potentials). 
Power seekers may use discretionary resources to promote their own 
visibility or enlarge their bureaucratic empires rather than optimize service 
arrangements. 
In nonprofit sectors especially, there tends to be a large margin for discretionary 
behavior of these varieties, despite the potential constituent antipathy that such behavior 
might arouse. The relatively indirect and part-time control exerted by constituent 
groups, the imprecise criteria that such groups can apply, and the separation of resource 
acquisition from resource allocation are the main reasons for this discretion. 
In contrast to the motives of the value-free entrepreneurial types, other types are 
strongly tied to specific rationales for enterprise. Hence they may openly conflict with 
constituent groups with respect to venture purpose and style of operation rather than 
adapt to, or even subvert, constituent preferences. The believer is the best example. The 
believer will operate by attempting to draw like-minded constituents to his side, rather 
than obfuscate or seriously compromise his purpose through adaptation to the 
preferences already in place. For this reason, the believer leans toward forming new 
agencies rather than adapting to the machinery of existing ones. 
The professional, particularly one in a scientifically oriented field, presents a 
similar example. To advance in his discipline, this variety of entrepreneur may lean 
heavily toward proving, testing, or demonstrating ideas and new concepts through 
model venture initiatives. Constituents may be less interested in ideas or research than in 
servicing clientele or community groups. Tensions can easily develop, pitting the 
preference of professionals for small, controlled, but well-publicized and documented, 
demonstration like programs with sophisticated research and measurement components 
against the preferences of constituents for programs that use resources in a manner that 
is less sophisticated but more responsive to immediate community needs. The fate of 
ventures may thus rely heavily on the professional's ability to convince constituents of 
the ultimate social or economic merit of his methods. 
The poet may be as strong-minded as the professional and perhaps as 
impassioned as the believer. Although he pursues the implementation of ideas as more 
of a personal creative act than a formal disciplinary matter or religiously held
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belief, the poet may nonetheless encounter the same sources of conflict with constituent 
groups and be similarly unwilling to compromise. 
The rationale for ventures initiated by believers, poets, and professionals will 
strongly reflect the intrinsic preferences of these entrepreneurial types. Constituent 
groups can be expected to achieve less ostensible influence on venture design for these 
types than for the value-free types, but whatever compromise is achieved by 
constituents will tend to be substantive and clearly labeled. The value-free types are 
more likely to accept whatever nominal rationale constituencies prefer, but to shape 
organizational behavior to their own ends, in less apparent ways. 
Searchers and conservers constitute somewhat different cases of interaction 
between the pursuit of own motives and adherence to desires of constituents. The 
searcher is an outsider who is looking for the right sets of constituents—those who will 
accept him and give him a sense of purpose, yet who will promote values with which he 
can live. Like the believer, he will reject sources of constituent support that make him 
uncomfortable, but unlike the believer, he needs to find a constituent group that will 
help him define a mode of service that he can pursue. Thus the searcher may either 
attach himself to an existing organization or once having discovered a latent coalition 
and set of resources capable of supporting a venture in some new area of service, he may 
organize a new set of constituents. 
Of all the entrepreneurial types, the conserver is least likely to conflict with his 
organizational environment. His objectives will be those of the organization that he 
seeks to preserve, and his perspective will thus be consistent with key constituent 
groups. However, the conserver may be faced with the need to reconcile conflicts 
among constituents—for example, between the staff and board members who wish to 
change the organization least and the new consumer groups or resource providers that 
have shown concern for the agency's performance and may have begun to withdraw sup-
port or make new demands. 
In summary, the constraining forces on enterprise that derive from entry controls 
and the preferences and monitoring of various constituent groups affect sectoral 
behavior in two principal ways. 
1. They help shape and define the rationale and nominal purposes for which a 
venture may be undertaken within a given sector. 
2. They limit the discretion with which entrepreneurs can utilize ventures to pursue 
their own personal ends. 
Effect 1 may subdue or limit the activity levels of certain concept-oriented 
entrepreneurial types (believers, poets, professionals) whose values may explicitly 
conflict with certain constituencies or performance criteria. Effect 2 may restrain the 
excesses of entrepreneurs, particularly value-free types (income seekers, power seekers,
Constraints, Constituents, and Venture Outcomes    117 
 
independents, architects), whose motivations are less explicitly identified with 
particular venture rationales or client interests. 
The two constraint effects appear to vary substantially across sectors. In the 
proprietary sector, constituent pressures clearly lean in the direction of financial 
performance, and profitability serves as a fairly unambiguous and precise criterion that 
constituents (investors) can use to hold entrepreneurial discretion in check. Thus the 
rationale for venture must reflect paying constituents (individual clients, government, or 
other funding sources), and operations must generate a reasonable return to capital. 
Within such a context only, entrepreneurs may engage in discretionary 
(autonomy-seeking, self-aggrandizing, or other) behavior. 
In the government sector, constituent pressures appear to constrain the nominal 
rationale and operational guidelines for entrepreneurial activity less effectively than in 
the commercial sector, but still fairly severely. Most important, new initiatives must 
meet tests of political acceptability before they can go forward. However, performance 
criteria are imprecise, performance information is poor, and accountability to 
resource-providing constituents is indirect and fragmented, permitting a considerable 
degree of entrepreneurial self-indulgence once programs are well under way. 
In the nonprofit sector, there is substantially more diversity of restraints than in 
the public or profit-making sectors. Neither market nor political criteria are overriding, 
although both may be reflected within the framework of nonprofits that depend on both 
paying customers and governmental allocations. In addition to these sources of funds, 
however, the nonprofit entrepreneur has the option to pursue grants from donors and 
foundations as well as contributions from the public at large. Even within some 
industries practices range from total reliance on government funding to cases in which 
such reliance is negligible. Thus funds may be sought from sources whose motivations 
align more easily with entrepreneurial objectives (people with similar ideas or leanings, 
willing to back them up with financial support). A nonprofit entrepreneur with 
program-specific values, that is, the believer, poet, or professional, may therefore have 
more opportunity to shape his own enterprise than he might in other sectors, where his 
design must appeal to current political realities or consumer tastes. In a similar vein, the 
value-free entrepreneurial types also have more of an open field in which to experiment 
with venture rationales that can attract alternative sources of support (market, 
government, and voluntary). 
Once under way, ventures in the nonprofit sector suffer a dearth of specific 
performance criteria similar to that of government programs. The market test will apply 
to a degree, because nonprofits must show a balanced budget and may depend in part on 
sales or memberships, but this criterion avoids the issue for venture supporters, such as 
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agents of philanthropy or government, who are asked to fill in the gaps between sales 
revenues and expenditures. Moreover, the rationale for nonprofit ventures may be 
specifically counter to market success, for example, service to groups unable to pay for 
needed services. Nor do political criteria (who gets what) or legislative mandates fully 
apply, as the nonprofit can cite its diversity of support and semi-market obligations as 
the basis of its right to independence and self-determination. In essence, then, subject to 
minimal performance levels imposed (insisted upon) by various constituents groups and 
the necessity for a balanced budget, nonprofit ventures often operate under vague 
performance criteria and loose control by any given group or coalition. As such, they 
leave substantial room for discretionary behavior by entrepreneurs, who may indulge in 
self-defined motives and goals. 
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9  Success and Long-Run 
Character of Ventures 
 
Entrepreneurial influence is no doubt strongest at the birth of a venture and may decline 
thereafter. For example, in his case study of the founding of a medical school, Kimberly 
notes that although knowledge of the entrepreneur and his values and objectives is 
essential for an understanding of an organization, the importance of the person at the top 
diminishes in explaining organization outcomes as that organization matures.1 
Drucker's review of the histories of Harvard and Columbia universities is also 
relevant: 
[Charles W.] Eliot, at Harvard (1869-1909) saw the purpose of the university as 
that of educating a leadership group with a distinct "style." His Harvard was to be a 
"national" institution rather than the parochial preserve of the "proper Bostonian" 
that Harvard College had been. . . . [Nicholas] Butler, at Columbia (1902-1945) 
. . .  saw the function of the university as the systematic application of rational 
thought and analysis to the basic problems of a modern society. . . . These founders' 
definitions did not outlive them. Even during the lifetime of Eliot and Butler, for 
instance, their institutions escaped their control and began to diffuse objectives and 
to confuse priorities. . . .  Yet the imprint of the founders has still not been totally 
erased. It is hardly an accident that the New Deal picked faculty members primarily 
from Columbia and Chicago to be high level advisors and policymakers . . . [while] 
the Kennedy Administration [which] came in with an underlying belief in the 
"style" of an "elite," . . . naturally turned to Harvard.2 
Organizations do continue to reflect their entrepreneurs, while those entrepreneurs are in 
charge and to a degree thereafter as well. Thus it is justified to view entrepreneurs not 
merely as ephemeral or transient agents in an organization's life but as fundamentally 
influential actors who set the tone of activity for substantial periods of time. It is also 
useful to examine the nature of long-term entrepreneurial influence in more detail—to 
ask if different brands of entrepreneurship (types of entrepreneurs) affect long-run 
organization and sector activity in different ways and in different degrees of intensity. If 
so, the entrepreneurial screening processes can be expected to differently influence the 
long-run stability and dependability of organizations in alternative sectors. 
The long-run success of an enterprise and the degree to which it continues to 
reflect its original intent appears to be directly related to the length of time that the 
entrepreneur remains committed to it. Consider the extreme example of American dance 
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companies.  
The Jose Limon Dance Company was formed in 1946. . . . Limon's death (in 1972) 
left the company in a unique position in the history of American dance. Never 
before had a major American dance company, ballet or modern, continued beyond 
the death of its founder and principal choreographer. The Limon company is the 
first to do so.3  
Cornuelle observes for nonprofits in general that "The know-how often stays at its 
points of origin. Look at Saul Alinsky's conquest of America's worst slum, at Henry 
Viscardi's success in putting the handicapped to work, at Cleo Blackbrin's work in 
rebuilding slums, at the Meningers' work in mental health, at Millard Robert's work in 
education. These operations rarely reach far beyond what these gifted and strong-willed 
men can do themselves."4 
In cases observed by the author, entrepreneurial influence diminished and 
ventures all seem to have suffered from the inability of the primary entrepreneurs to 
nurture them on a full-time or long-run basis. In most other cases, however, where 
entrepreneurs were able to concentrate their attentions on their ventures over a 
substantial period, the enterprises struggled much less and remained truer to original 
purposes. In a few cases, success was attributable to the stable guidance of the 
entrepreneur coupled with the commitment of hand-picked administrators to assume 
control and to carry on the original intent beyond the continued involvement of the 
entrepreneur. 
The connection between entrepreneurial commitment and long-run outcome 
prompts the question: Are different varieties of entrepreneur more or less likely to give 
long-term attention to their ventures or to establish conditions under which they will be 
competently administered and remain true to original purpose? The answer is yes—the 
entrepreneurial types may be characterized according to their degrees of long-run 
commitment for a given venture. This venture-specific notion must be distinguished 
from general commitment to enterprising, however. Some kinds of entrepreneurs, 
although loosely dedicated to a given venture over the long term, are heavily committed 
to enterprising itself. Thus there are really two extremes: 
 
1. Entrepreneurs who tend to be committed over the long run to particular ventures 
(long-term venturers). 
2. Entrepreneurs who tend to be loosely committed to particular ventures but 
dedicated to enterprising as an ongoing activity (short-term venturers). 
 
Each entrepreneurial character may be classified along the spectrum from 1 to 2, 
clustering at the extremes (see Figure 9-1). 
Long-term venturers include independents, believers, conservers, architects,
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Figure 9-1. Classification of Entrepreneurs by Degree of Long-Term Commitment to 
Ventures 
 
 
and, possibly, controllers. Independents are essentially one-time venturers who, having 
established their autonomous enclaves, will simply act to maintain them into the 
indefinite future. Conservers are of a similar nature; having come to the rescue of a 
cherished institution, the conserver will also continue to exert his efforts and retain 
responsibility for maintaining it on an even keel. Controllers resemble independents but 
are somewhat less reliable in terms of long-term commitment. The controller will be 
tempted to move from one venture to a larger one until he arrives at one that tests his 
limits, sense of security, and viability of central control. At that point he resembles the 
independent, seeking largely to maintain that enterprise in balance. 
Believers and architects tend to create venture frameworks within which they can 
continue to innovate and build according to a consistent structure or idea. The believer, 
for example, will establish an agency or program centered on a singular idea or mission, 
but may continue to expand or elaborate on this theme with further ventures. The 
success of the mission is of paramount importance to the believer, and all his efforts go 
into maintaining its viability and elaborating on it. 
The architect is especially committed to continual elaboration of his enterprise, 
but this requires maintenance of the structural foundations as well. Although the 
architect will be substantially more flexible than the believer in adjusting the rationale 
for ventures to suit changes in the environment, he will remain committed to a given 
venture as long as it maintains the potential for growth and experimentation. The pride 
with which the architect can trace his impact to the venture's roots is a fundamental 
source of his satisfaction. 
The long-term commitment to a venture's initial rationale or mission, compared 
with its economic well-being, provides a contrast not only between the believer and the 
architect, but also among other types as well. In particular, the independent and the 
controller will strive to maintain economic viability, showing flexibility of mission 
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where necessary. To the contrary, conservers may resemble believers somewhat in their 
commitment to original purpose; conservers are strongly concerned about the mainte-
nance of both mission and economic stability. 
Short-term venturers include income seekers, players, and, to a lesser degree, 
poets and professionals. Income seekers and players are essentially opportunists, willing 
to abandon one venture for another if better opportunities arise to increase their personal 
wealth or power. Hence their commitments to a given venture, its integrity of purpose or 
its long-term economic well-being, will be precarious. So long as alternative 
opportunities do not call, income-seeking and power-seeking players will stress the 
economic growth of their enterprises, following whatever path the environment makes 
most lucrative (in the case of income seekers) or most socially noteworthy (in the case of 
players). If attractive alternative opportunities for venture arise, however, these 
entrepreneurial types will be quickest to move on. The income seekers will leave first. 
The player, as a public-oriented personality, depends heavily on keeping his reputation 
unblemished. He will therefore take some pains to avoid abrupt abandonment of an 
enterprise whose failure may be blamed on him. The player will work to establish a 
credible transitional arrangement that would absolve him of any culpability should the 
venture founder after he leaves. 
The poet and the professional are short-term venturers in the sense that their 
attention spans for a given enterprise depend on the venture's level of intellectual or 
emotional novelty or freshness. The professional is intent on working at the frontier of 
current disciplinary thought and knowledge generation. His ventures tend to have an 
experimental or demonstration quality to them, especially in industries governed by 
scientific disciplines. Such ventures are kept relatively small and controlled, studied 
intently, described at professional conferences, and written up in the literature. Given 
the changing currents of disciplinary thinking, however, a particular venture is unlikely 
to command professional attention for very long. New schools of thought or innovative 
ideas gradually but continually emerge, requiring the professional to move on to new 
forms of experimentation within a relatively short time. 
The poet also has a relatively short attention span and a chronic need to explore 
new avenues of experience. Rather than key himself to the currents of disciplinary 
activity (like the professional), however, the poet is more of a free spirit, driven 
internally to move away from ventures that have reached a plateau of initial success and 
preferring to undertake some new experience. Of all entrepreneurial types, the poet is 
most likely to disdain the managerial role, preferring to coax, catalyze, and cajole others 
to contribute to and manage the new enterprise. If ventures require the poet to manage 
for a while, that responsibility will be assumed only reluctantly until a managerial team 
can be put into place. Professionals will also behave this way, to a more limited
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extent, preferring to establish, oversee, contemplate, evaluate, and publicize ventures 
rather than directly administer them. As a result, programs and agencies established by 
poets or professionals will tend to lose their initial flavor after a while. Such ventures 
will either founder after their entrepreneurs move on or they will shed their innovative, 
experimental tone as more conventional management assumes long-term responsibility. 
Finally, the searcher is the least predictable of entrepreneurial types in terms of 
his long-term commitment to venture. Two conflicting effects exist in his case. On the 
one hand, a searcher may undergo long periods of exploration and restlessness during 
which he may dabble in a number of ventures. Like the poet, a searcher in this phase 
cannot be depended on for long-term leadership and ventures that he establishes face an 
uncertain future. On the other hand, a searcher will grasp tenaciously to his venture, 
once having found his true calling. At this point, the searcher begins to resemble the 
believer or independent and may be counted on to provide long-term commitment. 
In summary: 
1. Sectors that attract (through screening) entrepreneurs of the believer, 
independent, controller, conserver, or architect varieties are likely to exhibit long-term 
behavior consistent with original entrepreneurial motivations. This behavior will consist 
of: 
Agencies exhibiting long-term, relatively rigid mission orientations (believers). 
Small to moderately sized (or decentralized) groups of stable, insulated agencies 
(independents and controllers). 
Conservative, old-line, stable agencies (conservers). 
Growing, expansive, dynamic agencies with multiple programs adaptive to the 
current economic environment (architects). 
2. Sectors that attract income seekers, players, poets, and professionals will 
exhibit more dynamic short-run behavior but less consistency and stability over the long 
run than sectors that attract other types. 
Sectors that attract income seekers and players will be faster to respond to 
economic opportunities, but also faster to modify and abandon ventures as the 
external structure of opportunities changes. Hence agencies in sectors with these 
types of entrepreneurs are likely to undergo substantial fluctuations of both 
nominal purpose and economic well-being. 
Sectors that attract professionals and poets will be fast to shape and develop
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new ideas and translate them into working programs. However, such sectors are 
not likely to exhibit very long-term commitments to such programs, but rather 
will move slowly from one set of ideas to another over time. 
Real sectors will, of course, tend to attract varying mixes of entrepreneurial 
motivations according to the industry- and sector-structure variables discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7. Thus correlation of long-run entrepreneurial continuity with 
nonprofit-organization and sector behavior is a complex task. 
Those entrepreneurial types with the strongest tendencies toward long-term 
consistent venture commitment—the believers and conservers—will gravitate to the 
nonprofit sector, whereas those with the strongest transient tendencies—the income 
seekers and power seekers—will tend to concentrate outside the nonprofit sector. This 
overall pattern is by no means rigid, however. Aside from the variations across 
industries in these nominal screening patterns, the relatively short-run-oriented poets 
and professionals also tend to inhabit the nonprofit sector more than other sectors. Still, 
the analysis here of long-run entrepreneurial commitments is roughly consistent and 
even enlightening of the observation that nonprofit sectors lean toward the more stable 
and trustworthy varieties of category 1 behavior, while foregoing some degree of the 
dynamism and unreliability of category 2. This observation is considered more fully in 
the next chapter, where venture-commitment considerations are integrated with other 
aspects of entrepreneurial behavior to derive a more general outlook on nonprofit-sector 
performance. 
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The theoretical framework of motives and constraints, screening processes, and 
circumstances for venture developed in previous chapters can now be applied in a 
normative way. This chapter will evaluate, according to a set of general 
social-performance criteria, the behavior of nonprofit organizations and the service 
industries in which they participate under alternative circumstances in the economic and 
regulatory environment. More specifically, it will consider the social-performance 
implications of alternative public policies that would change that environment. 
The discussion follows three steps. First is a review of some of the key 
social-performance concerns or criteria that commonly pervade policy discussions 
pertaining to the nonprofit sector. The second step is to summarize the behavioral 
patterns implicit in the activity of the various entrepreneurial stereotypes in a manner 
that relates these behavior modes to the performance dimensions. The final step is to 
develop the performance implications of particular public policies by analyzing how 
such policies affect the screening and post screening activity of nonprofit 
entrepreneurial characters, and hence the mix of behavior patterns that result for sectors 
and industries. 
 
 
Performance Issues 
 
Within present limits of social science knowledge, application of a single global 
criterion of social welfare is untenable; it is simply too overwhelming or oversimplified 
to ask whether one or another set of conditions that describe the nonprofit sector makes 
society better or worse off. The approach taken here is to reference some of the more 
salient concerns articulated by those who use and pay for the services of nonprofit 
organizations or have studied their history of service delivery. Within this context, four 
performance issues—some not precisely delineated in the literature but nonetheless 
frequently raised in discussion—stand out as relevant to this analysis. 
 
Trustworthiness. The notion that nonprofits are in some sense more trustworthy than 
their proprietary and perhaps public-sector counterparts underlies the rationale 
developed by various scholars for the existence and utilization of nonprofit agencies. 
Trustworthiness basically denotes the reliability with which an agency can be expected 
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to pursue and protect the interest of consumers and contributors in the absence of direct 
client or constituent supervision. Trustworthiness involves both the fulfillment of 
promises, that is, delivery of services as advertised, and abstinence from fraud and 
depreciation of quality as strategies for self-aggrandizement. As Vladeck observes, the 
relationship between dishonesty and quality can be subtle: 
officials in the office of the New York Special Prosecutor insist that they have 
found no systematic relationship between the extent of stealing and poor care. In 
fact, they found that many of the biggest crooks ran moderate to very good nursing 
homes, while some of those who ran poor nursing homes were more incompetent 
than dishonest. Officials in other states have reported similar observations. The 
most intelligent and farsighted crooks might endeavour to run especially good 
facilities in order to maintain good relations with regulatory authorities, stay out of 
the public eye, and develop a positive professional reputation.1 
Nonetheless, in this book's terminology, a strategy of dishonesty coupled with a 
facade of good quality would constitute nontrustworthy behavior. Much of the argument 
in favor of nonprofits as agents of trust centers on the administrative barriers to 
misconduct imposed by the nondistribution constraint. John Simon, referring to 
Hansmann's work, explains: 
the rule that prevents the managers of nonprofits from retaining profits, limits their 
incentives to exploit the underinformed consumer or under-informed donor; the 
rule, in other words, provides some basis for permitting that consumer or donor to 
place trust in the organization and its promises. That trust acts as a kind of 
substitute for the protection the well-informed consumer can obtain for himself in 
an orthodox market situation.2 
It is also argued, however, that the nature of motivations screened into the 
nonprofit sector influences an agency's trustworthiness as much as the vigor with which 
the nondistribution and other constraints are enforced. Vladeck writes: 
Whatever the enforcement mechanisms, laws work best when people would behave 
as the law commands them to even were there no law.3 
Thus proponents of nonprofit provision assert that participants in nonprofit 
agencies tend to have personal goals and attitudes more consistent with maintaining the 
quality and integrity of services than do participants in other sectors and for this reason 
are more trustworthy. 
 
Responsiveness. An argument often heard against utilization of nonprofit (and some-
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times public) organizations as vehicles for delivery of services is that they are slow to 
respond to demands for new or expanded services or to change their portfolio of services 
in response to pressures of the marketplace or government funding agencies. Nonprofits 
are sometimes accused of going their own way, unmindful of global societal needs. 
Consider Cornuelle's indictment: 
The independent sector seems to drift, moving blindly and without discipline. Its 
power lies raw and undeveloped. It often seems listless, sluggish passive, and 
defensive. The commercial and government sectors have outrun it.4 
Profit-making agencies, on the other hand, are said to be driven more easily 
toward rapid response through the lure of income. Vladeck's and Dunlop's5 
documentations of the nursing-home industry provide a more dramatic and extensive 
illustration. Vladeck sees the nursing-home experience in the following way: 
precisely because they are profit-seeking, for-profit firms tend to be more 
responsive to economic inducements provided by governments in the hope of 
expanding the provision of services. Public policy largely succeeded in one of its 
major, even if misconceived, objectives—rapid and dramatic expansion in the 
availability of nursing home beds—by providing more-than-adequate . . . 
inducements for the investment of private capital. Nonprofit organizations, whose 
objectives are more complex and more cross-pressured and which are probably less 
able to respond rapidly to anything, rise to the bait much more slowly. Indeed, 
nonprofit hospitals by and large failed to respond at all to repeated government 
efforts. . . .  to get them into the long term care business.6 
The causes of observed sluggishness of nonprofit agencies are open to some debate. 
Vladeck cites both external capital constraints and internal motivational factors in the 
nursing-home industry.7 Dunlop stresses nonprofit decision-making procedures: 
Because of their typically more cumbersome administrative and fund-raising 
mechanisms . . . nonprofit providers, on average, take considerably longer to move 
on the application and construction process than do proprietary interests. As a 
consequence . . . the latter . . . moved in quickly with their formal plans to meet 
almost all of the anticipated bed shortage . .  . before the nonprofits were ready to 
submit an application.8 
Whatever the causes, when shortages of certain services exist or when new public 
priorities are adopted, government often seeks to rapidly increase available capacity, 
whether in nursing homes, day-care centers, services to the handicapped, or other 
essential areas. In such circumstances, the responsiveness issue tends to become
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a prominent, if not paramount, public concern. 
 
Efficiency. In times of economic prosperity, when society can indulge in the search for 
solutions to pressing social needs (health, education) or in the fulfillment of social goals 
(arts, research), the responsiveness criterion tends to dominate public debate. In more 
stringent times, however, the generation of new service capacities is not the principal 
concern. The control of expenditures within existing service modes or substituting new, 
cheaper service modes for old ones, for example, replacing residential care with 
homemaker services, is of greater concern. One need only compare the U.S. domestic 
public agenda of the 1960s with that of the late 1970s and early 1980s to reinforce this 
impression. In the context of fiscal stringency, the productive efficiency of service 
delivery gains a more prominent role as a social criterion with which to judge the 
relative performance of sectors and organizations. Simply put, people become more 
interested in the question of which organizations will deliver service for the least cost. 
This efficiency criterion is hard to divorce from the trust issue, however. In particular, 
efficiency can only be referenced with respect to a given level of quality. Thus a 
trustworthy institution that maintains quality cannot necessarily be said to be less 
efficient than a less costly agency that depreciates the quality of its services. 
Nonetheless, microeconomists typically argue that (presumably less trustworthy) 
proprietary agencies tend to be more efficient because the maximization of profits 
requires minimization of costs (exclusive of profits) for any given level of quality and 
output. Overall, therefore, any comparison of productive efficiency by sector, that is, the 
cost per unit of service of a given quality, must recognize the subtle distinctions among 
inefficiency, quality depreciation, and profit taking. A commonly held view is that 
nonprofits maintain quality but produce services in a relatively wasteful fashion, 
whereas proprietaries produce efficient services of perhaps questionable quality and 
extract some of the surpluses through profit taking. 
 
Innovation. Chapter 3 reviewed the relationship and the distinction between 
entrepreneurial activity and innovation and noted that, although technical innovation 
and invention are not synonymous with entrepreneurship, new ideas, technical methods, 
and implementation of advanced concepts often form a substantial part of the basis for 
enterprising behavior. Innovation is a rather indirect social criterion; its relevance 
pertains more to its contributions to the three previous criteria than as a goal in itself. 
Innovation may be seen to contribute primarily to efficiency, as new methods or 
procedures enable agencies to deliver particular services at lower cost or higher quality. 
Innovation may also contribute to responsiveness in the sense that new
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technologies may lead to wholly new services, permitting agencies to address unserved 
or poorly served societal needs or clients. The diagnostic-center concept in 
child-welfare services provides an example. A much less direct connection exists 
between innovation and trustworthiness, a link that involves the subtle distinction 
between innovations that are useful and those that might simply be interesting or more 
attractive to service producers than to consumers. For example, certain innovations 
might have great intellectual value to entrepreneurs trained in a particular profession but 
have uncertain or limited immediate relevance to the needs of constituents. Basic 
research projects often have this character, although they may proceed in the belief that 
practical applications will ultimately result. In any case, a trustworthy agency would 
change on the basis of new ideas clearly relevant to client needs, whereas a less 
trustworthy agency's concerns would center on innovation for the sake of advancing 
knowledge in a more abstract sense. 
 
 
Modes of Behavior 
 
The main strategy of analysis in this book is to develop the sectoral implications of 
alternative kinds of entrepreneurial motivation. The behavior patterns of each 
entrepreneurial type will therefore be assessed relative to the four social-performance 
criteria just considered. This discussion will briefly summarize the behavior patterns of 
the different entrepreneurial characters developed in earlier chapters and proceed with 
the social-performance implications of allowing each of these entrepreneurial types to 
operate freely in the nonprofit sector, only weakly restrained by governmental or 
constituent machinery of regulation and accountability. Subsequently, the question of 
how alternative policy instruments that influence the screening and policing of nonprofit 
agencies result in various mixes and intensities of these social-performance patterns will 
be considered. 
 
Independent Behavior. Sectors in which the independent variety of entrepreneur is 
allowed to operate freely would feature the promulgation of multiple, autonomous 
organizational units, each relatively resistant to external demands or to the internal 
sharing of authority. Such sectors would respond to external opportunities to fund new 
ventures leading to the establishment of new units, but existing units established by 
independents could not be expected to undertake large risks or expansions or to strike 
out dramatically in new directions. Rather, ventures undertaken in a sector featuring 
independents will tend to be stable, with dependable, long-term leadership. Thus a new 
field open to independents or an old field featuring large organizations that is suddenly 
opened to the independent-minded entrepreneur (for example, through loosened entry  
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controls) would be initially dynamic, featuring the founding of many new organizational 
units. An older field already saturated with independent-led agencies would tend to be 
insular and stagnant. 
In terms of the four social criteria, sectors that feature independent behavior 
would tend to be (1) trustworthy in the sense that entrepreneurs will protect their 
reputations in order to stay in business and jealously guard their autonomy. They will 
thus avoid false advertising or quality depreciation unless threatened with financial 
collapse. (2) Responsive in the short-run process of establishing new agencies according 
to existing social opportunities, but relatively unresponsive (insular) in the long run, 
once an array of independent agencies is established and entry becomes difficult. (3) 
Efficient in the sense that costs will be contained to make ends meet. Fraud will be 
avoided, but no particular incentives to minimize costs or introduce new methods will 
be demonstrated. Economies deriving from large-scale or interagency cooperation will 
be specifically forgone. (4) Innovative at the stage of new-agency formation if a new 
idea is helpful for garnering support to get started. No particular innovative bent will be 
demonstrated thereafter. 
 
Believer Behavior. Sectors in which believers are given free rein will feature the 
proliferation of organizations based on single-minded, conscientious pursuit of different 
(self-defined) causes. Such sectors may exhibit the pursuit of radical ideas and 
risk-taking behavior stemming from indifference to economic, legal, and personal 
consequences. Instability from risk taking and conflict with the establishment will be 
compensated to some extent by dependability that stems from the long-term consistency 
of purpose, dedication, and commitment of entrepreneurs. The mission of ventures 
driven by believers will initially be inspired by and derive sustenance from extant social 
turmoil. Once established, however, believer-based ventures will be internally 
self-guiding and relatively insensitive to changes in the social context or the demand for 
services. Change in believer-based sectors basically arises from the establishment of 
new agencies rather than changing the purposes of old ones. Some believer-based 
organizations may grow fairly large, but most are limited by the difficulty of believers to 
delegate authority or share control with others whose ideas might not conform to their 
own. 
In reference to social-performance criteria, believer-oriented nonprofit sectors 
would tend to be (1) trustworthy in the sense that believers will be true to their stated 
purposes and will work tirelessly in the cause of advertised goals. The believer-based 
sector will be selfless rather than self-aggrandizing or fraudulent. (2) Responsive only in 
the sense that believers have to tap into latent pockets of demand to support their efforts. 
Believer-based causes are basically self-defined, may be coincident with certain social 
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concerns in the short run, but will be essentially unresponsive to societal pressures in the 
long run. Agencies led by believers follow an inner calling rather than signals from the 
outside. (3) Efficient in the sense that resources will be devoted to articulated purposes 
and waste and fraud will be minimized. Potential economies of scale and interagency 
cooperation are likely to be passed by because of the basic antagonisms that believers 
are likely to encounter in working in larger contexts. In addition, as idea and program 
advocates rather than entrepreneurs with managerial interests, believers may not 
administer their operations well. (4) Innovative only in the sense that preconceived 
methods or beliefs represent actual breakthroughs or productive changes in accepted 
procedure. Strong entrepreneurial support for some causes (for example, research on 
birth defects) may encourage innovation, however. 
 
Professional Behavior. Sectors in which professional-type entrepreneurs operate freely 
will tend to feature the proliferation of experimental, demonstration, or show case 
programs that reflect new ideas under discussion by the relevant discipline. Such a 
sector is likely to be trendy, perhaps even capricious in its efforts to remain 
professionally avant-garde. Services of such a sector will tend to be costly, of high 
quality, and coupled with machinery to document, analyze, and disseminate results. 
Programs will be designed to be small, and in some scientifically oriented professional 
contexts, carefully controlled. Generation and distribution of knowledge will be an 
expressed purpose, but expansion of successful programs will not be enthusiastically 
undertaken. 
Although professional-based agencies act to maintain themselves at the forefront 
of knowledge generation and disciplinary visibility, they will rarely jeopardize their 
agencies with ventures of high economic risk or ventures that radically depart from the 
mainstream of current disciplinary thought. Nor will the professional-based agency 
continue to nurture programs (past ventures) that are conventional or out of date in the 
eyes of the discipline. 
With reference to the criteria of social performance, professional-based nonprofit 
sectors will be (1) trustworthy in the sense of delivering services of high quality, with 
high costs and possible extravagance, but little outright fraud. Services will be delivered 
as advertised because alleged deception can be professionally damaging. 
Professional-based agencies cannot be counted on to sustain given service modes for an 
indefinite period of time, once those modes become conventional. (2) Responsive only 
in the sense that disciplinary thinking may follow (or even anticipate) developing 
social problems. New ventures may be designed to alleviate or otherwise address 
accumulating needs but a professional-based sector will be unresponsive in terms of 
providing new services in quantity or in providing conventional, routine services that, 
although needed, have no special disciplinary interest or appeal. (3) Efficient
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only in the sense of avoiding outright fraud. Otherwise, there will be little effort in 
professional-based sectors to produce given varieties of services at minimum cost or to 
manage ventures in a Spartan manner. Furthermore, professional-based sectors may 
tend to duplicate variations of trendy experimental programs, and because such 
programs tend to be small and possibly experimentally controlled and there may be 
rivalry among alternative professional-based agencies, possible economies of 
cooperation and scale may be forfeited. (4) Innovative in the sense that 
professional-based agencies will operate programs at the forefront of disciplinary 
knowledge, putting new ideas into limited, tentative practice. Although this can be a 
major source of sectoral change, professional-based agencies will tend to ignore 
innovations that require cross-disciplinary cooperation and will specifically avoid 
maverick ideas and methods that run counter to prevailing disciplinary thought or 
challenge the appropriateness of the discipline itself. 
 
Conserver Behavior. Sectors in which conservers are provided the opportunity to 
operate freely as entrepreneurial agents will exhibit a strong sense of stability in purpose 
but may prove to be too rigid or cautious to withstand dramatic changes in the economy 
or in society at large. Such sectors will protect the character and viability of their 
existing agencies, adjusting their structures and programs only when threatened by 
crises, and even then only on an incremental basis. Conserver-based sectors will be 
averse to ventures that involve large uncertainties and risks, but can be depended on to 
see ventures through into the indefinite future. 
In terms of the social-performance criteria, conserver-based sectors will be (1) 
trustworthy in the sense of being sensitive to preserving the reputation of cherished 
institutions. Thus fraudulent or deceptive practices will be avoided, and long-term 
commitment to stated objectives and promised services may be relied on. (2) 
Responsiveness in the sense that conserver-based agencies will attempt to adjust their 
programs and services to avoid major collapse. Otherwise such agencies will attempt to 
maintain a traditional course, relatively unaffected by environmental changes in 
demand. (3) Efficient only in the sense that explicit fraud, which may tarnish institu-
tional reputations, will be avoided. Otherwise, management practices will tend to 
become stagnant, except when jarred and revamped in times of crisis. (4) Innovative 
only in minor ways that may assist incremental adaptation to new circumstances in 
times of extreme difficulty. 
 
Architectural Behavior. Nonprofit sectors that afford architect-type entrepreneurs free 
rein will have an expansionist flavor characterized by opportunistic adaptation to 
environmental demands as well as long-term commitment to maintaining the viability of 
individual ventures. Quality will be maintained as a matter of pride in workmanship
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and entrepreneurial identification with product. Agencies in the architect-driven mode 
will be insular in the sense of preferring to build from within rather than acquire 
programs or enter joint or cooperative ventures with other agencies 
Relative to the four social-performance criteria, architect-based sectors will be 
(1) trustworthy in the sense of quality maintenance that derives from inherent pride in 
workmanship. Commitment to original or advertised purposes is tenuous, however, 
depending on how the opportunity structure for acquiring resources to build shifts over 
time. (2) Responsive in the sense that architect-based agencies will explore, in 
opportunistic fashion, all available resources for further building, expansion, 
modification, and tinkering with programs, without strong reference to preconceived 
directions or purposes. Thus agencies in architect-based sectors remain sensitive to 
changes in demands as expressed in the marketplace, philanthropic quarters, and 
government funding. (3) Efficient in the sense that architects want to perfect their 
mechanisms and have them run smoothly. Expansionary tendencies will allow 
exploitation of scale economies but may also lead to overbuilding (that is, incur 
diseconomies of scale) if entrepreneurs are extraordinarily successful in garnering 
resources. Need for personal identification by entrepreneurs of architectural agencies 
may forfeit opportunities for savings through cooperative efforts with other agencies. 
(4) Innovative in the sense that architect entrepreneurs will constantly try new 
administrative or programmatic ideas, components, and structures. Ventures will exhibit 
a bigger and different quality, they may be inventive, clever, and impressive, even tied 
to a grand organizational design or master plan, but still mechanical and adaptive rather 
than derived from an overriding programmatic concept or philosophic principle of 
service delivery. 
 
Poetic Behavior. Nonprofit sectors that allow unrestrained operation of poet-type 
entrepreneurs will be quixotic, featuring multifaceted deployment of imaginative, 
wide-ranging, vista-expanding programs. Such sectors will experience instability 
associated with risk taking in path-breaking new ventures and the short time during 
which poetic entrepreneurs remain committed to nurturing particular projects. Ventures 
in sectors of this kind may involve sweeping changes or small-scale demonstrations of 
new concepts, undertaken within the confines of an agency on which the poet 
entrepreneur singularly imposes his signature. In such sectors, the ideas that underlie 
new ventures will be stressed, with the nuts-and-bolts mechanics given secondary 
attention. On the four social criteria, the poet-based nonprofit sector will be (1) 
trustworthy in the sense that entrepreneurs will be sincere, truthful, and indeed 
provocative in their intentions. Short attention spans and disinterest in details, however, 
may result in service delivery that falls short of original promises. (2) Responsive in the 
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sense that entrepreneurs may seek to solve festering social or other problems through the 
application of bold new ideas and concepts. Ideas will be pursued more on the basis of 
intellectual arguments and creative inspiration than direct pressures from the 
environment, however, and the poet-driven agency will not be readily responsive to 
demands for implementation or expansion of routine or conventional programs. (3) 
Efficient in the sense that dynamism at the entrepreneurial level translates into general 
agitation and questioning of purpose and performance at the operating level. Otherwise, 
the entrepreneurial preoccupation with expression of new ideas and concepts and lack of 
attention to operating details and routine operations can lead to various forms of 
inefficiency, including poor administration and coordination of diverse programs, 
failure to expand to take advantage of scale economies, and failure to engage in 
economical cooperative efforts with other agencies. (4) Innovative in the sense that 
entrepreneurs are constantly preoccupied with new ideas and experiences and will tend 
to channel these energies into unique projects and programs. 
 
Player Behavior. Sectors in which the player variety of power-seeking entrepreneur is 
allowed to operate unrestrained will feature increasing concentrations of industrial 
activity within a relatively few, large, growing, hierarchical organizations. Such a sector 
will be eager to expand into new areas and to adapt existing services to larger markets. 
Ventures may lack long-run stability because of the limited time frames of 
entrepreneurial commitments, and long-term managerial control may be hampered by 
organizational size and disinterest of entrepreneurs in routine administration. 
With respect to social-performance criteria, a player-dominated sector will be (1) 
trustworthy only to the degree that entrepreneurs fear for their reputations and may be 
harmed by scandal that would prevent their further advance. Beyond this concern, such 
sectors will be opportunistic, seeking to divert resources toward visible, 
attention-garnering activities and shifting policies and service characteristics to suit the 
moment. Maintenance of quality and fulfillment of advertised service characteristics 
may therefore prove problematic. (2) Responsive in exhibiting great sensitivity to 
current issues on the public agenda and ventures that can attract immediate support. 
Agencies in player-based sectors will therefore be highly adaptive to demands for new 
services by government agencies or shifts of economic resources that allow new 
consumer groups to express their demands in a tangible manner. (3) Efficient in that 
economies of scale will be exploited and opportunities for merger and consolidation of 
weaker programs will be pursued. However, player-led organizations can become 
inefficient in the sense that programs may grow too large and uncontrollable or they 
may be poorly administered. Furthermore, resources may be diverted for self-serving 
purposes, including top-heavy staffing, perquisites of office that signify
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prestige, and programs that have glamor and visibility but low productivity. (4) 
Innovative in the sense that player-based agencies will latch on to new ideas that have 
significant resource-producing or publicity-producing potentials. However, risks 
associated with the implementation of innovations will be carefully calculated, and 
innovations are unlikely to be undertaken unless they have been tried elsewhere and will 
not antagonize large groups of people. 
 
Controller Behavior. Controller-dominated sectors will exhibit behavior patterns 
reminiscent of both the independent and player modes. Ventures will be aimed at 
expanding existing agencies within limits of the entrepreneur's ability to retain effective 
central control. Within self-imposed growth limits, agencies will respond 
opportunistically to changes in the demand environment to increase resources and staff. 
Controller-based organizations will be more conservatively run and more meticulously 
managed than player-based ones and larger and more outward looking than 
independent-based agencies. 
With respect to the four social criteria, agencies in controller-based sectors will 
be (1) trustworthy to the degree that entrepreneurs fear that their power and control may 
be shaken by scandal, misrepresentation, or depreciation of quality. (2) Responsive in 
the sense that opportunities to garner additional resources for new or expanded 
programs will be sought as a way of increasing entrepreneurial power within limits of 
controllability. Thus controller-based agencies will be relatively adaptive to changing 
demands of government agencies and markets. (3) Efficient to the degree that retention 
of effective control requires meticulous management, and the limits of controllability 
also allow exploitation of economies of scale. Inefficiency may result from the 
reluctance of entrepreneurs to enter beneficial cooperative ventures with other agencies 
(which dilutes their control) and from the possible overdiversion of resources to 
top-level staff, which allows entrepreneurs to monitor their organizations more closely 
and to experience power from the control of the staff. (4) Innovative in the same sense in 
which player-based agencies are innovative, that is, in the adoption of relatively new 
ideas that attract resources to permit agencies to expand within desired limits. 
 
Income-Seeking Behavior. Nonprofit sectors in which income seekers have free rein will 
exhibit a strongly opportunistic pattern of development, highly adaptive to current social 
priorities as expressed through economic demands of government, private consumers, 
or third parties. Opportunities for quality depreciation and fraud will be exploited where 
consumers or funding agents cannot maintain vigilance and cost-cutting savings can be 
diverted to salaries or other modes of personal wealth augmentation. Income seeker-
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based nonprofits will, in effect, act like profit maximizers—raising prices (padding 
reimbursable costs) and expanding output to maximize the difference between revenues 
and minimum costs—except that profits will appear as additional components of 
expenditure. Thus, in a highly disaggregated income-seeking sector, output levels and 
prices may be optimal if competitive pressures are allowed to operate. However, in more 
concentrated sectors or where agencies in disaggregated sectors can collude, output is 
likely to be restricted and prices kept artificially high, as in a monopolistic 
profit-making industry. Ventures in income-seeker-based sectors will experience 
instability insofar as market demands for services are volatile and entrepreneurs' 
attentions are diverted from one profitable venture to the next. 
With respect to the four social-performance criteria, income-seeker-based 
nonprofit sectors are (1) trustworthy only insofar as consumers and other resource 
providers are vigilant and able to exert their influence through choice of suppliers or 
other (regulatory) means. Otherwise, organizations in such sectors present a risk of 
quality depreciation, fraud, profiteering, and misrepresentation of promised services. (2) 
Responsive to demands for new services or expansion of existing services as long as 
these demands are expressed through willingness-to-pay levels that can provide 
revenues in excess of minimum costs. Highly concentrated or collusive sectors may 
raise prices and restrict output short of socially optimal levels. (3) Efficient in the sense 
that inherently wasteful (costly) methods of operation will be avoided, but inefficient 
because components of costs that can be effectively drawn out as entrepreneurial profits 
will be artifically inflated. (4) Innovative where new methods are able to lower 
minimum costs or attract new sources of demand. When possible innovations promise 
an uncertain return, calculated risks will be taken. 
 
Searcher Behavior. Nonprofit sectors that give free rein to searchers are likely to be in 
newly defined fields or in variations of established industries that have not been claimed 
as the domains of particular professions or disciplines. The principal mode of venture 
response will be the establishment of new agencies rather than program development 
within existing agencies. Searchers will tend to identify latent coalitions of supporters 
and resource providers (new government funding programs, pockets of unserved 
constituents groups) that form the potential basis for starting new services. In this sense, 
searcher-based sectors are opportunistic, with enterprise founded on identifying the 
sources of latent demand and incipient service trends rather than on self-defined or 
independently conceived ideas or beliefs. Because of entrepreneurial inexperience, 
uncertainty of personal goals, and the novel character of ventures, searcher-based 
sectors are likely to exhibit instability and tenuousness in the nature of ventures. 
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With respect to the criteria of social performance, searcher-based nonprofit 
sectors will be (1) trustworthy in that entrepreneurs, operating out of conscience and 
frustration, are legitimately seeking to provide services that they feel are useful and 
required. Furthermore, because they face the uphill tasks of establishing themselves in 
new areas, entrepreneurs will be sensitive to reputation, wishing to avoid scandals that 
could result from fraud or misrepresentation. (2) Responsive in the sense that 
entrepreneurs will seek out the nooks and crannies of latent demand and newly 
emerging areas of funding and try to develop and implement them. Although searchers 
may be highly selective of the kinds of activities in which they become involved, they 
will also tend to develop areas that are neglected by other entrepreneurial types. (3) 
Efficient in that searchers, at least initially, will have to scrape by and make do with the 
minimal resources available to new fields that require definition, justification, and 
focusing. Such sectors are also potentially inefficient, as entrepreneurs may lack 
management skills, experience, or access to tested methods. (4) Innovative more by 
necessity than design. The seeking out and development of new service areas is likely to 
require the formulation of new methods and procedures. 
 
 
Review 
 
Table 10-1 provides an approximate summary of the performance character of nonprofit 
sectors in which the various types of entrepreneurs are allowed to operate freely. In 
general, it is noteworthy that compromises or trade-offs among the four criteria appear 
to be an inherent necessity. That is, assuming that the postulated set of motivations are 
relatively complete and that perfect policing or molding of behavior through regulatory 
means is impossible, then behavior derived from the screening of entrepreneurs into a 
given sector will necessarily come up short on at least one social criterion. The main 
trade-off seems to occur between trustworthiness and responsiveness, with strong 
positive correlations between responsiveness, efficiency, and innovation. As a result, 
the entrepreneurial types appear to separate roughly into two categories: the trustworthy 
types and the innovative, efficient, responsive types. The first group includes 
independents, believers, professionals, and conservers. The second group includes 
players, controllers, architects, and income seekers. Poets and searchers have some of 
the positive attributes of each group. 
The key question for policy is what effects various policy instruments can be 
expected to have on the screening and postscreening discretionary behavior of the 
various types of entrepreneurial characters, and hence on the performance of the sectors 
within which they operate. The following discussion will focus on a number of policy 
proposals often considered in connection with delivery of services in industries that 
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Table 10-1 
Social-Performance Criteria and Entrepreneurial Behavior 
            
Behavior Mode   Trust   Response  Efficiency  Innovation  
Independent  Positive  Short-run Neutral to Neutral 
     positive;  negative 
     long-run 
     negative 
Believer   Positive  Neutral  Neutral  Neutral 
Professional  Positive  Negative Negative Positive 
Conserver  Positive  Negative Neutral  Negative 
Architect  Neutral  Positive  Neutral to Positive 
       positive 
Poet   Positive  Neutral  Neutral to Positive 
       negative 
Player   Negative Positive  Neutral to Positive 
       negative 
Controller  Neutral to Positive  Positive  Positive 
   negative 
Income Seeker  Negative Positive  Neutral to Positive 
       positive 
Searcher   Positive  Positive  Neutral  Positive   
 
 
involve nonprofit participation. The concern here is how such policy instruments affect 
behavior and performance within the nonprofit sector and, additionally, in 
service-producing industries as a whole. 
 
 
Policy Instruments 
 
The analysis of sector-level screening in chapter 7 suggested that nonprofit sectors tend 
to draw primarily on the believer, conserver, poet, searcher, and professional varieties of 
entrepreneur. This entrepreneurial mix leans decidedly toward the trustworthy category 
and away from the responsive category of performance identified above. However, this 
tentative conclusion is contingent on the assumptions that (a) selection at the industry 
level is not heavily biased toward or against any particular type of entrepreneur; (b) the 
nonprofit sector in the industry in question follows the general pattern of income 
potential, bureaucratic structure, and service ethic presumed to be characteristic of 
nonprofit sectors; and (c) the opportunity structures for employment are open enough to 
allow latent entrepreneurs relatively unconstrained sector selection. 
Clearly, industries vary considerably on these conditions; thus the behav-    
ioral mixes of alternative nonprofit sectors also vary. Rather than dwell on a behavior 
mix that may characterize a nominal, hypothetical nonprofit sector, it will be more ana- 
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lytically useful and relevant to consider the implications of variations in these 
conditions, particularly as these variations are brought about by public policies 
addressed to the role of nonprofit organizations in specific industries that deliver 
essential services. 
In response to public concerns over the quality of services or the integrity with 
which essential services are delivered, policies intended to specifically delimit and 
regulate the kinds of agencies or people that may practice in a given area of economic 
activity have often been proposed and frequently implemented. Four such policies 
commonly encountered are (1) the requirement that service-delivery organizations be 
incorporated as nonprofit; (2) the requirement that practitioners be qualified members of 
a particular profession or discipline; (3) the control of entry of new agencies into an 
industry or into the nonprofit sector of that industry; and (4) the targeting to nonprofit 
agencies of resource commitments of government funding programs. Such policies are 
intended to increase the trustworthiness or the competence of service providers by 
attempting to exclude or control undesirable individuals or organizations. As implied in 
chapters 6, 7, and 8, such policies may affect the screening of entrepreneurial 
motivations into alternative sectors and industries over the long run and may affect 
discretionary behavior of those already screened in the short run. Performance 
implications for industries and their nonprofit sectors, often different from those 
anticipated by policy designers, may be seen to flow from these effects. 
 
Nonprofitization. Distrust of the profit motive is the main motivating element for those 
who have proposed the elimination of proprietary interests and the concentration on 
nonprofit agencies as primary vehicles for the delivery of social, health, educational, 
and other varieties of essential services. Vladeck's perspective from the nursing-home 
industry reflects the general picture. 
Expansion of nonprofit ownership is seen by some observers as the only way to 
improve the nursing home industry. They see for-profit ownership as the original 
sin at the root of many of the industry's problems because of the inherent conflict 
between the provision of high quality services to the dependent elderly and profit 
maximization. As most other kinds of health care institutions are operated on a 
not-for-profit basis with apparently happy results, public health professionals tend 
to be made uneasy by profit-seeking firms. So it is not surprising that a number of 
studies of the nursing home industry have concluded with calls for eliminating 
proprietary interests and, though formal limitations on proprietary ownership have 
not been adopted in any state, the trend toward slowly increasing market share for 
the voluntaries continues. Policymakers have sought to limit the spread of 
proprietary interests to other areas of health care, most notably to the provision of 
home health services.9 
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To a lesser extent, nonprofitization initiatives are also intended to remove government 
as a direct service supplier, for example, by substituting purchase-of-service 
arrangements with private or independent nonprofit organizations. Various arguments, 
including the alleged inefficiency of direct government supply and improvement in the 
flexibility and accountability in use of government funds when the government finance 
function is separated from the production task, have been made on behalf of such 
arrangements.10 The following discussion thus considers nonprofitization a policy of 
confining an industry solely to private, nonprofit organizational participants. 
A policy that requires all agencies in a particular industry to become nonprofit 
can be expected to have both short-run and long-run effects. 
In the short run, imposition of a nonprofitization policy will bring into the 
nonprofit sector those entrepreneurs who have previously screened themselves into the 
proprietary and public sectors of the given industry. This result follows from the initial 
effects of screening discussed in chapter 7: once entrepreneurs have been screened into 
industries and into particular organizations, they will tend to remain in those positions, 
even if this requires conversion to nonprofit status. Such conversion, however, conflicts 
with entrepreneurs' sector-related preferences for income, bureaucratic structure, and 
service ethic, leading to various patterns of behavior subversive to the character of the 
nonprofit sector. This conversion also changes the basic behavioral mix within that 
sector. 
Alternatively, a product-differentiation tactic may be taken by some 
entrepreneurs who wish to avoid conversion to nonprofit status. New industries may be 
defined in an effort to circumvent the nonprofitization edict. For example, proprietary 
child-care facilities may be relabeled as residential schools or mental-health treatment 
centers if the latter are not covered by the nonprofitization policy and if alternative 
means of support can be found outside the set of resources normally reserved for the 
industry as originally defined. 
In the long run, a nonprofitization policy will cause changes in the patterns of 
screening for latent entrepreneurs entering the industry. In particular, a nonprofitization 
policy may, over time, affect the industrial structure (concentration and size of 
organizations) as well as access to the (material, power) rewards associated with the 
industry's social priority-variables on which latent entrepreneurs make career decisions. 
As a result, certain types of entrepreneurs who might previously have selected the 
industry may screen themselves elsewhere. Over time, the increased heterogeneity of 
motives in the nonprofit sector and the mismatches of motives that inspire subversive 
behavior induced by nonprofitization in the short run are likely to decline. They will not 
disappear, however, because industry-screening decisions are made on other grounds as 
well as on industrial structure and social priority (for example, nature of service and 
professional control) and tend to dominate the issue of sector selection within industries. 
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The particular behavioral implications of a nonprofitization policy on a given 
industry can be discerned by reviewing each entrepreneurial type, using as a base the 
nominal screening pattern of figure 7-1. 
Income seekers and independents, likely to have been previously screened into 
the proprietary sector, will in the short run be brought into the nonprofit sector. In the 
long run, some future entrepreneurs of these types may choose other industries. 
Power seekers, especially players, likely to have been previously screened into 
the public sector, will in the short run be brought into the nonprofit sector. In the long 
run, some future entrepreneurs of this kind may also select other industries. 
Because believers, professionals, conservers, artists, and searchers will tend to 
concentrate in the nonprofit sector to begin with, no major shifts of these types may 
occur from a policy of nonprofitization. However, particular industries vary 
considerably on this score. For example, in some industries, such as scientific research, 
the proprietary sector may have created conditions especially conducive to professionals 
or to architects. In such cases, these types would also exhibit similar short-run and 
long-run shifts under a nonprofitization policy. 
The main implications for behavior and performance within the nonprofit sector 
of these screening shifts may be described as a combination of the following 
developments. 
Income-seeking behavior would become more intense, and the non-distribution 
constraint would be more sorely tested. The nonprofit sector would become less 
trustworthy, featuring increased incidence of indirect profiteering and fraud. The sector 
would also become more responsive to societal demands as expressed through the 
marketplace and government funding programs. 
Autonomy-seeking behavior would increase, leading to entry of new agencies or 
decentralization and fragmentation of existing agencies, depending on the stringency of 
entry controls. In the short run, this situation would represent an increase in 
responsiveness, but in the long run such responsiveness would be retarded by the 
conservative bent of established independents. 
Assuming that governmental provision is also precluded by nonprofitization, the 
responsiveness of the nonprofit sector would be increased by the entry of power seekers, 
and the trustworthiness of that sector would be decreased for the same reason. 
Depending on the balance between the decentralizing tendencies of independent types 
and the centralizing inclinations of power seekers, the nonprofit sector could become 
either more or less concentrated than it would be in the absence of a nonprofitization 
policy. 
It is interesting to reflect on how the prior implications of the analysis compare
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with the intentions and expectations of those who propose a policy of nonprofitization. 
Clearly the designers of such policies have in mind increasing the trustworthiness of 
services. According to the analysis here, some of the less trustworthy motivational types 
may indeed, in the long run, drop out of the industry, and entrepreneurs of those types 
who are shifted into the nonprofit sector (by force in the short run and by selection in the 
long run) may find it more difficult to carry out their objectives in the nonprofit domain, 
although the intensity of this effect depends on how well nonprofit regulations are 
policed. 
On the other hand, a policy of nonprofitization may stimulate new labels and 
variations of service outside the nonprofit sector according to the product-differentiation 
effect noted above. To the degree that such differentiated services are able to retain or 
attract new resources (from the marketplace or alternative government programs), the 
nonprofitization policy will be limited in its potential for improving the trustworthy 
character of the industry as a whole. Overall, however, some industry-wide 
improvement in trustworthiness may be anticipated, although probably much less than 
policy proponents would argue. 
Whatever the net result on industries as a whole, it is clear that nonprofitization 
will have a corrupting influence on the nonprofit sector, making it less pure and less 
easily describable in terms of particular motivations and modes of behavior and 
performance. Thus a nonprofitizaton policy may be expected to improve industry-level 
performance but also to obfuscate the character and trustworthiness of the nonprofit 
sector. 
 
Entry Controls. Varying degrees of difficulty are associated with the founding of a new 
agency in the nonprofit sector. In some areas, such as management consulting, 
establishing a nonprofit may be as simple as filing a few papers and paying an 
incorporation fee. In other areas, stringent need and necessity standards may be imposed 
by regulatory bodies or heavy capital investments may be necessary. In some fields, 
such as nursing-home and health services, the use of entry controls has increased over 
time and is likely to become even more prominent.11 
Entry-control policies allow state agencies to restrict the formation of new 
agencies directly through the manipulation of approvals, and indirectly, by increasing 
the costs of surmounting the entry process and meeting the imposed standards of 
operation. Furthermore, such controls may limit the growth and development of 
programs within established organizations. Although such controls may apply to 
programs of existing agencies, the most severe effects are felt by would-be entrants 
from the outside who normally have fewer resources and less expertise for negotiating 
the system. 
Entry controls may apply evenly to an industry as a whole, or they may be 
differentially severe toward one or more sectors within an industry. In some
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cases, controls on entry have been observed to favor the nonprofit sector—in 
broadcasting, for example, where a certain portion of licenses have been reserved for 
educational radio and television,12 and in higher education, where accrediting bodies 
have rejected applications by proprietary institutions.13 In such cases, the effects of entry 
control are similar to those of a nonprofitization policy, though perhaps less severe. 
Entry-control polices may also discriminate against nonprofits. The process of 
incorporation, itself a form of entry control, can be especially difficult for novice 
nonprofit applicants, especially as such groups are required to clarify their public 
purposes, prove their ties to the community, and demonstrate financial viability. 
Application for tax-exempt status can be similarly arduous. 
Even a nominally uniform policy of entry control across an industry may 
discriminate against nonprofits, because fledgling nonprofits will be implicitly 
handicapped in their abilities to raise capital or to put together the necessary coalitions 
of community sponsors.14 Hence they will be slower to apply for the available spaces in 
an industry, the number of which is limited by entry control. 
The following analysis supposes that entry controls would be relatively more 
severe for the nonprofit sector than elsewhere, but effective only in limiting entry of new 
organizations rather than new programs of established agencies. 
Entry controls with a more severe impact on the nonprofit sector of a given 
industry would have the following short-run and long-run effects. 
In the short run, entry controls would cause mismatches of (sector-related) 
preferences for those entrepreneurial types already screened into the nonprofit sector but 
who favor small agencies or the option of forming new agencies. Such entrepreneurs 
would be locked into the nonprofit sector by the inertial tendencies of the 
sector-screening process. Entry control would cause them to operate at diminished 
levels of activity, but also to undertake ventures that subvert the design of this policy. 
Entry controls may also liberate the energies of those entrepreneurs already screened 
into the nonprofit sector, whose preferences center on power and concentration of 
activity. 
In the long run, screening effects will attract to the nonprofit sector future 
entrepreneurs who prefer the greater concentrations of economic activity induced by 
entry control and will divert those entrepreneurial types who prefer more decentralized 
regimes. 
Independents who may have been screened into the nonprofit sector will find 
themselves bound to that sector (and particular organization) by inertial tendencies and 
also inhibited in their proclivity to venture by the imposition of entry controls. 
Nonetheless, they may attempt to venture from within their agencies, that is, to promote 
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decentralization of their agencies and set up autonomous enclaves internally. In the long 
run, however, future independent types will be discouraged by entry controls from 
entering employment in the nonprofit sector. 
Power seekers previously screened into the nonprofit sector may pursue their 
ventures with renewed vigor after imposition of entry controls. In the long run, future 
power-seeking entrepreneurs will be more strongly attracted to the nonprofit sector as a 
result of this policy. 
Searchers who might otherwise consider the nonprofit sector for its venture 
possibilities will in the long run (process of screening) direct their explorations 
elsewhere as a result of restricted entry policy. 
Other types of entrepreneurs are less likely than independents, power seekers, or 
searchers to be seriously affected in their short-run behavior or screening tendencies by 
an entry-control policy. Some, like the architect, professional, income seeker, or 
conserver, will be relatively indifferent, and others, like the poet and believer, will be 
antagonistic but unlikely to change their sectoral preferences. However, the latter two 
types may emulate the short-term behavior of the independent in his attempts to 
decentralize existing organizational structures. 
Note that, generally speaking, these effects are likely to be relatively weak. In the 
case of independents and power seekers, for example, the entrepreneurs would already 
be predisposed toward other sectors and may not be found in the nonprofit sector in 
great numbers to begin with. In the case of independents, entry controls would simply 
reinforce the screening tendencies otherwise at work; and such controls may not change 
the bureaucratic structure of the nonprofit sector enough to attract large numbers of 
power seekers from the public sector. To the extent that entry restriction does induce 
observable effects, corresponding behavior and performance implications may be 
expected. 
The nonprofit sector will tend to become more concentrated and subject to 
power-seeking behavior, especially in the long run, with entrepreneurial activity taking 
place by internal expansion of existing organizations rather than formation of new ones. 
Some decentralization within those agencies may be observed, however, via (short-run) 
activity of independents. The loss of searchers and independents and the gain of power 
seekers may yield little net change on the responsiveness dimension, but a net loss in 
trustworthiness. 
The nominal intended purposes of entry control in nonprofit sectors is certainly at 
odds with the foregoing analysis. Indeed, entry restrictions are usually imposed in an 
attempt to screen out, or at least restrain, untrustworthy elements. Thus the expected 
direction, if not intensity, of the predicted effects does not appear to support entry 
restriction as a productive policy. 
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Professionalization. A trend toward increased and more specialized training and 
licensing of key personnel has pervaded almost the entire spectrum of services in which 
nonprofit provision is an important part. Through the decades of this century, the 
education, health, social work, fine arts, and research fields have all explicitly or 
implicitly imposed and reinforced stringent requirements for licensing practitioners and, 
by extension, for requiring professional credentials of managerial and entrepreneurial 
personnel. A similar policy thrust is often proposed for emerging service areas, such as 
preschool and day-care services for children and nursing home care for the elderly. 
Although the nominal intent of a professionalization policy is to increase the 
competence and integrity of service providers, such proposals are not viewed with 
unanimous or unqualified enthusiasm. As Vladeck explains, in the case of nursing 
homes inflation is one fear, as professionals are trained and ethically constrained to 
assure the highest possible service quality without regard to cost.15 
Other concerns are raised by pursuing the analysis of screening and discretionary 
behavior. A policy that requires entrepreneurial personnel in a given industry to qualify 
as professionals of a particular educational discipline (for example, social work, 
education, medicine, art, or music) may affect the motivational structure of nonprofit 
sectors in a number of ways. Alternative disciplines—by reinforcing the social, 
technical, or creative character of services—were seen in chapter 7 to encourage 
different motivational traits. Furthermore, the various professions were observed to 
filter candidates on the basis of ethical values bearing on material reward and power 
seeking. Whatever the particular motivational biases introduced by a given discipline, 
the control of an industry by a certain profession—through processes of certification of 
personnel—will have two principal effects. 
In the short run, professionalization will tend to suffocate entrepreneurial activity 
by those without the relevant training, but it may also encourage product differentiation 
through ventures operating parallel to, but technically outside, the industry. Specifically, 
previously screened entrepreneurs, unqualified by new disciplinary standards but locked 
into careers by postscreening inertia, may attempt to circumvent the professionalization 
policy by redefining their activities as different industries. This situation is similar to 
that observed under nonprofitization. 
In the long run, professionalization will tend to narrow the distribution of 
entrepreneurship in the industry, by screening out those motivational types inconsistent 
with the values promoted by the professional discipline and attracting more strongly 
those with compatible interests. 
The short-run effect results from the fact that professionalization, coupled with 
rigorous standards or degree requirements for qualification in the discipline,
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will effectively exclude some entrepreneurs who are committed to a particular field, for 
example, those engaged in child care but without a master's degree in social work. Such 
individuals will seek to continue to provide similar services under alternative auspices, 
for example, through educational institutions or mental-health clinics. 
In the long run, as disciplinary control takes hold, fringe movements will tend to 
be eliminated or overwhelmed as new aspirants to the industry recognize the discipline 
as the appropriate and accepted entry mode. Aberrations may still occur, however, 
where whole disciplinary approaches come under attack and entrepreneurs from outside 
the discipline are able to attract support, for example, the entry of educational-consultant 
firms into public education during the period of experimentation with performance 
contracting,16 where there is controversy within the industry as to appropriate modes of 
training, for example the desirability of business training for leaders of museums,17 or 
where the profession itself creates a vacuum, for example, the successful entrepreneurial 
entry by non-social-work mavericks into child care, in circumstances where the 
social-work establishment has failed to mobilize appropriate services for violent 
children. 
The net social-performance effects of professionalization must be considered in 
two parts—general implications and implications peculiar to particular disciplines. 
In the short run and over time, a policy of professionalization will tend to reduce 
searchers as a source of entrepreneurial energy, because qualifications for disciplinary 
competence usually require early career decisions and enrollment in appropriate 
educational curricula. The searcher often lacks such specific training and may be 
reluctant to make such an investment at his later stage of life. In addition, a policy of 
professionalization will obviously discourage generalists—those with business, law, or 
liberal-arts educations. Generalists in a service-producing field are more likely to be 
income seekers and power seekers, because these motives reflect some of the key 
reasons that people choose to obtain such flexible, pragmatic training; therefore, a 
policy of professionalization is likely to weed out these types as well. 
Nonetheless, professionalization is also likely to have monopolistic 
effects—restricting the labor pool and lifting the income potential of those who enter the 
discipline—thus attracting (properly trained) income seekers, partially nullifying the 
generalist effect noted above. In addition, the profession itself will create a power 
structure through which power-seekers (players) can gain influence and fame (through 
participation in professional associations) within the industry and social arena as a 
whole. These latter effects, because they are spread thin over the discipline as a whole 
(that is, income benefits are not concentrated in entrepreneurial hands, and power 
opportunities in professional associations are relatively few), will tend to moderate but 
not overwhelm the former effects. Hence, mainly as a result of the loss of income 
seekers and power seekers, an industry in which a professionalization policy is 
introduced may be expected to gain somewhat in trustworthiness over
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the long run but to lose some of its ability to respond to changes in the social demand for 
services. 
Coupled with these general effects, a policy of professionalization will 
differentially alter the motivational structure in particular industries. For this discussion 
services will again be divided into three broad categories-social, technical, and creative. 
Professions in the socially oriented services stress altruism and social purpose 
and deemphasize accumulation of personal wealth and power. As a result, a policy of 
professionalization will cause the industry to differentially attract more believers and 
poets and to further underrepresent income seekers and powerseekers. 
Professionalization will thus move a socially oriented industry toward those varieties of 
entrepreneurial behavior that inspire trustworthiness but may further inhibit 
responsiveness to changes in social demands for service. 
Professions in the creative industries emphasize and reinforce originality and 
expression of ideas, technical excellence, and human values. A policy of 
professionalization in such fields will differentially encourage entrepreneurs of the poet, 
professional, and architect varieties and implicitly discourage other types. This situation 
leads to relatively neutral or weakly positive effects on trustworthiness and 
responsiveness, and a net positive effect in terms of the potential for significant 
methodological or product innovations. 
Professions in the technical service fields will reemphasize technical 
competence, intellectual honesty, and pecuniary reward as a symbol for achievement 
and advanced training. Ideological and expressionistic modes of initiative (believers, 
poets) will be discouraged in favor of intellectual and material modes (professionals and 
income seekers). In the long run, such a field may lose some of its trustworthiness but 
exhibit a stronger inclination toward technical innovation. Its responsiveness orientation 
will be bifurcated—featuring the restraint of professionals and the enthusiasm of 
income seekers. 
 
Resource Targeting. Many nonprofits operate in industries where government provides 
operating revenues and capital through grant and contracting programs, fees for 
services, or other funding arrangements. In addition, government influences the cost of 
doing business in these industries through its taxation, labor-market, and other policies. 
Frequently such government programs specifically favor organizations in the nonprofit 
sector. Indeed Hansmann observes that "Large classes of nonprofits receive special 
treatment in almost all areas in which federal legislation impinges upon them 
significantly, including corporate income taxation, Social Security, unemployment 
insurance, the minimum wage, securities, regulations, . . .  and postal rates".18 
In the health field, Clark cites biases toward nonprofits in the areas of 
unemployment compensation, taxation, tax deductibility for gifts, grants and loans
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for health-maintenance organizations, planning grants, terms of reimbursement under 
Medicare, and property taxation.19 In communications, Schutzer cites special federal 
funding for public television and radio stations.20 
In the performing arts, Netzer observes that the "dominant approach [for 
funding] in this country . . .  is to provide support to nonprofit organizations and 
individual artists through a government foundation."21 For federal museum funding, 
Meyer notes that a "museum" is defined as "a public or private nonprofit agency which 
is organized on a permanent basis for essentially educational or aesthetic purposes, and 
which, using a professional staff, owns or uses tangible objects . . .  and exhibits them to 
the public on a regular basis."22 In the child-care field, reviewed by Young and Finch, 
federal, state, and local funding for residential care may be essentially restricted to 
nonprofit providers.23 Finally, in the field of home-health care, Vladeck cites targeting 
developments promoted by those who fear a repeat of the recent experience with 
proprietary nursing homes and would prefer to see the industry develop via the growth 
of voluntary home health agencies.24 
Public funding programs that target resources specifically to nonprofits will have 
behavioral effects that differ from those of programs that inject funds on an 
industry-wide basis without regard to sector. 
A policy that provides new funds for an industry without discriminating by sector 
will have the following effects. In the short run, it may differentially stimulate 
entrepreneurship in those sectors into which certain responsive entrepreneurial types 
have previously been screened. In the long run, it may cause certain types of 
entrepreneurs to be screened into the industry and it may alter the distribution of 
entrepreneurial types among sectors of the industry. 
At any point in time, a given industry is likely to have a nonuniform distribution 
of entrepreneurial types among sectors and these entrepreneurial types are likely to be 
differentially responsive to new funding opportunities. In the short run, the introduction 
of a significant new resource program (such as vendor payments for nursing homes) 
may differentially encourage the response of particular sectors, even though the 
resource policy is nondiscriminatory. The reason for this situation derives partly from 
the fact that funding programs are likely to have strings attached that constrain the use of 
funds to particular program purposes, designs, or service patterns. As a result, 
entrepreneurs who are concept bound (as noted in chapter 8) will be more inhibited in 
their responses than those characterized as value free and not bound by a specific 
ideology or program concept. In short, the more adaptive, value-free types are likely to 
be first out of the gate. 
Income seekers, more likely to be concentrated in the proprietary sector,
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will react rapidly to expand programs in this sector. This situation has occurred in 
nursing homes and, according to Vladeck, appears to be under way in homes for adults, 
through Supplemental Security Income (SSI) financing.25 Power seekers, more likely to 
be found in the public sector, will build up programs in that sector. 
Architects are somewhat less predictable in their sector affiliations but are likely 
to be differentially concentrated in the nonprofit or proprietary domains; hence they will 
stimulate the growth of these sectors when general new funding programs are 
introduced. 
Overall, the less adaptive believers, professionals, poets, and conservers, who 
tend to concentrate in the nonprofit domain more than elsewhere, will slow that sector's 
short-run response to the introduction of a major, new, government funding program. 
Note that this effect may be partially compensated by the efforts of such entrepreneurs 
to bend funding opportunities to their own programmatic purposes, but such attempts 
may be expected to be piecemeal and hard to sustain. The handicapping effect of the 
nonadaptive entrepreneurial types is a matter of degree, however, declining in potency 
for funding programs that are more flexible in their requirements or more attuned to the 
particular ideas of one or more of these entrepreneurial types. 
In the long run, the short-run results of a nondiscriminatory but constrained 
funding program are likely to be reinforced through screening. The value-free types of 
entrepreneurs will be drawn to the industry in greater numbers than the concept-bound 
types and will be more heavily attracted to the proprietary and public sectors of that 
industry. Thus the new funding program will attract income seekers, who sense 
opportunities to increase their wealth; power seekers and architects, who sense the 
chance to employ public funds as a resource for building organizational structures and 
power bases; and searchers, if resources are targeted to new service areas yet unmined 
by established agencies. 
Resource programs with looser strings attached may also attract other 
entrepreneurial characters: independents, if regulatory control and accountability for 
funding is light-handed and does not intrude on executive decision-making autonomy; 
professionals, if funded services can be defined in terms consistent with current 
disciplinary interests; and believers, poets, and conservers, if funding is flexible enough 
to encompass their individualistic entrepreneurial interests or if there is a fortunate 
confluence of entrepreneurial and funding-program objectives. 
Overall, however, a resource-targeting policy that is nondiscriminatory by sector 
but retains effective programmatic guidelines on use of funds will lead in the long run to 
an industry that is more responsive but less trustworthy and that exhibits a relative loss 
of vigor of the nonprofit sector. 
Resource-targeting programs that differentially favor the nonprofit sector
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may be intended, in part, to compensate for the presumed response handicaps as well as 
to capitalize on the presumed trustworthiness of that sector. Such a policy may be 
expected to have substantially different implications than those of a nondiscriminatory 
policy. A policy that specifically targets resources to the nonprofit part of an industry 
will in the short run, stimulate venture activity by those entrepreneurial types already 
screened into the nonprofit sector of the industry. In the long run, such a policy will 
make the nonprofit sector more heterogeneous in its motivational content by attracting 
various types of entrepreneurs from other sectors and industries. 
The short-run effect follows from the view that, within whatever inhibitions are 
posed by funding constraints (concept-bound) entrepreneurs in the nonprofit sector will 
nonetheless respond in some measure to opportunities for venture created by the 
injection of new resource programs, however much they may have to wrestle to bend the 
programs to their own designs. Moreover, some value-free entrepreneurial types may 
have been previously screened into the nonprofit sector as well. Those types will tend to 
be more vigorous in their response than their concept-bound colleagues, thus skewing 
the nonprofit sector in the short run toward a more responsive but less trustworthy 
orientation. 
In the long run, funding programs targeted specifically to nonprofits will attract 
certain types of entrepreneurs to the industry as a whole, and from other sectors to the 
nonprofit sector in particular. As a consequence, the nonprofit sector will become more 
heterogeneous in its mix of entrepreneurial motivations. More specifically, such a 
policy will, like nonprofitization, induce a shift of income seekers and, perhaps, 
independents from the proprietary sector and a shift of power seekers from the public 
sector to the nonprofit sector of the industry. Unlike nonprofitization, however, a policy 
that targets resources to the nonprofit sector will encourage rather than discourage an 
influx of such types from outside the industry as well. Thus the nonprofit sector will 
become more heterogeneous, more responsive, and less trustworthy than it would be 
without such a policy, as will the industry as a whole. 
The intent of public funding policies is usually to increase and upgrade the kinds 
of services produced by a given industry. This analysis implies that injection of 
resources is likely to stimulate activity by those entrepreneurial types who will tend to 
make industries more responsive to government-articulated societal needs but less 
reliable or trustworthy in delivering the services associated with addressing those needs. 
An across-the-board funding program would appear to maintain the nonprofit sector in a 
relatively more trustworthy state, but to erode the vigor of that sector relative to others. 
Alternatively, a policy of targeting resources specifically to nonprofits would tend to 
make that sector more of a cosmos of all entrepreneurial types—yielding a more
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heterogeneous, less trustworthy, more responsive sector and a more heterogeneous, 
responsive, and less trustworthy industry as well. 
 
 
Policing of Nonprofit Constraints 
 
Earlier discussion has shown that (a) entrepreneurs screened into a nonprofit sector may 
be inclined to engage in various forms of discretionary behavior according to their 
particular objectives; and (b) the structure of the nonprofit sector itself tends to allow for 
such discretion. The diffuse nature of performance criteria, the diversity and 
fragmentation of constituent groups, and the separation of resource allocation from 
resource accumulation in the nonprofit arena were seen to be responsible for this margin 
of indulgence. The degree of entrepreneurial discretion is not some fixed, immutable 
factor, however. One option for the government is to devote increased resources to the 
policing of regulatory constraints on nonprofits, with the objective of limiting certain 
forms of discretionary action. 
Across industries, the regulatory instruments available to government are 
numerous and varied, some applying to all organizations within a particular service area 
and others peculiarly applicable to nonprofits. This section is concerned with the latter. 
It will focus on three generic types of institutional constraints that specifically apply to 
nonprofits and that reflect the intended and presumed nature of the nonprofit form, 
namely, its deemphasis of financial gain, its dedication to public purposes, and its 
voluntary, cooperative modes of participation and decision making. These three sets of 
constraints are: (1) fiscal requirements, that is, the nondistribution constraint and rules 
for tax exemption; (2) requirements for shared decision making between agency 
executives and boards of directors or trustees; and (3) networking mandates that 
emphasize public accountability and cooperative programming among nonprofit 
organizations in a given community or industry. 
The effect of enforcement of such requirements on discretionary behavior is 
considered below. Subsequently, the complementarities that may exist between the 
implementation of particular public policies—nonprofitization, professionalization, 
entry control, and resource targeting—and the intensity of policing these nonprofit 
constraints are considered. The intent here is to see whether coupling these policies with 
policing can eliminate some of the negative performance implications and retain the 
benefits of these policies. 
Each of the entrepreneurial characters, if unrestrained, will indulge in 
discretionary excesses of various kinds, including autonomy seeking by independents 
and controllers, excessive expansion by architects, and pursuit of independent goals by 
believers, poets, and professionals. Income seekers will look for ways to siphon
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agency resources for personal use, and players will use agency resources to promote 
personal visibility or status or to build empires through excessive expansion. The most 
worrisome form of discretion is the self-aggrandizement of income seekers and players 
that leads most ostensibly to the losses of trustworthiness associated with implementa-
tion of the public policies—nonprofitization, resource targeting, and entry control, in 
particular—considered above. 
Policing of the nonprofit constraints may be seen to potentially impinge on these 
particular discretionary-behavior modes in various ways. 
Enforcement of the nondistribution constraint and tax-exemption rules makes 
self-aggrandizement more difficult to indulge. For example, within limits, stiffer and 
more frequent auditing will inhibit the siphoning of resources through obviously 
inflated salaries, improper arrangements for purchasing input resources, or other fiscal 
irregularities. Such auditing will also tend to raise questions about legal but questionable 
practices such as over-intensive staffing, extensive travel, or other unusual 
concentrations of resources that might reflect personal more than programmatic goals. 
According to Smith, enforcement of tax-exempt status has the potential for special 
cogency. 
the tax exempt status of the nonprofit corporation is hardly an automatic and 
irrevocable right enjoyed by any group wishing to proclaim itself a "nonprofit" 
organization. Tax-exempt status can be lost if an organization fails to observe 
defining conditions laid down by law, administrative action, and court decision. 
The withholding or withdrawal of tax-exempt status gives the federal government a 
powerful tool to regulate the activities of nonprofit corporations.26 
In sum, enforcement of the fiscal constraints on nonprofits may help ameliorate 
discretionary self-enrichment within the nonprofit sector or the use of resources to 
promote personal visibility or status. 
Encouraging shared decision making between agency executives and boards of 
directors is a policing option in industries in which nonprofit agencies that are recipients 
of government funds must receive charter or licensing approval or are otherwise subject 
to governmental control. In practice, formal regulations that require boards of directors 
or trustees to assume an independent and strong role in corporate decision making are 
taken with varying degrees of seriousness and interpreted in different ways by 
government regulatory bodies. In some cases, government may insist that boards be 
representative of various public constituencies, that no obvious family or business 
relationships exist between executives and trustees, and that board members maintain a 
significant role in shaping service policies as well as financial decisions. In other cases, 
boards are allowed to be subservient to executive wishes or confined to pro forma 
matters of ratifying budgets and personnel appointments. 
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A conscientious policy of enforcing the independent strength of boards of 
directors could effectively influence discretionary entrepreneurial behavior. As 
fiduciary agents, more effective boards could thwart self-aggrandizement; as agents 
with whom executives must share power, more effective boards would reduce the ability 
of the executives and program managers to avoid accountability in the use of resources; 
as independent sources of judgment, boards could put the brakes on overbuilding, 
assuming that their members' own objectives did not also run in this direction. (Board 
members of nonprofit agencies are often accused of memorializing themselves through 
agency projects, especially buildings and other physical facilities). 
It is worth a slight digression to recall that presidents or other active board 
members are sometimes themselves involved in entrepreneurial roles, usually in concert 
with executives. In such cases, remaining board members would need to independently 
exert their influence to preserve the accountability property of shared decision making 
in the nonprofit agency. 
Realistically, however, a governmental policy to enforce shared decision making 
can only hope to be moderately successful for two principal reasons. (1) No matter how 
heavily the policy is pushed, government normally cannot actually control the selection 
of board members, but can only help shape the criteria and procedures within which the 
entrepreneur-executive and current board members make their choices. (For some types 
of nonprofits, government officials serve directly as trustees. These nonprofits might be 
classified as public or semi-public rather than private nonprofit agencies.) (2) Board 
members themselves tend to be part-time and also preselected for their commitment to 
the style and purposes of the agency and its leadership. People are reluctant to join 
boards of agencies with which they are, in principle, at odds. As a result, and with some 
exceptions, boards will tend not to effectively restrain entrepreneurial indiscretions in 
the area of program planning. However, they will usually want to be part of the 
decision-making process, to ensure fiscal integrity, and to control aggrandizement 
within the time and resources that they have available. Even here, however, the 
prospects are mixed. As Cornuelle says: 
boards of trustees or directors . . . presumably are ultimately responsible for the 
institutions they govern, for the integrity of the operation. They are stewards of the 
money and sweat that individual citizens put into the colleges, churches, and 
welfare agencies they choose to help. These trustees are supposed to set policy and 
police the managers. Management, presumably, either works well or gets fired. . . . 
[But] the idea that laymen really control independent organizations has too often 
turned into a myth. Boards usually just raise money and vote "Yes" on whatever the 
professional managers want to do.27 
Enforcing mandates for cooperative activity among nonprofit service providers is a 
governmental option in industries such as health care or social services that feature 
government-sponsored planning agencies whose goals include the more efficient
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use of community resources and more equitable distribution of services. A pioneering 
example is the Hill-Burton program in health care. As described by Dunlop: 
the biggest contribution of the Hill-Burton program was the administrative idea it 
introduced of a broad organizational [systems] perspective specified by the rational 
organization of health care institutions—for example, nursing homes in relation to 
hospitals—on a community-wide basis. This was the planning idea and the 
beginning of comprehensive health planning and regulation of provider entry.28 
Planning agencies can encourage interagency cooperation through various 
potential means, including sponsorship of planning meetings and discussions, 
preparation of planning documents and master plans, requirements for reporting 
operational activities and for cross-referring clients, control over the entry of new 
programs through the application of need and necessity criteria, and funding of joint 
projects that feature the cooperation of multiple participating organizations. In effect, 
the enforcement of community-wide mechanisms of interagency coordination subjects 
individual entrepreneurial discretion to the rigors of comprehensive planning and peer 
pressure in areas in which competitive market or other external forces tend to be weak in 
restraining such discretion. Therefore, the vigorous pursuit of interagency cooperation 
and system planning can conceivably inhibit discretionary nonprofit entrepreneuring 
behavior. In particular, expansionary tendencies by player-type entrepreneurs in given 
agencies would presumably be restrained by reference to global planning requirements 
and peer review. 
 
 
Policy and Policing 
 
Increasing the intensity with which the nonprofit constraints are policed is not of as 
much interest in isolation as it is in conjunction with the formulation of other public 
policies, specifically those considered earlier in this chapter. In particular, it is worth 
asking whether some of the adverse effects (losses in trustworthiness) induced by such 
policies might be mitigated through an intensified policing effort, so that combinations 
of policy and policing achieve more effective social performance than is achieved by 
either alone. The answer to this question is a qualified yes in those circumstances where 
the policy option creates unique opportunities within the nonprofit sector of an industry. 
In such cases the policing mechanism may be useful as a complement to suppress 
dysfunctional behavior without simply shifting activity to other sectors or otherwise 
seriously suppressing the desired performance benefits. This principle can be applied to 
the four policy prescriptions as follows. 
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1. Nonprofitization creates unique opportunities in the nonprofit sector simply by 
ruling out industrial activity elsewhere. In the short run, enforcement of the nonprofit 
constraints could help suppress the discretionary leanings of income seekers and power 
seekers brought into the nonprofit sector by nonprofitization. In the long run, however, 
such policing might induce future such entrepreneurs to screen themselves into other 
industries because of the reduced discretionary opportunities. This latter effect may be 
minimal in view of other, more fundamental industry attributes that influence the 
industry-level screening process. Thus only minor losses of income seekers or power 
seekers to the industry may be expected from policing, either in the short run or the long 
run, although the discretionary excesses of these entrepreneurs maybe curbed. 
The remaining question is whether policing will significantly reduce the vigor 
with which income seekers and power seekers undertake venture activity. If it does, the 
industry's responsiveness would be inhibited. Because nonprofitization does not 
immediately alter the industry's resource base or opportunities for advancement or 
necessarily change these radically over the long term, income seekers and power seekers 
may be expected to continue to be active, perhaps working harder to find legitimate 
income and power-based rewards. In this case, increased policing may serve as a useful 
complement to a nonprofitization policy, helping control the excesses in discretionary 
behavior that such a policy would induce, without crippling side effects. 
2. Resource targeting specific to nonprofits creates unique opportunities in that 
sector in a manner similar to the nonprofitization policy. Specifically, if entrepreneurs 
wish to exploit the targeted resources, they must operate in the nonprofit context. Thus 
increased policing of the nonprofit constraints can serve as a complement here as well, 
helping ameliorate the losses of trustworthiness in the industry and nonprofit sector 
induced by resource-targeting policy. Because the latter policy increases the net re-
sources available to the nonprofit sector and its respective industry, long-term screening 
losses of income seekers and power seekers or a significant reduction in the energy with 
which these types of entrepreneurs pursue their ventures seem even a less likely side 
effect of policing here than under nonprofitization. 
3. Entry control applied differentially to the nonprofit sector creates some new 
opportunities in that sector (for example, for power seekers) while it reduces other 
opportunities (for example, for independents). Concurrent policing of the nonprofit 
constraints may therefore aid in controlling the discretionary activity of power 
seekers—both those activated in the short run within the nonprofit sector and those 
attracted to it in the long run—thus helping ameliorate the losses of trustworthiness that 
accompany entry control. However, as indicated by the analysis earlier, the activation 
and screening effects relative to power seekers are likely to be weak and
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hence easily deterred or reversed by policing initiatives. Thus any gains in 
trustworthiness achieved by coupling policing with entry control are likely to be 
matched by losses in responsiveness of the nonprofit sector. 
4. Professionalization is a non-sector-specific policy that in itself creates no 
opportunities unique to the nonprofit sector, although some of the entrepreneurs drawn 
to the industry in the long run, as a result of this policy—believers and poets in the social 
industries, poets, professionals, and perhaps architects in the creative industries, and 
professionals in the technical-service fields—may prefer to locate in the nonprofit 
sector. In none of these cases, however, does the loss of trustworthiness pose a serious 
threat. Hence complementary policing of nonprofit agencies offers no special benefits 
toward increasing an industry's trustworthiness, but it might inhibit the responsiveness 
of nonprofits by interfering with initiatives of its entrepreneurs. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has analyzed some of the public policy implications of the theory 
developed in previous chapters. The first step was to consider what the performance 
characteristics of nonprofit sectors would be, if dominated in turn by each of the 
entrepreneurial stereotypes. Subsequently, the performance implications of various 
public policies were derived by determining how each policy would affect the screening 
and control of these various entrepreneurs within a nonprofit sector and industry. 
Four social-performance criteria were established for service-producing 
sectors—trustworthiness, efficiency, responsiveness, and innovation. The analysis of 
entrepreneurial motivations indicated probable trade-offs between trustworthy and 
responsive patterns of sector behavior, whatever policy options were adopted. 
Four policy alternatives, or proposals, often encountered in debates over 
nonprofit utilization and governance were analyzed—nonprofitization, resource 
targeting, entry control, and professionalization. All were seen to induce both short-run 
and long-run behavioral effects. In addition, several of these policies were seen to vary 
in their ultimate performance implications when coupled with increased public 
enforcement of the fiscal and organizational constraints that apply to nonprofit agencies. 
Perhaps most significantly, these public policies were seen to induce some 
potential performance effects contrary to the presumed expectations of policy designers. 
In particular, increasing the nonprofit character of an industry, for example through 
nonprofitization or by targeting external resources specifically to that sector, was seen to 
be less productive than expected because it threatens the integrity (trustworthiness) of  
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the nonprofit sector itself and, in the case of resource targeting, the character of the 
industry as a whole. This conclusion derives largely from consideration of the screening 
phenomenon, which implies that in the long run policy changes tend to rechannel 
existing motivations rather than to eliminate those motives. 
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11  Summary and Perspective 
 
The most meaningful test of a descriptive social theory is not so much whether it is 
correct in all its details, but whether it stimulates people to think in some new and 
productive terms. These pages have put forth a theory that involves a series of 
descriptive details—most notably the specific motivations that characterize 
entrepreneurial behavior and the structural factors that influence the channeling and 
control of these motivations within different sectors of the economy. These descriptions 
are based on the author's empirical work and reading of the literature. Other observers 
may differ with the particulars presented here. Certainly the subject is open for further 
empirical study aimed at verifying and clarifying the nature of the parameters on which 
this analysis is based, but such refinement is secondary to the matter of attending to the 
essential ideas developed here. These ideas have implications for the way in which 
social scientists, particularly economists, model and analyze the behavior of nonprofit 
organizations as well as for the manner in which analysts and decision makers formulate 
and anticipate the consequences of policies designed to improve the performance or 
enlarge the role of nonprofits in the delivery of public services. For the social scientist, 
the principal lesson here is that the inherent diversity of participation in nonprofit 
organizations preordains failure in the search for any single, satisfactory, homogeneous 
model of a generic corporate nonprofit firm. Industry-wide perspectives that transcend 
sector boundaries are needed. For the policymaker, the essential point is that nonprofits 
cannot be properly viewed in isolation. Thus problems solved by ministering to 
nonprofits alone or by attempting to exploit the presumed purity of the nonprofit 
structure will tend only to change the shape or form of the problems rather than to make 
them disappear. 
The central concept from which these lessons emanate is the mechanism of 
screening applied to entrepreneurial motivation, that is, the self-selection of 
entrepreneurial characters into industries and sectors that best suit their individual 
motives and styles. From this key notion, the following essential ideas have emerged: 
 
1. The nonprofit sector is inherently flexible and diverse, capable of entertaining 
a wide variety of entrepreneurial motivations and giving such motivations substantial 
discretionary movement because of the absence of any dominant market or 
political-accountability mechanism. 
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2. The behavior of a nonprofit sector cannot be represented by a single behavioral 
mode, but is best characterized as a mix of motivations, the nature of which depends on 
the relative attributes of the particular industry compared with other industries and on 
the relative structure of the nonprofit sector compared with other sectors that participate 
within the industry. 
On the basis of attributes generally descriptive of nonprofit sectors relative to 
proprietary and public sectors, it has been argued that nonprofit sectors tend to exhibit 
mixes of entrepreneurial motivation that offer assurances of trustworthy behavior but a 
slowness of response to societal demands for service. This nominal nonprofit 
motivational mix may be expected to vary widely among industries, however. 
3. Screening of entrepreneurs is necessarily coarse because of the many factors 
involved in sector choice and the inertial tendencies (resistance to further screening) of 
entrepreneurs after early career decisions have been made. As a result, there will be 
discretionary behavior within nonprofit sectors, not only by those dominant types who 
have successfully screened themselves into sectors with attributes generally consistent 
with their motives, but also by those whose motives are relatively inconsistent with the 
structures within which they operate. The latter will tend to subvert the structural 
characteristics of their sectors, for example, the income-moderating constraints of 
nonprofits or the autonomy-reducing features of sectors that restrict new entry. 
4. The particular behavior patterns and social performance of a given service 
industry and its nonprofit component may be affected in a significant way by the 
implementation of various social policy instruments that alter short-run behavior and 
long-run screening processes. These instruments include the nonprofitization of 
industries, the control of entry by new organizations, the requirement of professional 
certification of managerial and program personnel, and the targeting of public resources 
to the nonprofit parts of an industry. 
5. The expected effects of such public policies may not always match the good 
intentions of policymakers. For example, the screening and short-run behavior effects 
associated with such policies as nonprofitization and resource targeting may corrupt the 
nonprofit sector and subvert the intent of policymakers to make particular service 
industries more trustworthy. 
6. Complementarities may exist in the use of public resources to promote use of 
the nonprofit sector and to regulate that sector. For example, nonprofitization or the 
targeting of programmatic resources to nonprofit organizations might best be carried out 
in a regime of reinforced policing of the nondistribution and shared-decision-making 
mandates of organizations in that sector. 
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In short, the nonprofit sector must be viewed as an entity whose qualities can 
only be properly appreciated in the context of its economic environment. In particular, 
the performance qualities of this sector, inspired by its entrepreneurial elements, are 
seen to hinge on the screening and secondarily, on the restraint of these elements. The 
outcomes of these processes, in turn, depend on alternative opportunities outside the 
nonprofit sector as well as specific characteristics of organizations in the sector. Thus 
nonprofits must be seen as components of industrial systems, rather than as fully 
independent subsystems. 
Much of the mystery surrounding nonprofits has emanated from an apparent lack 
of consistency in behavior and purpose of these organizations, both within and across 
industries. This lack of consistency has led to difficulty in describing these 
organizations, because there is no single, coherent, objective function with which to 
characterize the nonprofit agency. This difficulty is overcome by a screening theory that 
allows the nonprofit sector to filter out or absorb different behavioral elements as the 
ground rules for it and the other sectors with which it interfaces vary. In this light, the 
nonprofit sector has a residual character and is able to accommodate a range of 
entrepreneurial motivations that may clash with the more well-defined accountability 
and survival rules of the commercial and governmental sectors of the economy. The 
nonprofit sector can thus provide an invaluable, if changeable and fragile, refuge for 
enterprise and service provision based on various forms of idealism, emotional 
attachment, and intellectual purpose not accommodated elsewhere. The chemistry 
through which such motives mix with the more conventional economic and political 
drives commonly associated with other sectors is, however, also a crucial aspect of this 
analysis. This aspect fundamentally colors how well nonprofits can be expected to 
respond to demands for, and faithfully deliver, essential public services. 
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